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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
It is of prime importance to ensure the safety of chemical process plants due to volatile nature 
of the industry and drastic consequences of the accidents. A number of parameters can affect 
the safety of the process plants. One of the main parameters that has the influence on the 
safety of operations is the Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) as suggested by 
numbers of existing studies. Therefore, in order to enhance the safety of operations it is 
required to improve the HOF. These factors can be improved by an integrated approach as 
proposed in this work, instead looking at these factors in an isolation. A number of existing 
risk assessment approaches have been analysed in this work and their compliance 
requirements to the relevant International Standards with respect to the HOF. 
A new quantitative methodology “Method for Error Deduction and Incident Analysis 
(MEDIA)” has been developed in this work. During the development of this methodology, 
practicality; consistency; integration with other risk assessment techniques and efficient use 
of information were explicitly ensured. The MEDIA can help to integrate the HOF around the 
technical aspect and can prioritize the follow up actions based on risk. The quantification of 
this methodology is based on results of the accident analysis, that has been carried out in this 
work. The accidents of 25 years (1988-2012) in the Seveso establishments and that were 
reported to the European Commission’s Major Accident Reporting System (eMARS) have 
been studied. 
The results from the accident analysis have further used in order to learn lessons and to 
propose future recommendations. These recommendations are mainly aimed at further 
integration of the HOF and to improve the overall safety of chemical process plants. More 
specifically, these recommendations are addressed to the use of organizational checklist 
during the Hazard Identification (HAZID) study; improvement of existing eMARS reporting 
structure and the legal obligation towards the EU Member States to report their accidents to 
the European Commission. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) are associated to almost 30% of the Loss of 
Containment (LOC) events during normal and maintenance operations (OGP, 2010). 
Meanwhile, (Nivolianitou et al., 2006) have concluded after performing an accident analysis 
that around 40% of all the accidents have an immediate cause related to the human factors.  
There are number of existing methods that can assess the HOF. However, a possible 
integration of HOF can help to manage the HOF in an efficient way. Among others, (Bellamy 
and Geyer, 2007) have proposed to model the human factors integrated with the technical 
aspect and to provide a risk-based human factors assessment. Furthermore, it was also 
observed that the human factor engineering and conventional risk assessment engineering 
move in parallel during the lifetime of a project and hence induce issues due to their complex 
interface and transfer of information among them. 
In order to provide a possible integration, existing risk assessment approaches that are 
commonly used in the chemical process industry have been studied. The following main risk 
assessment approaches have been reviewed in this work: 
 Hazard Identification (HAZID); 
 Hazard and Operability (HAZOP); 
 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA);  
 Safety Integrity Level (SIL) allocation / verification; 
This review step can also provide an insight into how these approaches currently consider the 
HOF. 
However, one of the main issues faced during the human factors assessment is the human 
reliability data. The data required for the human factors assessment is either incomplete or 
had been inadequately validated (Sträter, 2000). At the same time, the human reliability data 
is also influenced by number of internal and external Performing Shaping Factors (PSF). The 
influencing effect of the PSF tend to change therefore adding more complexity into the 
overall human reliability data. Apart from that, most of the human reliability methods and 
data had been developed for the nuclear industry. So, there is a need to develop or at least to 
validate the existing human reliability data and to adapt them specifically according to the 
chemical process industry (CCPS, 2000). 
 
2 
 
This work consists of following main steps: 
 Development of a structure to analyse the accidents; 
 Accidents analysis; 
 Quantification of Human and Organizational Factors (HOF); 
 Development of a new methodology (i.e. MEDIA); 
 Recommendations followed by the accident analysis. 
During this work, an accident analysis has been performed of the accidents reported to the 
European Commission’s Major Accident Reporting System (eMARS). The accident analysis 
can help to gather the empirical data, required to quantify a HOF assessment. The 
probabilistic Rasch model has been used in this work to convert the obtained data into the 
human reliability data. The human reliability data can also be used in any of the risk 
assessment methods (e.g. fault tree analysis / bow tie etc) that require the Human Error 
Probabilities (HEPs).   
A new methodology, Method for Error Deduction and Incident Analysis (MEDIA) has been 
developed based on the accident analysis. The MEDIA assessment not only provides a 
possible integration of HOF around the technical aspect but also adapt the THERP human 
reliability data according to the chemical process industry. The MEDIA assessment can 
identify the critical sections of a plant with respect to the HOF and the technical failure 
criticality. This new methodology can be carried out in MS Excel, integrated with the Hazard 
and Operability (HAZOP) and Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) studies.   
Meanwhile, a number of recommendations are also proposed in this work as a result of the 
lessons learned from the accident analysis. These recommendations can help to improve and 
to integrate the HOF aspects in chemical process plants. The main recommendations are 
related to: 
 HAZID study, to consider the organizational attributes; 
 European Commission’s Major Accident Reporting System (eMARS), to modify the 
existing report structure with respect to the HOF; 
 Reporting criteria for the EU Member States to report their accidents to the European 
Commission, to modify the existing accidents reporting criteria; 
 Preliminary risk assessment studies (e.g. HAZOP), to consider the maintenance 
activities during the risk assessment studies. 
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2 Major accidents – a way to learn lessons 
 
The past accidents can provide the information about the inadequacies that possibly led to 
those accidents. Therefore, by analysing the accidents / near-misses it is possible to improve 
the situation for the future.  
In this section, few accidents from the eMARS database are presented with a purpose to 
provide an overview of the problem and an insight about the lessons learned. 
 
Accident 1  
This accident was occurred on 10/09/2002 in a refinery, while workers were performing the 
catalyst unloading operation on a reactor at a Claus unit. The Claus process is used as a  
desulfurizing process to recover the sulfur. Therefore, workers were working in a highly toxic 
atmosphere. The workers from a hired contractor performed their actions for several hours 
with appropriate protective devices. By the end of the day, one of the workers violated the 
end of work order and entered the restricted area without any protection and supervision. He 
suddenly fell unconscious after entering into the vessel. The other two workers followed him 
in order to help him and suffered the same symptoms. All three workers were fatally injured 
as a result of this accident.        
The accident was occurred due to release of hydrogen sulphide and possibly carbon 
monoxide from catalyst enclosure and worker’s violation not to use the breathing apparatus at 
the end of the work. The reason why the workers violated the end of work order and entered 
into the vessel without protective means is still unclear. The worker’s knowledge about the 
possible toxic atmosphere in the vessel and the consequences from their violation can also be 
questioned. It is quite probable that they were not aware of possible hazardous atmosphere 
and consequences of their actions as they were hired by an outside contractor to carry out this 
task.   
Lessons learned 
From this accident it can be learned that worker’s knowledge about possible hazardous 
atmosphere and consequences of potential violations should be ensured. Moreover, whenever 
contractors are involved into the operations, it is required to further ensure the safety of 
operations and their preparedness for operations.  
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Accident 2 
This accident was occurred on 03/09/2000 in a refinery, during a periodic test phase of a 
system in a catalytic reforming section of the plant. A number of complex factors have been 
identified during this accident that had increased the gravity of this accident. The accident 
was occurred according to the following order as reported in the eMARS database: 
 Rupture of a ¾ inch tapping (connection) on the suction pipe of a pump; 
 Ignition of the cloud (as a result of about 200 Kg of released material) and creation of 
torch fire; 
 Rupture of another 3- inch pipeline which was exposed to the fire; 
 By domino effect, rupture of the collector of a cooling tower and further ignition of 
released substances; 
 By domino effect, rupture of 8-inch head pipe of a column and ignition of the release; 
 By domino effect, rupture of the column valve collector, connected to the site’s flare 
system, and ignition of the released substances; 
The ignited releases kept on burning until the material being processed in the unit was 
exhausted. The hydrogen and hydrogen sulphide were released and ignited as a result of this 
accident. After investigations, numbers of factors have been identified that had led to this 
accident. These factors mainly caused a strong vibration of the pump, leading to fatigue stress 
and consequently to the rupture of the tapping connection of the pump. Another main factor 
that has increased the gravity of this accidents was an anomalous delay (of about 10 min) in 
closing the block valve of the feeding line to the pump. The valve was controlled an 
automatic safety system and should have operated within normal time (of about one min). 
The domino effects from the initial accident could have been mitigated by in-time 
intervention of the safety system. This accident has caused minor injury to one person and a 
seven-month shutdown of the unit. The material damage amounts to about 13.72 M€ for 
repairs and 68.6 M€ for production loss. 
As a result of this accident, number of corrective actions have been proposed, some of the 
proposal are as follows: 
 Change of pipe type and modification of the column alignment; 
 Replacement of the valves on the pump feeding line in order to reduce the shutting 
time; 
 Implementation of a campaign to increase the operator’s awareness of the importance 
of strict application of the procedures. 
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Lessons learned 
From this accident it can be learned that monitoring of un-wanted vibration of units 
specifically for pumps is important. Meanwhile, proper type of units should be selected by 
the management according to any potentially critical foreseen scenarios. The reaction time of 
the automatic safety functions should be verified by considering the shutting time, mainly 
from the final element.      
Furthermore, in the accident number 2 and also in some other accidents it has been observed 
that whenever hydrocarbons release they find an un-identified source of heat and ignite. 
Therefore, considering three elements of a fire triangle it is recommended to contain 
hydrocarbons as much as possible rather than looking to isolate the hydrocarbons and the heat 
source. However, in certain cases these situations are interdependent. 
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3 An overview of existing tools/ methods 
 
There are number of already developed tools/ methods that are used to assess/ quantify the 
risk of operations coming from the hazardous activities. Similarly, a numbers of human factor 
methods provide estimate about the reliability of human/ operator actions. In order to provide 
the estimates about the human reliability/ availability it is require to rely on a human factors 
database. A human factor database should also provide the guidelines about the modifications 
of Nominal Human Error Probability (NHEP) based on certain Performance Shaping Factors 
(PSF).   
In this section an overview is provided about the relevant methods/ techniques that are used 
in the process industry to assess and to quantify the risk; widely used human factor databases 
and some of the human reliability methods.  
 
3.1 Review of most commonly used risk assessment techniques 
 
There are number of techniques, that are used in chemical process industry in order to assess 
and to manage the risk. Some of these techniques are listed in the Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Review of risk assessment/ management techniques 
 
The risk of a hazardous event is usually defined by a combination of likelihood and severity 
Method 
Qualitative/ 
Quantitative 
Relevant Standards/ Engineering 
Guidelines 
Hazard Identification (HAZID) Qualitative (ISO 17776, 2000) 
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Qualitative 
(IEC 31010, 2009), (CEI/IEC 
61882, 2001) 
Quantitative Risk Assessment 
(QRA) 
Quantitative 
(CCPS, 2000), (Purple Book, 
2005), (Green and Maloney, 1997)  
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 
assessment 
Semi-qualitative 
(IEC 61511, 2003), (IEC 61508, 
1997) 
Layer of Protection Analysis 
(LOPA)  (also called barrier 
analysis 
Quantitative 
(IEC 31010, 2009), (IEC 61511, 
2003) 
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of that event. However, this deification of risk can subject to changes depending upon the 
context in which the risk is being considered.   
 
3.1.1 Hazard Identification (HAZID) 
 
The Hazard Identification (HAZID) is a technique for the identification of all significant 
hazards associated with a particular activity under consideration (ISO 17776, 2000). 
According to the International Standard (ISO 17776, 2000), a hazard is something with a 
potential to cause harm, this may include: 
 Ill health or injury;  
 Damage to property;  
 Products; 
 Production losses or increase liabilities. 
In the risk management process, a hazard can be prevented from being released by using 
barriers or counter-measures. The barriers could be in the following forms (ISO 17776, 
2000): 
 Physical; 
 Isolations; 
 Separations; 
 Protective devices; 
 Procedures; 
 Alarm systems; 
 Training; 
 Drills. 
The International Standard also provide checklists to identify the potential hazards for 
offshore installations. These checklists can also be applied to onshore activities and can also 
be modify depending upon company’s operations. The following aspects related to hazard 
identifications and risk assessment with relevant check lists are included in the International 
Standard: 
 Seismic and topographical surveys; 
 Drilling and well completions; 
 Field development; 
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 Operations; 
 Decommissioning and disposal; 
 Logistics. 
The Table 2 shows the checklists from the International Standard that can be used for the 
hazards and risk assessment considerations with the proposed risk reduction measures. 
However, different set of checklists are proposed according to the project progress phases. 
The new HAZID checklists are proposed in this work, that are explained in detail in the 
section 5.2. 
The HAZID assessment is usually performed during early phases of a project and therefore is 
very important to identify the potential deviations and to suggest recommendations to bring 
the residual risk to an acceptable level. The output from the HAZID is also generally 
considered during the HAZOP studies for enhanced analysis. The HAZID procedures follows 
a guided brainstorming using checklists in a HAZID team led by a third party chairman.  
During the HAZID when a potential hazard is identified to be credible in a given plant’s 
situation then specific cause and consequences of that hazard are also identified. The 
adequacy of barriers (preventive or recovery) is considered in order to assign hazard a 
“likelihood level”. The following aspects are usually considered during the HAZID in order 
to assign a “severity level”: 
 Health 
 Safety 
 Environment 
 Company’s reputation 
Usually, a probability and consequence matrix is used to rank the risk associated with the 
identified hazards/ deviation based on likelihood and gravity of that scenario. This is required 
in order to make a decision on the results of risk assessment and to establish a screening 
criteria. The Figure 1 illustrates a 5×4 risk matrix, on which it can be defined if the risk is 
acceptable or not. However, risk ranking criteria can vary from one company to the other. 
If associated potential risk from inherent hazards is high or in intolerable region, then further 
recommendation should be agreed and proposed in order to achieve the residual risk within 
the tolerable region according to the pre-established criteria. 
As highlighted by the International Standard, care should be taken in order to screen out the 
low probability and high consequences events. Since, a low probability can suggest a low 
probable occurrences of the events leading to a possibility of overlooking them.  
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The matrix proposed by the International Standard as shown in the Figure 1 has suggested to 
use the following main elements in order to rank the consequences of the events: 
 People 
 Assets 
 Environment 
 Reputation 
 
Table 2: Examples of hazards identification and risk assessment considerations during the 
prospect evaluation and feasibility assessment phase of field development activities, 
Adapted from (ISO 17776, 2000), p. 35. 
Activity: Field 
development 
Description: This activity includes all tasks involved in the planning, 
design, procurement, construction, installations and commissioning of 
offshore installation used for the exploitation of oil and gas resources. 
Hazard 
identification 
and risk 
assessment step 
Examples of aspects to be considered and 
activities undertaken 
Comments 
Identify hazards 
 Consider broad hazards occurring 
throughout life cycle; 
 Identify main hazards and effects 
arising from wells, produced fluids 
and processing, structure, export 
facilities, utilities and manning 
arrangements, environment, logistic 
support arrangements etc; 
 Identify possible hazards associated 
with the construction and 
installation of the facility. 
Particular attention should 
be given to hazards that 
could arise due to the use 
new technology or the 
extension of existing 
technology outside its 
previous range. 
Hazards and 
risk assessment 
 Experience from previous or similar 
projects; 
 Codes and standards, including 
company guidelines; 
 PHA; 
 Environmental risk assessment. 
Major hazards and risks 
should be highlighted to 
allow risk management 
decision-making.  
Rough environment risk 
assessment concentrates on 
possible impact of 
development without 
consideration of frequency 
of occurrence. 
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Screening 
criteria  
 Company maximum tolerable risk 
levels for personnel, environment 
and assets; 
 National and international 
regulations for health, safety and 
environment; 
 Special local constraints due to 
factors such as sensitivity of 
ecology, seismic activity. 
 
At this stage the screening 
criteria is relatively broad.  
Risk-reducing 
measures 
 Inherently safety options to be 
selected whenever practicable; 
 Need for and extent of offshore 
processing; 
 Minimize hazardous inventory on 
the installation;  
 Minimize offshore manning without 
jeopardizing HSE considerations or 
production regularity; 
 Consider phased field development 
or long-term well testing to obtain 
better appreciation of risks; 
 Consider new technology where 
clear benefits are apparent; 
Give adequate considerations to 
minimize offshore inspection and 
maintenance tasks and evaluate 
alternative maintenance 
philosophies. 
 
Functional 
requirements 
 High-level criteria regarding overall 
performance of installation; 
 High-level functional requirements 
for health, safety and environment 
protection systems to be established   
 
 
 
 
The risk in the ALARP region is acceptable if cost of further treatment is grossly 
disproportionate to the benefits gained (IEC 31010, 2009). In other words, the risk in ALARP 
region is acceptable if it is not feasible to bring down the risk economically or operationally. 
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Figure 1: Example of a risk matrix and consequences that may be considered, adapted 
from Standard (ISO 17776, 2000) 
 
However, there are number of techniques that can be taken as hazard identification and these 
techniques are used in different stages of a project development as listed in the (Mannan, 
2012) “Lees” p. 209”. Although, techniques quoted for one stage may also be applicable for 
another stage.  
 
3.1.2 Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) 
 
The hazard and operability (HAZOP) study is a structured and systematic analysis of a 
defined system with an objective to identify the potential hazards and operability problems 
(CEI/IEC 61882, 2001). In chemical process industry, among other relevant documents the 
Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) are used to review a proposed design. This 
methodology relies on “guidewords” in contrary to checklists as in a HAZID study. The 
relevant guidewords are selected against each of the parameters and applied to all nodes in a 
plant.  
In order to ease the guided brainstorming and to understand the complex continuous 
operations. A plant is usually divided into “nodes” depending upon the characteristics of 
materials and also the nature of operations. A "node" is a system, sub-system or portion of a 
system which can be analysed by itself, together with the relevant connections to the 
interfaces.  
The HAZOP study is performed by a multidisciplinary team led by a third party HAZOP 
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chairman to ensure the impartiality of HAZOP study. The Table 3 illustrates the basic 
guidewords with their generic meaning that can be used during a HAZOP study. 
 
Table 3: Basic guidewords and their generic meaning, 
adapted from (CEI/IEC 61882, 2001) 
Guidewords Meaning 
No or not Complete negation of the design intent 
More Quantitative increase 
Less Quantitative decrease 
As well as Qualitative modification/increase 
Part of Qualitative modification/decrease 
Reverse Logical opposite of the design intent 
Other than Complete substitution 
Guidewords relating to clock time and sequence 
Early Relative to the clock time 
Late Relative to the clock time 
Before Relating to order or sequence 
After Relating to order or sequence 
 
The Table 4 illustrates the typically used guidewords and deviations against different 
parameters during a HAZOP study. Each relevant deviation and hazards should be analysed 
identifying the primary potential causes (e.g. malfunction of a process control system, 
blockages, operational error, faulty maintenance activities, failure of power supply, cooling 
water, instrument air or other utilities, etc). 
For each realistic cause that are identified, the consequences associated to the deviation are 
analysed without considering the existing safeguards, assessing whether identified causes can 
lead to a hazard (where the term "hazard" is intended from a safety or operational point of 
view: such as fire, explosion, release of flammable or toxic material, off-spec. products, loss 
of production, etc). Then the team considers what mitigating features actually exist (e.g. relief 
valves, shutdown systems, alarms, etc) and whether they could be considered sufficient or 
not, depending upon the severity of the expected outcomes.  
When existing safeguards/ controls appear to be insufficient. In this case recommendations/ 
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actions have to be proposed to control the hazard. The recommendations/ actions could be in 
the form of design modifications, extra safeguards or to review the operations procedures.  
The output from HAZOP studies can also be used in further studies (e.g. QRA) to identify the 
credible process deviation events and where possible quantify the risk for those deviations 
and rank them according to company’s risk ranking criteria.   
However, depending upon the scope of a HAZOP and team members. The operator error are 
also considered intuitively during the HAZOP study. After that, depending upon the input 
from team members, the relevant deviation scenarios can be qualitatively ranked if causes (i.e 
operator error) are believed to be credible.  
 
Table 4: Typical parameters, guidewords and deviations for continuous processes 
 
A HAZOP can also be used in conjunction with other dependability analysis methods such as 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) (CEI/IEC 
61882, 2001), p. 13. Such combinations can be used in situations when: 
 The HAZOP analysis clearly indicates that the performance of a particular item or 
Parameters Guidewords Deviations 
Flow 
No/ Less No flow/ less flow 
More High flow 
Reverse Reverse flow 
Temperature 
More High temperature 
Less Low temperature 
Pressure 
More High pressure 
Less Low pressure 
Level 
More High level 
Less/ None Low level/ no level 
State/ 
Composition 
More Additional Phase 
Less Loss of phase 
Reverse Change of state 
Other than 
Off-spec composition / contaminants / corrosive 
concentration 
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equipment is critical and needs to be examined in a considerable depth. Then the 
HAZOP can be complimented by a FMEA of that particular item/ process; 
 Having examine a single element/ deviating by the HAZOP it can be decided to assess 
the multiple deviations by FTA or to use the FTA to quantify the likelihood of a 
failure event (i.e. top event).  
Whilst, HAZOP studies can provide extremely important indication about the potential 
process deviations. However, HAZOP also have limitations to explain complex situations in 
which there could be an interaction of multiple elements/ processes (CEI/IEC 61882, 2001).  
Therefore, it is essential to use the HAZOP in conjunction with other relevant studies. There 
is also a need to include the human error explicitly and affect of the overall safety 
management system on the results of a HAZOP.  
 
3.1.3 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) 
 
A QRA is a tool for determining the risk of the use, handling, transport and storage of 
dangerous substances (Purple Book, 2005). The results from a QRA study are provided in the 
form of a safety report to demonstrate if calculated risk from an establishment is in the 
acceptable zone. The procedures to determine whether a safety report has to be made are 
provided in the “Seveso Directive” (EC, 2012)  and are also mentioned in the (Purple Book, 
2005). 
Overall, the aim of a QRA study is to quantify the overall risk related to a specific plant, 
installation or facility with respect to people, health and safety. During a QRA, major 
accidental hazards arising from loss of containment events, which could lead to possible 
flammable gas dispersion, fire and/ or ignition or toxic exposures are analysed. Normally, 
following steps are taken in a QRA study: 
 Hazard and incident identification; 
 Frequency assessment; 
 Consequence assessment; 
 Risk assessment. 
Further detail of aforementioned steps with relevant reference to be followed are provided in 
the (CCPS, 2000) and in (Purple Book, 2005). 
During hazard and incident identification, major hazards are identified mostly coming from 
the Loss of Containment (LOC) events. Since, release of hydrocarbons (e.g. toxic or 
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flammable) can easily lead to a hazardous situation. A complete set of LOC events consists of 
generic LOC, external-impact LOC, loading and unloading LOC and specific LOC (Purple 
Book, 2005). However, only those LOC should be considered which contribute to the 
individual or societal risk.  
The following three major accidental events are usually identified and analysed within a 
QRA study: 
 Process deviation Events; 
 Loss of Containment (LOC) events; 
 External events. 
The process deviation events are those events occurring as a consequences of a process 
malfunction or an operator error. For example, failure of a Pressure Safety Valve (PSV) on an 
overpressure vessel or the operator’s intervention associated with an overpressure vessel (e.g. 
responding to an alarm). The process deviation events can be identified based on the HAZOP 
report as mentioned earlier. While, LOC events consider an unexpected rupture (e.g. random 
rupture caused by corrosion, constructing errors, welding failures and blockage etc) of a 
piping/ equipment leading to release of a fluid (e.g. hydrocarbons etc). In case of particular 
facilities (e.g. offshore installation) some external events (e.g. ship interaction, dropped 
object and aircraft interaction) are also considered by adding an extra failure frequency, 
accounting for these particular interaction.     
During QRA studies, process/ facility is divided into isolatable sections will the help of 
P&IDs, preferably by locating the isolation elements (e.g. ESVs etc) as an engineering 
practice. If the identification of isolation elements is not possible, the process streams will be 
divided based on homogenous representative streams, based on operative conditions (e.g. 
pressure, temperature, flow rate) and composition.  
In order to estimate the frequency of previously identified events, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
and historical failure data are used for process deviations and random rupture events, 
respectively. The Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is used to identify the final outcome of the 
accidental scenarios (i.e. process deviation, loss of containment and external events). The 
final outcome depends upon the characteristics of the events (e.g. type of release, nature of 
substance etc) and immediate surroundings (e.g. presence of ignition source, meteorological 
conditions, congestion and confinement etc).     
The consequences of the identified scenarios are modelled using commercial tools by 
providing information about the characteristics of a release. The consequences are modelled 
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in terms of distances reached by radiations or the hazardous concentrations.    
In a QRA, risk assessment is usually performed qualitatively by using risk matrix approach as 
also shown in the Figure 1.The quantitative results can be obtained by using the estimated 
frequencies and obtained consequences, that can provide the vulnerability to the personnel 
exposed to the potential accidents based on physical accidents effects and the duration of the 
exposure. The calculation of the risk to individuals is performed on the basics of risk indices. 
The risk indices are usually single number estimates, which may be used to compare one risk 
with another or used in an absolute sense compared to a specific target, (Green and Maloney, 
1997). The following main risk indices are used in a QRA to estimate the risk: 
 Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR); 
 Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA); 
 Fatal Accident Rate (FAR); 
 Societal risk. 
 
3.1.4 Safety Integrity Level (SIL)  
 
The Safety Integrity Level (SIL) assessment defines the level of integrity required by a Safety 
Instrumented Function (SIF) to prevent/ mitigate the hazardous events. The safety integrity 
levels are the discrete levels (i.e. 1OO4) for specifying the safety integrity requirements of 
the safety instrumented functions to be allocated to the safety instrumented systems (IEC 
61511, 2003), p. 28. The Table 5 and Table 6 show the integrity levels for on-demand and 
continuous operations, respectively. The level 4 provides the highest level of safety integrity, 
while the level 1 provides the least safety integrity. 
During the SIL verification, probability that a loop fails on demand, (probability of failure on 
demand, PFD) is assessed by the application of architectural constraints as given in the 
International Standard (IEC 61511, 2003). It is necessary to check if the assigned SIL level is 
satisfied for a given loop. 
The Safety Instrumented System (SIS) is an instrumented system used to implement one or 
more safety instrumented functions. A SIS constitutes of initiators (device/ sensor or 
combination of devices/ sensors that indicates whether a process or equipment item is 
operating outside the operating range), logic solver (an element of SIS that performs the 
transformation between the input and output information) and the final element (device or 
combination of devices that manipulate a process variable). 
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Table 5: Safety integrity levels: probability of failure on demand 
Safety integrity level 
(SIL) 
Target average probability of 
failure on demand 
Target risk reduction 
4 ≥ 10ˉ5 to < 10ˉ4 >10000 to ≤ 100000 
3 ≥ 10ˉ4 to <  10ˉ3 >1000 to ≤ 10000 
2 ≥ 10ˉ3 to < 10ˉ2 >100 to ≤ 1000 
1 ≥ 10ˉ2 to < 10ˉ1 >10 to ≤ 100 
 
The Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) is a specific control/ mitigation performed by the SIS 
to achieve the specific risk reduction. It is also defined in the International Standard that 
when human action is a part of SIS, the availability and reliability of the operator actions 
must be specified and included in the SIS calculations (IEC 61511, 2003). 
 
Table 6: Safety integrity levels: frequency of dangerous failures of the SIF (continuous 
mode of operations) 
Safety integrity 
level (SIL) 
Target frequency of dangerous failures to perform the safety 
instrumented function (per hour) 
4 ≥ 10ˉ9 to < 10ˉ8 
3 ≥ 10ˉ8 to < 10ˉ7 
2 ≥ 10ˉ7 to < 10ˉ6 
1 ≥ 10ˉ6 to < 10ˉ5 
 
A detail list of activities during the SIS life cycle is presented in the Appendix I. The further 
detail about the procedure to determine the safety integrity level with guidelines can be found 
in the International Standard (IEC 61511, 2003). 
In this scope of work, SIL allocation and SIL verification are discussed among all the 
activities during the life cycle of a SIS. 
 
SIL allocation 
 
The SIL allocation procedure is composed of following main steps, however these steps can 
vary mainly depending upon company’s internal procedures and practices: 
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 Tolerable risk definition: the tolerable risk level must be defined in order to calibrate 
the allocation method by using ALARP approach; 
 SIL allocation team: SIL allocation is performed by a team in which process, 
instrumentation and HSE specialists are involved; 
 SIF identification: The SIF to be analysed are identified from C&E matrices and 
P&ID. Every SIF is characterized by a “design intent” (the hazard that the SIF has to 
prevent or mitigate), a “demand scenario” (conditions, deviations that determine the 
SIF intervention) and “consequences” (consequences of scenario arisen from the 
failure of SIF); 
 SIL classification (unrevealed failure): Failure on demand of SIF is classified. The 
main SIL allocation methods are the “risk graph” (qualitative method), LOPA (semi-
quantitative method) and “fault tree” (quantitative method); 
 Revealed failure classification: This classification is performed to evaluate the loop 
robustness against any possible spurious interventions. This classification uses the 
economic criteria in which “cost of robustness” (the cost to make the system robust 
against spurious intervention), “cost of spurious trip” (cost associated to the trip of the 
system) and the “rate” (estimated spurious intervention frequency) are compared. 
Generally, SIS loops have many final elements. In this case during the SIL allocation phase 
(independent of assessment methods) it is important to prioritize the final elements (final 
elements critical for process safety). This prioritization can be achieved by evaluating the 
consequences of failure on demand of the whole SIS loop compared to consequences of 
failure on demand of each of the final elements of SIS. 
 
SIL verification 
 
During the SIL verification, each SIS loop is analysed to ensure that the calculated SIL level 
satisfies the safety integrity level requirements assessed during the SIL classification. 
Each loop is analysed considering the system’s architecture, relevant reliability data and test 
intervals for the elements making up the safety function. On the basis of this information, the 
overall PFD (Probability of Failure on Demand) is calculated by Fault Tree Analysis, and 
compared with the target SIL specifications. The SIL verification study is performed in 
conformance with the (IEC 61511, 2003) and (IEC 61508, 1997). 
The human actions could be in the form of maintenance (i.e. proof test) of the SIS in the 
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operational phase and also sometimes operator/ human could also be a part of the SIS. In a 
SIS, operator’s interface is by which information is communicated between a human operator 
(s) and a SIS. For example, indicating lights, push-buttons, horns, alarms etc require a human 
intervention. The operator interface is sometimes referred to as the Human-Machine Interface 
(HMI), (IEC 61511, 2003). However, fault avoidance procedures can also be established in 
an organization for the maintenance of the SIS, giving the criticality of the SIS to ensure the 
safety of operations.  
The International Standard (IEC 61511, 2003) also provides the steps to be taken mostly by 
the end-users to conform SIS to the International Standards, clauses 5 through 19. While, 
clause 5 shows the management steps to be taken to ensure that functional safety objectives 
have been met. Moreover, Standard also highlight that the “persons, departments or 
organizations involved in the safety life-cycle activities shall be competent to carry out the 
activities for which they ate accountable”. The minimum criteria to assess the competency of 
a person, department, organization or other units involved in the safety life-cycle activities 
are as follows: 
 Engineering knowledge, training and experience appropriate to the process 
application; 
 Engineering knowledge, training and experience appropriate to the applicable 
technology used (e.g. electrical, electronic or programmable electronics); 
 Engineering knowledge, training and experience appropriate to the sensors and final 
elements; 
 Safety engineering knowledge (e.g. process safety analysis); 
 Knowledge of the legal and safety regulatory requirements; 
 Adequate management and leaderships skills appropriate to their role in safety-life 
cycle activities; 
 Understating of the potential consequences of an event; 
 The safety integrity level of the safety instrumented functions; 
 The novelty and complexity of the application and the technology. 
The common cause failures are also need to be considered during the SIL verification. The 
International Standard provides following list of common cause failures that should be 
considered (IEC 61511, 2003): 
 Plugging of instrumentation connections and impulse lead lines; 
 Corrosion and erosion; 
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 Hardware failure due to the environment causes; 
 Software failure; 
 Power supplies and power sources; 
 Human error. 
Therefore, human factors/ errors are one of the common cause failures that could influence 
the performance of a SIF and can lead to a hazardous situation as it has also been seen during 
the past accident analysis. Meanwhile, human capabilities and limitations should also be 
considered during the design and engineering of a SIS related to maintenance tasks 
performed by the operator. The International Standard says that “The design of all human-
machine interface shall follow good human factors practices and shall accommodate the 
likely level of training and awareness that operator should receive” (IEC 61511, 2003), p. 
45. Therefore, during the design and engineering of a SIS it should be ensured that the 
relevant training and procedures for operator are also in place. These aspects can be assessed 
during the SIL verification, however lack of existing knowledge about this field pose an 
enormous challenge to materialize these aspects practically.  
 
3.1.5 Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)  
 
During a LOPA, it is determined if there are sufficient measures to prevent or mitigate a risk. 
However, the main use of the LOPA is to provide the specification of Independent Protection 
Layers (IPLs) and SIL (SIL levels) for the Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) as described in 
the Standard (IEC 61511, 2003) and is also mentioned in the Standard (IEC 31010, 2009). 
The LOPA can also be used to allocate risk reduction resources effectively by analyzing the 
risk reduction provided by the IPLs (IEC 31010, 2009). Therefore, a LOPA can help to 
identify the most critical layers to spend further resources and time. The Figure 2 depicts 
typical layers that are used in the process industry to reduce the risk.  
The different types and number of layer can be applied against different scenarios depending 
upon the likelihood of an events and severity of relevant consequences. However, more 
layers can possibility add more complexity into the operations and difficult to maintain them 
during the operational stage of a project. Therefore, use of layers should carefully be selected 
against only credible scenarios. 
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Figure 2. Risk reduction method, adapted from (IEC 61511, 
2003), p. 10. 
 
As mentioned in the International Standard (IEC 61511, 2003), p. 47, that information 
required for a LOPA is usually collected and developed during a HAZOP study. Therefore, 
LOPA can easily be applied followed by a HAZOP study as a correspondence can be seen in 
the Table 7.  
 
Table 7: HAZOP data for LOPA, adapted from (IEC 61511, 
2003), p. 47 
LOPA required information HAZOP developed information 
Impact event Consequences 
Severity level Consequences severity 
Initiating cause Cause 
Initiating likelihood Cause frequency 
Protection layers Existing safeguards 
Required additional mitigation Recommended new safeguards 
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While, during a LOPA credits based on PFDavg can be claimed for different layers. Therefore, 
a LOPA can provide an estimate if the existing layers are enough and also the integrity of 
SIF, if any. 
 
Table 8: Typical protection layers PFDs, adapted from (IEC 61511, 2003), p. 49 
Protection layer PFDavg 
Control loop 1,00×10-1 
Human performance (trained, no stress) 1,00×10-2 to 1,00×10-4 
Human performance (under stress) 5,00×10-1 to 1,00×100 
Operator response to alarms 1,00×10-1 
Vessel pressure rating above maximum  
challenge from internal and external pressure 
sources 
1,00×10-4 or better, if vessel 
integrity is maintained 
 
In order to claim the credits from the human/ operator layer, it is also important to consider 
the PSF that can affect the reliability of the human/ operator. The Human Error Probability 
(HEP) (in this case PFD) and effect of PSF to modify the HEPs have been obtained in this 
work and are highlighted in the section 6.  
It has identified that LOPA have certain advantages as compared to the conventional QRA 
mainly because LOPA can consider wider range of issues as followed (Gowland, 2006): 
Initiating events such as: 
 Human error; 
 Procedural failures; 
and barrier performance such as  
 Operator response; 
 Management systems; 
Therefore, a concept similar to LOPA can provide an easy estimate about the severity of an 
event and distribution of safety layers according to the severity. Hence, LOPA can be 
beneficial to distribute the available resources (i.e. safety layers) according to the failure 
criticality. 
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3.2 Review of existing human and organizational factors databases/ methods 
 
It has been reported by (Alvarenga et al., 2014), that Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) in 
general lacks a human reliability database. The similar aspects are also highlighted by the  
(Sträter and Bubb, 1999). While, (Mannan, 2012) has pointed out that large number of human 
error data points are collected from the nuclear industry. Since, scope of this work is the 
chemical process industry, therefore it is important to analyse the human factors database and 
subsequently human reliability methods specifically for the chemical process industry. 
A number of human reliability databases are already available which can provide numerical 
estimates of Human Error Probabilities (HEP) and associated Performance Shaping Factors 
(PSF). Furthermore, some of these databases are also complemented with an associated 
methodology to perform the human factor assessment. Meanwhile, there are number of 
Human Factor (HF) methods that are qualitative, therefore these methods not require any 
database. The Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) involves the use of qualitative and 
quantitative methods to assess the human contribution to the risk, (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). 
In a report by HSE (Health and Safety Executive), a review of 72 potential HRA methods can 
be found, out of which 17 methods have been identified that are potentially useful for major 
hazards directorates (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). These methods are also listed in the Table 9. 
The further detail about the safety methods, databases or models can be found in (Everdij and 
Blom, 2013). The (Bell and Holroyd, 2009) have highlighted, that 2nd generation methods are 
generally considered to be under development but they can provide some further insight into 
human reliability issues and challenges.  
However, the Table 10 lists the selected human reliability methods which will be discuss in 
detail in this scope of work. Some of the concepts from these methods that can be applicable 
are used during the development of new methodology (i.e. MEDIA) in this work. These 
human reliability methods have been selected after concluding a preliminary literature review 
and based on amount of information required to quantify the human factors assessment. It can 
be seen from the Table 10 that majority of methods developed in chemical process industry 
are qualitative compare to the nuclear industry. The qualitative methods can lessen the 
required information for assessment compare to quantitative methods but at the same time 
qualitative methods have the tendency to add more uncertainty due to subjective 
interpretation of assessment and results.   
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Table 9: List of HRA tools, adapted from (Bell and Holroyd, 2009), p. 6. 
P
u
b
li
cl
y
 a
v
ai
la
b
le
 
 
Tool Domain 
1
st
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 
Techniques for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) 
Nuclear with wider 
application 
Accident Initiation and Progression Analysis (ASEP) Nuclear 
Human Error Assessment and Reduction Techniques 
(HEART) 
Generic 
Simplified Plant Analysis Risk Human Reliability 
Assessment (SPAR-H) 
Nuclear with wider 
application 
2
n
d
 g
en
. A Technique for Human Error Analysis (ATHEANA) 
Nuclear with wider 
application 
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method 
(CREAM) 
Nuclear with wider 
application 
E
x
p
er
t 
ju
d
g
m
en
t Absolute Probability Judgment (APJ) Generic 
Paired Comparison (PC) Generic 
Success likelihood index methodology, multi-attribute 
utility decomposition (SLIM-MAUD) 
Nuclear with wider 
application 
N
o
t 
P
u
b
li
cl
y
 a
v
ai
la
b
le
 
1
st
  
g
en
. 
Human Reliability Management System (HRMS) Nuclear 
Justified Human Error Data Information (JHEDI) Nuclear 
INTENT Nuclear 
2
n
d
 g
en
. 
Connectionism Assessment of Human Reliability 
(CAHR) 
Generic 
Commission Errors Search and Assessment (CESA) Nuclear 
Conclusion from occurrences by descriptions of 
actions (CODA) 
Nuclear 
Method d’Evaluation de la Realisation des Missions 
Operateur pour la Surete (MERMOS) 
Nuclear 
3
rd
 g
en
. 
Nuclear Actions Reliability Assessment (NARA) Nuclear 
 
Since, it was observed that establishments generally lack the information that is required to 
perform in-detail human factors analysis especially when a project is in the design phase. 
Therefore, emphasis is given to those methods that have a potential to generate human factors 
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estimates balancing against the required information for the assessment. However, whenever 
enough information and resources are available it is recommended to carry out in-detail 
human factors assessment including cognitive, PSFs and HMI aspects etc.  
 
Table 10: Review of the human factors database/methods 
Methods Domain 
Qualitative/ 
Quantitative 
References 
Tecnica Emiprica Stima 
Errori Operatori (TESEO) 
Chemical Quantitative (Bello and Colombari, 1980) 
Predictive Human Error 
Analysis (PHEA) 
Chemical Qualitative 
(Embrey, 1992) cited in 
(Baber and Stanton, 1996) 
System for Predictive 
Error Analysis and 
Reduction (SPEAR) 
Chemical Qualitative 
(CCPS, 1994) cited in 
(Mannan, 2012) and (Stanton 
et al., 2005) 
Techniques for Human 
Error Rate Prediction 
(THERP) 
Nuclear Quantitative (Swain and Guttmann, 1983) 
Human Error Analysis and 
Reduction Technique 
(HEART) 
Nuclear Quantitative (Williams, 1986) 
Standardized Plant 
Analysis Risk-Human 
Reliability Analysis 
(SPAR-H) 
Nuclear Quantitative (Gertman et al., 2005) 
Cognitive Reliability and 
Error Analysis Method 
(CREAM) 
Nuclear Quantitative (Hollnagel, 1993) 
Connectionism 
Assessment of Human 
Reliability (CAHR) 
Nuclear Quantitative (Sträter, 2000) 
 
3.2.1 Tecnica Emiprica Stima Errori Operatori (TESEO) 
 
The Tecnica Emiprica Stima Errori Operatori (TESEO) was developed mainly for the control 
room operator to quantify the reliability based on five parameters. This model describes a 
plant control-room operator’s failure probability as a multiplicative function of following 
parameters, (Bello and Colombari, 1980): 
26 
 
 The type of activity to be carried out (K1); 
 The time available to carry out this activity (K2); 
 The human operator’s characteristics (K3); 
 The operator emotional state (K4); 
 The environmental ergonomics characteristic (K5); 
 The Table 11 shows the proposed HEPs for control room operator in this method for each of 
the five aforementioned parameters. However, full scale validation of this data has not yet 
obtained but some modest estimation have been made as mentioned by (Bello and Colombari, 
1980). Furthermore, this work also highlighted the possible approached to quantify the 
unreliability of an operator as follows: 
 Data from experience of operations in real plants (field data); 
 Data from plant simulators; 
 Data from laboratory studies; 
 Data collected by interviewing “experts”. 
The (Bello and Colombari, 1980) have argued that field data can provide the more reliable 
estimates compare to rest of the alternatives. However, there are numbers of challenges that 
have to be faced to collect data from operational experience. In the scope of present work, 
data has been collected from past accidents (i.e. closet to the field data) in order to provide 
estimates for the human reliability.  
 
Table 11: Failure probability of control room operator, adapted from (Bello and Colombari, 
1980). 
Activity’s topologic factors Temporary stress factor for routine activities 
Type of activity K1 Time available K2 
Simple, routine 0,001 2 10 
Requiring attention, routine 0,01 10 1 
Not routine 0,1 20 0,5 
Operator’s typological factors  
Operator’s topologic factor K3 State of anxiety K4 
Carefully selected, expert, 
well trained 
0,5 Situation of grave emergency 3 
Average knowledge and 1 Situation of potential 2 
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training emergency 
Little knowledge, poorly 
trained 
3 Normal situation 1 
Environmental, ergonomics factors 
Ergonomics factors K5 
Excellent microclimate, 
excellent interface with plant 
0,7 
Good  microclimate, good 
interface with the plant 
1 
 
Discrete microclimate, 
discrete interface with plant 
3 
Discrete microclimate, poor 
interface with plant 
7 
Worst microclimate, poor 
interface with plant 
10 
 
In the TESEO method the Human Unreliability (HU) or probability of an error is estimated 
by using equation the Eq. 1. 
 
 
Whenever, the product gives a value above unity, it is assumed that HU = 1 i.e. the operator’s 
probability of carrying out the activity successfully are considered to be nil. 
However, theoretical background of this method has been questioned and not considered to 
be accurate by some reviewers as mentioned in the (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). 
 
3.2.2 Predictive Human Error Analysis (PHEA) 
 
The Predictive Human Error Analysis (PHEA) method adapted the error classification against 
the behavioural taxonomy. According to (Embrey, 1992), the PHEA is a method by which 
specific errors associated with tasks are identified. In this method a checklist provides the  
information about the error classification as also shown in the Table 12. The validation of this 
error classification has been performed by Murgatroyd and Tait (1987), who have found that 
 HU = K1 · K2 · K3 · K4 · K5 Eq. 1 
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PHEA error classification related to the equipment calibration tasks account for about 98% of 
accidents  over a 5-years period and is reported in the (Mannan, 2012). 
 
Table 12: PHEA error classification, adapted from (Embrey, 1992) 
Planning Errors: 
P1: Incorrect plan executed 
P2: Correct but incomplete plan executed 
P3: Correct plan executed too soon / too late 
P4: Correct plan executed in wrong order 
Operation Errors: 
O1: Operation too long/ short 
O2: Operation mistimed 
O3: Operation in wrong direction 
O4: Operation too li ttle/ too much 
O5: Misalign 
O6: Right operation on wrong object 
O7: Wrong operation on right object 
O8: Operation mistimed 
O9: Operaion incomplete 
Checking Errors: 
C1: Check omitted 
C2: Check incomplete 
C3: Right action on wrong object 
C4: Wrong check on right object 
C5: Check mistimed 
Retrieval Errors: 
R1: Information not obtained 
R2: Wrong information obtained 
R3: Information retrieval incomplete  
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Communication Errors: 
T1: Information not communicated 
T2: Wrong information communicated 
T3: information communication incomplete 
Selection Errors: 
S1: Selection omitted 
S2: Wrong selection made 
 
Furthermore, an application of PHEA method is also presented by the (Embrey, 1992) with 
potential error reduction recommendations (i.e. 
Procedure, training, equipment etc). This error 
classification can help an analyst to identify the 
potentially critical errors relevant to an action and take 
precautionary measure, if required.  
The PHEA method has five principle stages as reported 
in the (Baber and Stanton, 1996) and illustrated in the 
Figure 3. The screening of errors (i.e. whether an error is 
relevant) is also performed in the error identification 
stage. Therefore, only those error classes are considered 
for further analysis which are relevant.  
 
3.2.3 System for Predictive Error Analysis and 
Reduction (SPEAR) 
 
The System for Predictive Error Analysis and Reduction 
(SPEAR) was developed by the Centre for Chemical 
Process Safety for use in the American chemical process industry as reported in the (Stanton 
et al., 2005). The SPEAR method also considers the action classes similar to the PHEA, and 
consists of following main steps (Mannan, 2012): 
 Task analysis; 
 Performance shaping factors; 
 Consequence analysis;  
Figure 3. PHEA Flowchart, 
adapted from (Baber and Stanton, 
1996). 
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 Error reduction analysis. 
Using a subjective judgment, the analyst classifies each step of an action into one the 
following classes used in the SPEAR taxonomy: 
 Action; 
 Retrieval; 
 Check; 
 Selection; 
 Transmission. 
Hence, after the identification of the action type. The available information and analyst’s 
domain expertise can be used to determine if the relevant errors are credible or not. The next 
step is to determine if recovery is possible or not and consequence associated with the error. 
In the SPEAR method, consequence are not only determined from failure to perform the task 
but also of consequences of any side-effect that may occur if the tasks is not executed 
properly (Mannan, 2012). 
However, as SPEAR is a structured approach to the human error identification by considering 
the PSF. This method becomes labours and time consuming for complex and large systems, 
(Stanton et al., 2005). At the same time, this method also lacks the cognitive component of 
the error. 
 
3.2.4 Techniques for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP)  
 
The Techniques for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) was reported by the (Swain and 
Guttmann, 1983) was the first systemic human reliability method especially for the Nuclear 
Power Plants (NPP). The THERP handbook presents methods, models and estimated HEPs to 
assist an analyst to make qualitative and qualitative assessment of human reliability.  
The key tasks to complete the quantification process are described by the (Kirwan, 1996) and 
are reported in the (Bell and Holroyd, 2009): 
 Decomposition of tasks into elements; 
 Assignments of nominal HEP to each element; 
 Determination of effect of PSF on each element; 
 Calculation of effect of dependence between tasks; 
 Modelling in an HRA event tree; 
 Quantification of total task HEP; 
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During the first step, a task is break down into its constitute elements according to the 
THERP taxonomy. The assignments of the nominal HEPs is carried out according to Chapter 
20 of the THERP handbook. The Table 13 illustrates the THERP tables that can be used to 
assign the nominal HEP against the selected taxonomy. However, problems can arise when 
task elements don’t appear to be representative from any of the tables as argued by the 
(Kirwan, 1996). The effect of the PSFs on the HEPs are considered by using multiplier to the 
nominal HEPs. This aspect of determining the effect of the PSFs on the nominal HEPs is 
relatively less structured in THERP as also highlighted by the (Kirwan, 1996). This aspect of 
determining the effect of PSFs is highly subjective as based on the analyst and this aspect 
might require some further improvement. 
The THERP provides five levels of dependency, which have very high inter-relation. A 
failure to model dependency can have dramatic effects on the overall HEP. The last two steps 
of developing a HRA event tress and quantification of total HEP are relatively 
straightforward tasks. In order to develop a HRA event tree elements of a task are divided 
into failure and successful outcome of the tasks and a tree is developed according to 
decomposition of task. The Figure 4 represents an event tree for a series and parallel system 
and also relevant calculations for probability of success /failure of task. A validation study of 
THERP model has been provided by (Kirwan et al., 1997) and recently another attempt was 
made by (Shirley et al., 2015) 
As highlighted by Swain and Guttmann themselves that real HEP is difficult to predict due to 
its variability. Each person/ operator has a tendency of variability and this variability also 
exists among the different persons/ operators. There are number of internal and external 
Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) which indicate the behaviour/ response of a person/ 
operator. However, despite this variability it is possible to predict the reliability of a person/ 
operator with a varying degree of uncertainty. This uncertainty will be smaller while 
predicting behaviour of a person/ operator for routine tasks and will be higher while 
predicting the behaviour for abnormal activities.   
In the THERP database, HEPs are provided using the lognormal distributions and single 
points are the median points of distribution. The range of error factors is considered to 
include the 90% of the HEPs in distribution. However, if this range is questionable then 
analyst can use another range by providing relevant justifications.  
The THERP handbook also justify the selection of lognormal distribution to provides HEPs. 
Since, it is believed that performance of skilled persons tends to bunch up towards the low 
HEPs on a distribution of HEPs and response time is main parameters that determined the 
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performance of a skilled person. Due to lack of sufficient data to propose an exact 
distribution, Swain and Guttmann argued that lognormal distribution can provide the best fit 
as shown in the Figure 5. However, it is also hypothesised that a “SD (Standard Deviation) = 
0.42” would provide a best fit for the NPP operations. But, for tasks performed under high 
stress the entire distribution will be shifted to the right and may be skewed to the left rather 
than the right. This phenomenon ensures the factual condition that under high stress majority 
of actions tend to fail.   
 
Table 13:  THERP tables for HEPs adapted from (Swain and Guttmann, 1983) 
Screening 
Diagnosis (Table 20.1) 
Rule-based actions (Table 20.2) 
Diagnosis 
Nominal diagnosis (Table 20.3) 
Post event CR staffing (Table 20.4) 
Error of omission 
Written materials mandated 
 Preparation (Table 20.5) 
Administrative control (Table 20.6) 
Procedural items (Table 20.7) 
No written materials 
Administrative control (Table 20.6) 
Oral instruction items (Table 20.8) 
Error of commission 
Displays 
Displays selection (Table 20.9) 
Read/ record quantitative (Table 20.10) 
Check-read quantitative (Table 20.11) 
Control & MOV selection & use (Table 20.12) 
Locally operated Valves 
Valve selection (Table 20.13) 
Stuck valve detection (Table 20.14) 
PSFs 
Tagging levels (Table 20.15) 
Stress/ experiences (Table 20.16) 
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Dependence (Table 20.17, 20.18, 20.19) 
Other PSFs 
Uncertainty bounds  
Estimated UCBs (Table 20.20) 
Conditional HEPs and UCBs (Table 20.21) 
Recovery factors 
Errors by checker (Table 20.22) 
Annunciated cues (Table 20.23, 20.24) 
Control room scanning (Table 20.25, 20.26) 
Basic walk-around inspection (Table 20.27) 
 
As can be seen from the Figure 5, HEP distribution also consider the uncertainty bounds 
(UCBs). These uncertainty bounds of HEPs account for both the imperfect knowledge and 
also the stochastic variability. The ratio of the upper to the lower bounds is the range ratio. 
The error factor (EF) corresponding to the HEPs is calculated by following equation, Eq. 2.  
 
 
Furthermore, THERP also proposes to use large EFs when HEPs < 0.001 to reflect the greater 
uncertainty associated with the infrequent occurring of the events. While, HEPs in range of 
10-3 - 10-2 generally apply to routine tasks involving rule-based behaviour.  
The THERP also provides general guidelines to assign the UCBs according to HEPs and 
relevant conditions as also shown in the Table 14 for the experienced personnel. It can be 
seen that higher EF values are proposed when HEPs are low, in order to account for the 
uncertainty due to infrequent events. Similarly, the EFs are also increased with the increase of 
stress level of the operator. 
   
 Error factor =  √
Upper uncertainty bound
Lower uncertainty bound
 Eq. 2 
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Figure 4. HRA event tree for series and parallel systems, adapted from (Swain 
and Guttmann, 1983) 
 
Given the fact that the exact values of these EFs are difficult to obtain, these EF can provide a 
comparative indication about 
the uncertainly among different 
actions types and operating 
conditions.  
During calculations, the 
simplest way to incorporate 
these UCBs is to use the most 
conservative estimates of the 
spread between the upper and 
lower bounds.  
The THERP is a well-used 
method in practice not only in 
NPP but also in chemical 
process industry. However, there are some aspects that are highlighted by the (Bell and 
Holroyd, 2009)  among others,  that need to be improved: 
Figure 5. Hypothesized lognormal probability density 
function of THERP HEPs, adapted from (Swain and 
Guttmann, 1983) 
35 
 
 THERP does not offer enough guidance on modelling scenarios and the impact of 
PSFs performance; 
 THERP level of detail can be excessive for some assessment. As this is certainly the 
case at lease for chemical process industry. 
It was observed on certain occasions that companies are unable to provide detailed 
information about their operation, especially when a project is still in the design phase. In this 
case, assessment based on THERP model has to be based on certain assumptions, that can 
add more uncertainty to the analysis.  
 
Table 14: General guidelines for estimating uncertainty bounds for HEPs, adapted from 
(Swain and Guttmann, 1983) 
Task and HEP guidelines Error factor 
A: Step by step procedures, routine, optimal stress level  
Estimated HEP < 0.001 10 
Estimated HEP 0.001 to 0.01 3 
Estimated HEP > 0.01 5 
B: Step by step procedures, non-routine, moderate stress level  
Estimated HEP < 0.001 10 
Estimated HEP > 0.001 5 
C: Dynamic interplay between operator and system indication, routine, 
optimal stress level 
 
Estimated HEP < 0.001 10 
Estimated HEP > 0.001 5 
D: Dynamic interplay between operator and system indication, non-
routine, moderate stress level 
10 
E: Task under high stress, e.g. large LOCA; conditions in which the 
status of shaping factors is not perfectly clear; conditions in which the 
initial operator responses have proved to be inadequate and sever time 
pressure is felt. 
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Apart from that, THERP was developed mainly for nuclear power plants. A study is also 
required which can indicate its validation / adjustments for chemical process industry based 
on the operational experience obtained within the chemical process industry. 
36 
 
3.2.5 Human Error Analysis and Reduction Technique (HEART)  
 
In the HEART, as described by the (Williams, 1986), the HEP of a task is treated as a 
function of type of task and relevant Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) also called PSFs as 
mentioned in the (Mannan, 2012). The HEART method is relatively simple and quick to 
estimate the human reliability as compare to the THERP. 
The main steps of HEART are as follows, as mentioned in (Bell and Holroyd, 2009): 
 The basic human reliability is dependent upon the generic nature of the tasks to be 
performed; 
 In “perfect” conditions, this level of reliability will tend to be achieved consistently 
with a given nominal likelihood within probabilistic limits; 
 Given that these perfect conditions do not exist in all circumstances, the human 
reliability predicted may degrade as a function of the extent to which identified Error 
Producing Conditions (EPCs) might apply. 
In the HEART method, there are 9 generic task types, each with an associated nominal 
human error probability and 38 error producing conditions that may affect the task reliability. 
The nominal human error probability can be modified by a multiplier defined for each of the 
error producing conditions. The Table 15 illustrates the HEART generic tasks and associated 
NHEPs as proposed by (Williams, 1986). The probability percentiles are calculated by 
assuming the log normal distribution for the HEPs. 
In the HERAT method, HEP is calculated from the NHEP by considering the effect of the 
EPCs. The effect of the EPCs is calculated by estimating two terms as shown in Eq. 3 also 
called assessed impact of EPCs. The multipliers against 38 EPC are also identified in the 
HEART. The assessed proportion of effect is an estimation of the impact of each EPC on the 
task and this effect value varies between 0 to 1.  
The HERAT assesses the impact as follows in the Eq. 3: 
 
 
Whereas:  
Assessed proportion of effect ≈ 0 - 1 
 
 
 Assessed impact = ((Mutiplier ­ 1)  · Assessed proportion of effect) + 1 Eq. 3 
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Table 15: Classification of generic HEART tasks and associated unreliability estimates 
adapted from (Williams, 1986) cited in (Mannan, 2012) 
Generic task 
Proposed NHEP  (5th- 
95th percentile 
boundaries) 
A: Totally unfamiliar, performed at speed with no real idea of 
likely consequences 
0,55 (0,035 – 0,97) 
B: Shift or restore system to a new or original state on a single 
attempt without supervision or procedures  
0,26 (0,14 – 0,42) 
C: Complex task requiring high level of comprehensive and 
skill 
0,16 (0,12 – 0,28) 
D: Fairly simple task performed rapidly or given scant 
attention  
0,09 (0,06 – 0,13) 
E: Routine, highly practiced, rapid task involving relatively 
low level of skill 
0,02 (0,007 -0,045) 
F: Restore or shift a system to original or new state following 
procedures, with some checking 
0,003 (0,0008 – 0,007) 
G: Completely familiar, well-designed , highly practiced, 
routine task occurring several times per hour, performed to 
highest possible standards by highly motivated, highly trained 
and experienced person, totally aware of implications of 
failure, which time to correct potential errors, but without the 
benefit of significant job aids 
0,0004 (0,00008 – 
0,009) 
H: Respond correctly to system command even when there is 
an augmented or automated supervisory system providing 
accurate interpretation of system stage 
0,00002 (0,000006 – 
0,00009) 
M: Miscellaneous task for which no description can be found  
(Nominal 5th – 95th percentile data spread were chosen on the 
basis of experience suggesting log normality). 
0,03 (0,008 – 0,11) 
 
While, the HEP can be calculated by multiplication of nominal HEP and assessed impact of 
each of identified EPCs as also highlighted by the Eq. 4. 
 
 
In order to check the variability of the assessed impact, calculations are performed against the 
assessed proportion for EPCs using Eq. 3. A linear relation has been obtained for all the EPCs 
 HEP = Nominla HEP × Assess impact 1 × Asssessed impact 2 × etc Eq. 4 
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for their assessed proportion scale (i.e. 0 to 1). So, it can be concluded that in HEART 
method, the assessed impact of EPCs varies linearly against the assessed proportion values. 
This is also a theoretical explanation of Eq. 3. If the assessed proportion of a EPC is zero, in 
this case the value of the assessed impact become one and the total HEP becomes equal to the 
NHEP. While, in cases when assessed proportion has any values except zero, then assessed 
impact also increase with a possible maximum value equal to the EPC’s multiplier value. 
Although, a simple linear relation between EPCs and their impact on the NEHP is proposed 
by HEART but considering lack of general data for quantification. This type of estimations 
can be justifiable since it can provide some initial estimates about the HEPs. 
The HEART has been designed as a practical and easy to use method. It was one of the 
principal techniques used in the quantitative risk assessment as indicated by the (Mannan, 
2012). The HEART can also be used in number of domains like nuclear, chemical, aviation, 
rail and medical as also indicated by (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). 
The main criticism which received by HEART is that the EPCs data has not been fully 
released and validated. Furthermore, assessed proportion of EPCs defined solely based on 
expert’s judgment, so it can be highly subjective and sensitive towards the HEP calculations. 
The relevant checklists to assess the EPCs can help to mitigate this uncertainty by providing 
the same ground to assessment procedures that are carried out by different analysts.  
 
3.2.6 Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) 
  
The SPAR-H method was developed for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission by Idaho 
National Laboratory and is reported by the (Gertman et al., 2005). During the SPAR-H 
method following main steps should be followed as identified by the (Gertman et al., 2005): 
 Decompose probability into contribution from diagnose failures and actions failures; 
 Accounts for the context associated with human failure events (HFEs) by using 
performance shaping factors and dependency assignment; 
 Assign appropriate values of PSFs to pre-defined the base case of HEPs; 
 Use of beta distribution for uncertainty analysis; 
 Use the proposed worksheets to ensure the analyst’s consistency. 
In the SPAR-H method, two main types of actions are identified: 
 Action 
 Diagnostic 
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The examples of action task include operating equipment, performing line-ups, starting 
equipment, conducting calibration and other activities performed during the course of the 
following plant procedures or work orders. While, diagnostic tasks consider the reliance on 
knowledge and experience to understand existing conditions. The base rate (i.e. HEP) for 
action and diagnostic activity types are defined as 1× 10-3 and 1× 10-2, respectively. 
In the SPAR-H method, following eight types of PSFs are identified, which were considered 
to have an influence on the human reliability: 
 Available time; 
 Stress and stressors; 
 Experience and training; 
 Complexity; 
 Ergonomics (including human-machine interface); 
 Procedures; 
 Fitness for duty; 
 Work processes. 
When applying the basic SPAR-H model, three out of eight PSFs are evaluated: time 
available, stress /stressors and complexity while rest of five PSFs are rated nominally because 
they are related to the event, plant or personal-specific. The Appendix II lists the SPAR-H 
PSFs levels and the associated multipliers along with recommended multiplier from HEART, 
CREAM, ASEP and THERP models. But, this comparison cannot be an absolute because 
multipliers’ final effect on the nominal HEP is determined by relevant equations in each of 
the method, that varies among methods. However, it can provide a relevant idea about the 
effect of PSFs when apply one of the method. Since, evaluation steps and relevant criteria 
varies among methods. Therefore, it is highly recommended to use just one method in whole 
plant or a facility.  
The SPAR-H also accounts for the +ve influence of the PSFs on human reliability as defined 
by its influencing levels. This model can be used retrospective as well as in prospective 
manner. 
In order to account for the effect of PSFs on human reliability, a different approach has been 
used in SPAR-H method compared to its predecessors. In most of the previous methods, 
multiplicative models have been used to modify the nominal human error probability. 
Although, practically multiplicative models can provide the similar results like THERP and 
HEART models but strictly in mathematical terms the direct application (i.e. HEP = NHEP 
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×PSF) of multiplicative models is only approximately correct as argued in the (OECD, 1998). 
The following main reasons have been identified for multiplicative models: 
 In Multiplicative models, a scalar (i.e. PSF value) is to multiply a probability and the 
value of HEP cannot be greater than 1. If PSFs values are greater than 1 then 
multiplicative models can provide a HEP greater than 1 for higher values of NHEPs 
and PSFs.  
Therefore, Given the aforementioned challenge, the SPAR-H method propose a new model to 
determine the HEP as also anticipated by the (OECD, 1998) and is also shown in the Eq. 5, in 
special cases when PSFs have -ve impact on the HEP (Gertman et al., 2005).     
 
 
Whereas:  
PSFComposite is obtained by product of analysts rating of all PSFs contained in the 
SPAR-H worksheet. 
 
The SPAR-H model provides some further insight into the human factors assessment and to 
understand the effect of the PSFs on the human reliability. At the same time, this model is 
also a simple model that can be adopted easily, (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). However, on the 
other hand, the degree of resolution of the PSFs may be inadequate for a detailed analysis.  
In the SPAR-H method, the PSFs definitions, levels and PSF’s multipliers are questionable as 
also pointed out by the (Laumann and Rasmussen, 2015), who have tried to adjust the SPAR-
H PSFs levels for the chemical process industry application based on expert’s opinion.  
 
3.2.7 Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) 
 
The Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) has been developed by the 
(Hollnagel, 1993) and was reviewed by the (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). The CREAM model 
uses an advanced cognitive concepts developed primarily for the nuclear plants. In this model 
a distinction is made among competence and control that is based upon Hollnagel’s COCOM 
(Contextual control) model: 
 Competence includes a person’s skills and knowledge; 
 HEP =  
NHEP ·  PSFComposite
NHEP · (PSFComposite − 1) +  1
 Eq. 5 
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 Control is reviewed as running along a continuum from a position where the 
individual has little/ no control to where they have complete control.  
In the CREAM model, genotypes (i.e. causes to errors) and phenotypes (i.e. consequences of 
operator’s actions) concepts have been used. The three main genotypes are identified in the 
CREAM as follows: 
 Direct or indirect cause to behaviour (e.g. emotional state and personality); 
 Causes related to man-machine interaction and interface; 
 Causes that are typical of an organization (e.g. temperature, nose etc).    
In this method, the context of human action is defined by following nine Common 
Performance Conditions (CPCs): 
 Adequacy of organization: 
 Working conditions; 
 Adequacy of man-machine interface and operational support; 
 Availability of procedures/ plans; 
 Number of simultaneous goals; 
 Available time; 
 Time of day; 
 Adequacy of training and experience; 
 Quality of crew collaboration. 
The CREAM method can be used both retrospectively to analyse errors and prospectively to 
predict the potential errors. However, the CREAM model does not provides any remedial 
measures to remove or to mitigate the human erroneous actions (Stanton et al., 2005). 
 
3.2.8 Connectionism Assessment of Human Reliability (CAHR) 
 
The Connectionism Assessment of Human Reliability (CAHR) has been developed at the 
Technical University of Munich and the Gesellschaft fur Anlagen-und Reaktorsicherheit 
(GRS) between 1992 and 1997 (Sträter, 2000) also is also cited in (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). 
The CAHR model is a database system developed after learning from past experience of 
German nuclear power plants and then comparing the obtained values with the THERP HEPs 
using the probabilistic models. During the development of the CAHR, it has been seen that 
probabilistic model based on Rasch provides the maximum agreement with the THERP 
values (Sträter, 2000). 
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The underlying philosophy of this tool is as is reported in the (Bell and Holroyd, 2009): 
 The focus of this tool is the working system and not just the human/ operator; 
 Human error caused by the interaction of several situational factors; 
 CAHR uses a fixed structure but not a fixed taxonomy; 
 A strict differentiation between observable information and causes is maintained.   
In the Connectionism Assessment of Human Reliability (CAHR) model, the term 
connectionism was used because it models the cognition aspects on the basics of artificial 
intelligence. Therefore, it refers to the idea that human performance is affected by the 
interrelation of multiple conditions and factors as mentioned in the (Everdij and Blom, 2013). 
Furthermore, an application of CAHR model in the maritime accidents investigation can be 
found in the (Loer et al., 2011). However, some theoretical challenges are also acknowledged 
in this model. 
The concepts from this model have been used in the present work and therefore are described 
in detail in the section 6. 
 
3.3 Models to integrate the risk assessment techniques and HOF  
 
As anticipated earlier, the scope of this work is to integrate the existing risk assessment 
techniques with the Human and Organizational Factors (HOF). The purpose of this work is 
not to provide a dedicated human factor tool that can account for all the PSF. Therefore, in 
this section some of the developed methods/ approaches will be discusses that can help to 
integrate the risk assessment techniques (mainly discuss in section 3.1) and the HOF.  
The (Bellamy and Geyer, 2007) have highlighted that often there are difficulties in explaining 
and communicating about the human factors and how human factors overlap and interface 
with the safety management systems and wider organizational issues, in the context of risk 
control. 
Furthermore, (Bellamy and Geyer, 2007) have analysed eight past accidents in order to 
understand the human factors, safety management systems and the organizational factors and 
have provided an integrated model. Furthermore, it was also mentioned that about 25% of the 
Loss of Containment (LOC) accidents with vessels could be attributed to human factors 
aspects which could have been prevented. In this model, (Bellamy and Geyer, 2007) have 
identified following main events as related to the theme of human errors during maintenance 
operations: 
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 Corrosion 
Containment not maintained (repaired/ replaced) 
 Exceeds containment limits 
Installed incorrectly (or wrong thing installed) 
Not replaced like with like 
 Operator error 
Wrong part (containing hazardous material) worked on 
 High Pressure 
Pressure relief fails to prevent excessive overpressure 
 Wrong equipment/ location 
Mixed up in storage/ location 
Not available 
right equipment in wrong place 
Incorrectly installed equipment 
Therefore, these issues should be addressed in the maintenance system in the plan-do-check-
act cycle featured in safety management systems. Furthermore, (Bellamy and Geyer, 2007) 
have concluded that integration of human element around a technical theme closely linked to 
the risk is particularly an interesting aspect, since it enables assessment and inspection 
approaches to be targeted in a risk based way. 
In the I-Risk approach, the management system was linked to the technical system through 
the base events of fault trees from the risk assessment and is reported by the (Papazoglou et 
al., 2003). The key components of the I-Risk methodology are the technical model, the 
management model and their interface. In the I-Risk methodology, the technical model 
consists of developing a Master Logic Diagram (MLD) defining major immediate causes of 
Loss of Containment (LOC) events and associated quantitative models for assessing their 
frequencies. While, the management model consists of the tasks, which must be carried out 
systematically in the primary business functions. In the I-Risk, the updated frequency of 
failure is provided against three management models (i.e. worst case, best case and against 
the current management system of specific installation). 
The (Øien, 2001) has proposed another model, Organizational Risk Indicator Model (ORIM) 
as a tool for risk control during operations of offshore installation as a complement to the 
QRA-based indicators. The results comprise a qualitative organizational model, proposed 
organizational risk indicators and a quantification methodology for assessing the impact of 
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the organization on the risk. It has been highlighted by the (Øien, 2001) that risk prediction 
has mainly covered technical failures and human errors but recently there is a focus to 
include the organizational aspects, explicitly. Since, the human error in certain cases is 
trigged by an error in the organizational aspects. The conceptual model of ORIM is illustrated 
in the Figure 6. In this figure, the selected organizational risk indicators can be used to 
modify the leak frequencies and hence the risk originated from those leak scenarios.   
 
 
Figure 6. Conceptual model for organizational risk indicators adapted from (Øien, 2001) 
 
In the ORIM model, the considered organizational factors can be seen in the Table 16.  The 
six main organizational factors are considered in the ORIM method. Furthermore, 
organizational risk indicators are also defined against each of the selected factors and five 
mutually exclusive states of the organizational factors can be defined. The organizational risk 
indicators can help to identify the existing state of an organizational factor.  
 
Table 16: Organizational factors used in ORIM, 
adapted from (Øien, 2001) 
Organizational factors 
Individual factor 
Training/ competence 
Procedures, guidelines and instructions etc 
Planning, coordination, organization and control 
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Design 
PM-Program/inspection 
 
The overall rating of an organizational factor is calculated by a combination of the rating of 
the organizational risk indicators and their weight on the organizational factor as shown by 
the Eq. 6.  
 
 
Whereas:  
 vkj is the distribution of individual weights of different indicators. (assigned by expert 
 judgment and assumed to remain constant over time).   
 vkj is the rating of different indicators.   
 
The Barriers and Operational Risk Analysis of hydrocarbon release (BORA - Release) 
method was developed to calculate the establishment’s specific conditions of technical, 
human, operational and organizational influencing factors and their impact on the barrier’s 
performance, that are established to prevent the hydrocarbon release as proposed by the 
(Aven et al., 2006). It was highlighted that technical, human, operational and organizational 
factors can influence the accident sequence. The following steps are the main steps to be 
carried out during the BORA-release analysis: 
 Development of a basic risk model including release scenarios; 
 Modelling the performance of safety barriers;  
 Assignment of industry average probabilities/ frequencies and risk quantification 
based on these probabilities/ frequencies; 
 Development of risk influencing diagrams; 
 Scoring of risk influencing factors; 
 Weighting of risk influencing factors; 
 Adjustment of industry average probability/ frequencies; 
 Recalculation of the risk in order to determine the platform specific risk related to the 
hydrocarbon release. 
 𝑟𝑘 = ∑  𝑣𝑘𝑗
𝑛𝑘
𝑗=1
. 𝑟𝑘𝑗 Eq. 6 
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In the BORA- Release, the effect of the risk influencing factors on barriers is calculated by a 
combination of weighting and rating as proposed in the ORIM approach as well.  
The ω-factor approach has been developed by the (Mosleh et al., 1997) to quantify the effect 
of sub-organizational attributes on equipment’s reliability and on operator’s performance in 
nuclear power plants. The results of this quantification has been used to determine the 
amount of increase in equipment failure rate and human error probability due to 
organizational factors. In the context of present work, some concepts from ω-factor model 
has been used therefore in the following section more description about this model is 
provided.  
In the ω-factor model, it has been argued that organizational factors influence is common to 
all technical components and human actions as demonstrated in the Figure 7. In this model it 
has been argued that there could be two possible influences of the organizational factors on 
the technical components: 
 Higher failures rate as a result of poor organization but independent from each other; 
 Dependency model of organizational factors similar to common cause failure (CCF) 
analysis, in which failures are simultaneous. 
But the first alternative has been considered to be more feasible and appropriate, therefore 
considered in this approach.  
In this model, it is proposed that failure rates (e.g. λ) are composed of two components: 
inherent failures (λ1) “the inherent portion of failure rate which is beyond the control of 
organization in-charge” and failures induced due to organizational influences (λO), as shown 
by the following equation: 
 
 
A parameter (ω) has been defines as follows: 
 
Therefore: 
 
λTotal = λ1 + λO 
ω =
𝜆𝑂
𝜆1
 
𝜆𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝜆1 + ω𝜆1 
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A structural relationship of the organization is shown in the Figure 8 as has been proposed in 
this model. The model of a big organization can be quite complex network of nodes and 
links. Therefore, considering the entire organizational influence diagram at once might be 
complex but a type of multi-layered model can be considered as shown in Figure 8. A 
parameter “P” is calculated, which is degree that the worker’s performance is adversely 
affected by organizational factors. In similar way, the human error probability can be written 
as: 
 
 
Whereas: 
 h1 is based on individual PSF 
 h2 is due to organizational PSF 
 
Since, most HRA models use PSF to quantify the human error probabilities so a link of 
human reliability 
through Eq. 7 can 
be justifiable.  
In another model 
proposed by the 
(Schönbeck et al., 
2010), a new 
approach to adjust 
the design values of 
safety integrity 
levels by 
considering the 
operational effect of 
the HOF has been demonstrated. The HOF affect can adversely impact the design risk 
reduction expressed as safety integrity levels. In this work, (Schönbeck et al., 2010) has 
identified following eight safety influencing factors with a potential to influence the 
performance of safety instrumented functions: 
 Maintenance management; 
 hTotal = h1 + hO Eq. 7 
Figure 7: Representation of dependency due to organizational factors, 
adapted from (Mosleh et al., 1997) 
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 Procedures; 
 Error-enforcing conditions; 
 Housekeeping; 
 Goal compatibility; 
 Communication; 
 Organization; 
 Training. 
In the subsequent steps, the relative weights of these safety influencing factors has to be 
identified. It has been proposed that weights can be obtained from past accidents but given 
the low ratio of the past accidents, the data from the dangerous detected failures can also be 
used. In this case, a relative weight can be assigned for each of the safety influencing factors 
and then these weights have to be normalized.  
Therefore, by providing weights and rating to these factors, operational SIL can be obtained 
from design SIL from the Eq. 8.  
 
 
Whereas:  
 θ is the proportion of the design SIL that can be explained by HOFs (0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤1) 
 Ri is the rating for the safety influencing factor ith (0 ≤  𝑅𝑖 ≤1 for all i) 
 wi the weight factor for the safety influencing factor ith (0 ≤  𝑤𝑖 ≤1 for all i) 
 PFDdesign is the average probability of failure on demand according to the design. 
 
A similar equation can also be used for operations in high demand mode or continuous mode 
and where PFD is given in dangerous failures per hour. Therefore, by using this kind of 
model, a difference between design and the operational SIL (ΔSIL) can be obtained. 
However, some of the previous identified challenges are also observed here: how influencing 
affect (i.e. weights) of various safety influencing factors can be obtained and if possible how 
to validate them.   
Meanwhile, (CCPS, 2000) p. 642, has highlighted the following areas of further improvement 
with respect to the human factors in quantitative risk assessment: 
 SILOperational =  (θ ∑ RiWi − 1
8
i=1
) log PFDdesign Eq. 8 
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 Continued improvements in models for incorporating human factors into a chemical 
process’ quantitative risk assessment study; 
 Better understanding of the impact of company and plant culture, management 
systems, maintenance practices, and other such factors on the reliability of process 
plant equipment (i.e. PSFs). 
 
 
Figure 8. Evaluating PSF through organizational factors, adapted from (Mosleh et al., 
1997) 
 
However, similar approaches can also be used for the human factor models, where the 
reliability of an operator changes with respect to the management systems or the 
organizational factors.  
Therefore, in the light of base models for both conventional risk assessment and human 
factors quantification. In this scope of work, it has been decided to use the data from past 
accidents to quantify the effect of the organizational factors on the human reliability. The 
International Standard (IEC 31010, 2009), has also mentioned to use the historical data from  
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past accidents and to predict the probability of occurrence of failure in the future. 
There are numbers of available databases to record past accidents for chemical process 
industry. These databases have been analyses to quantify the human and organizational 
factors assessment and to learn lessons. 
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4 Analysis of past accidents 
 
The Following main databases have been found which can be used to acquire the useful data, 
required for the quantification of human and organizational factors as detailed in Table 17. 
The website of Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet (NTNU, 2014) provides the 
useful information about the available accident databases. 
 
Table 17: List of some of the existing accident databases 
Accident databases Sources 
European Major Accident Reporting 
System (eMARS) 
Maintained by Major Accident Hazards 
Bureau (MAHB) under EU Seveso II/III 
Directive. 
Failure and Accident Technical System 
(FACTS) 
Maintained by unified Industrial and 
Harbour Fire Department – Rotterdam, 
Netherlands. 
Analyse, Recherche et Informations sur les 
Accidents (ARIA) 
Maintained by French Ministry of Ecology, 
bureau for analysis of industrial risks and 
pollutions. 
Process Safety Incident Database (PSID) 
Maintained by Canter for Chemical Process 
Safety (CCPS). 
Natural and Environmental Disaster 
Information Exchange System (NEDIES) 
Maintained by the European Commission’s 
Joint Research Centre. 
World Offshore Accident Database 
(WOAD) 
Maintained by Det Norske Veritas (DNV 
GL). 
Accident statistics for fixed offshore unit 
on the UK Continental Shelf (1980 - 2005) 
Prepared by (DNV, 2007a). 
Accident statistics for floating offshore 
units on the UK Continental Shelf (1980 - 
2005) 
Prepared by (DNV, 2007b). 
Ship/ platform collision Incident database 
(1975 - 2001) 
Prepared by (Robson, 2003). 
 
The eMARS database has been maintained by the Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) 
and collects the accidents occurred mainly in the EU Member States under Seveso II 
Directive or now Seveso III Directive (EC, 2012). The FACTS database contains information 
about the accidents involving hazardous materials which caused or could have caused severe 
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damage or danger. The FACTS database was initiated by TNO but now is maintained by 
unified Industrial and Harbour Fire Department - Netherlands.  
The PSID database is managed by CCPS to collect, track and share important information, 
process safety incidents and experience among project participants.  
The NEDIES database has been started and maintained by European Commission’s joint 
Research Centre with the aim to update the information about the occurrence of natural 
disasters and their management.  
The WOAD database can provide an access to accident database for diverse offshore facility. 
The WOAD database also provides accident causes, location, social and economic impacts 
that can be valuable for the risk management initiatives.  
The HSE has also collected data about past accidents mostly related to offshore facilities as 
also shown in the Table 17. 
Therefore, given the information of all aforementioned databases, it has been decided to use 
the eMARS for further analysis due to following main reasons: 
 EMARS is developed in the context of the EU Seveso Directive, therefore it is 
mandatory for the EU Member States to report their major accidents to the European 
Commission; 
 EMARS identify and record the causal factors to accidents; 
 EMARS provides a free access to their database and has already been used by other 
researchers to learn lessons from accidents. 
 
4.1 Accidents reported to eMARS 
 
The data from the European Commission’s Major Accident Reporting System (eMARS) has 
been analysed from past accidents occurred from 1988 to 2012 (i.e. 25 years). The purpose of 
eMARS is to facilitate the exchange of lessons learned from accidents and near misses 
involving dangerous substances to improve the chemical accident prevention and mitigation 
of potential consequences (Emars, n.d.). It is obligatory for the European Union (EU) 
Member States to report the major accidents to eMARS, if threshold of an event meets the 
criteria established in annex VI of the Seveso III Directive (EC, 2012). The reporting of a 
major industrial accident by competent authorities was also a requirement under predecessor 
Directives (i.e. Seveso I &II Directives). The criteria to notify an accident is based on 
discharge amount of a dangerous substance. The Annex I of the Directive provides 
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information about the amount of dangerous substances to qualify an establishment as lower 
or upper-tier establishments. The notifying criteria is also based on the consequences as a 
result of the accident. The detail about the notifying criteria can be found in the Appendix III 
of this document. 
However, accidents or “near misses” which do not meet the quantitative criteria defined in 
the Directive but the Member States regard them as of particular technical interest should also 
be notified to the European Commission (EC, 2012).  
The number of interesting results had already been obtained from the analysis of past 
accidents reported to eMARS by previous researchers. For example, (Nivolianitou et al., 
2006) have highlighted after analysing accidents from 1985 to 2001reported to the eMARS 
that about 40% of the major accidents have their cause either exclusively (19%) or partially 
(21%) related to human factors. While equipment failure was the cause to about 44% of the 
accidents. The rest of the accidents have their causes either related to natural phenomenon, 
combination of natural phenomenon and equipment or unclear.  
The (Kirchsteiger, 1999) has also concluded similar aspects that human error contributed to 
number of past accidents after reviewing the accidents reported to eMARS. 
A report published by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (Sales et al., 2007) 
has highlighted that analysis of past accidents in the process industries is a useful method for 
identifying common aspects regarding the causes that triggered such accidents. In this report, 
a trend in the evolution of the accidents is also presented. Furthermore, it was demonstrated 
that evolution of safety in process industries is cyclic, probably related to variations in risk 
perception or awareness. This could be due to an increased awareness after following an 
accident. Another report by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) has 
concluded after studying past accidents and contribution of corrosion to equipment failure 
that corrosion failures originated mainly in the pipework as compare to the storage tanks or 
rest of the units (Wood et al., 2013).  
 
4.1.1 EMARS reporting structure 
 
In the eMARS database, a classification has been provided among the following industrial 
types as can also be shown in the Table 18. In this scope of work only those industrial types 
are considered which are usually considered under the umbrella of the chemical process 
industry. These considered industrial types are highlighted in bold font in this table. The 
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selection of these industrial types is considered due to relevancy of operations among them 
and also to obtain enough data to conclude lessons learned. 
 
Table 18: Industrial types considered in the eMARS database 
Industrial types 
Agriculture 
Building & works of engineering construction 
Ceramics (bricks, pottery, glass, cement etc) 
Chemical Installations – ammonia 
Chemical Installations – carbon oxide 
Chemical Installations – chlorine 
Chemical Installations – fluorine or hydrogen fluoride  
Chemical Installations – hydrogen 
Chemical Installations – industrial gases 
Chemical Installations – inorganic gases 
Chemical Installations – nitrogen oxides 
Chemical Installations – other fine chemicals 
Chemical Installations – sulphur oxide, oleum 
Electronics & electrical engineering 
Fuel storage  (including heating, retail sale, etc) 
General chemicals manufacture (not included above) 
General engineering, manufacture and assembly 
Handling and transportation centres (ports, airports, lorry parks,  marshalling 
yards etc) 
Leisure activities 
LPG production, bottling and bulk distribution 
Manufacture of cements, lime and plaster 
Manufacture of food products and beverages 
Manufacture of glass 
Medical, research, education (including hospitals, universities,...) 
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Mining activities (tailing & physicochemical process) 
Not known / not applicable 
Petrochemical /Oil Refineries 
Plastic and rubber manufacture 
Power supply and distribution 
Processing of ferrous metals (foundries, smelting, etc). 
Processing of metals 
Processing of metals using electrolytic or chemical process 
Processing of  non-ferrous metals (foundries, smelting etc) 
Production and manufacture of pulp and paper 
Production and storage of explosives 
Production and storage of fireworks 
Production and storage of pesticides, biocides, fungicides 
Production of basic organic chemicals 
Production of pharmaceuticals 
Shipbuilding, ship breaking, ship repair 
Textiles manufacturing and treatment 
Waste treatment, disposal 
Water and sewage (collection, supply and treatment) 
Wholesale, retail storage and distribution (excluding LPG) 
Wood treatment and furniture 
 
In the eMARS accident reporting system following main aspects are considered relevant to 
an accident: 
 Reason of reporting 
 Accident involving 
- Domino effect 
- Natech events 
- Transboundary effects 
- Contractor 
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 Release major occurrences / initiating events 
 Fire major occurrences / initiating events 
 Explosion major occurrences / initiating events 
 Site description 
 Substances involved 
 Causes of accident  
- Organizational 
- Plant / equipment 
- Human 
- External 
 Consequences 
 Human 
 Environment 
 Cost 
 Disruption 
 Emergency response 
 Theme of lessons learned 
 Attachment section (if any) 
A detailed specimen of the eMARS reporting structure is also presented in the Appendix IV, 
which can highlight the options chooses by the European Commission to be presented during 
the reporting system. The data from the analysis of past accidents has been collected from 
these accident’s reports.  
 
4.2 Existing accident models 
 
In order to analyse the accidents systematically; coherently and structured, it is required to 
use an accident model. The (Al-shanini et al., 2014) have described accident modelling as a 
“methodology used to related the cause and effects of events that lead to an accident”. In this 
scope of work, the characteristics of used accident model should be as follows: 
 Applicable with the amount of information provided in the eMARS reporting system; 
 The structure of data acquisition (i.e. with the help of accident model) should also be 
coherent with the proposed model. The structure should also be applicable 
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prospectively to quantify the human and organizational factors (HOFs). 
Therefore, it is required to perform a background search about the available accident 
methods/ models that can be used to perform the accident analysis and consequently choose 
the most appropriate model.  
A typical safety pyramid for chemical process plants is shown in the Figure 9 in which the 
incidents/ un-safe behaviours move to the top of the pyramid (CCPS, 2011). There are 
multiple layers/ barriers with an intention to prevent/ mitigate the consequences of an 
incident. The failure of these layers lead to an accident with higher magnitude or severity. 
Another way to explain the Figure 9 is that incidents at the top of the pyramid reflect those 
situations where failure to the multiple layers of protection have already occurred while the 
bottom of the pyramid reflects failures or challenges to the safety layers as also mentioned by 
the (CCPS, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 9. Process safety pyramid/ failed protection layers, adapted from (CCPS, 2011) 
 
The (Al-shanini et al., 2014) have reported the categorization of different accidents models 
that can be used for the accident analysis. The main classes of accident models are, as 
illustrated in the Figure 10: 
 Sequential;  
 Epidemiological; 
 Systematic; 
 Formal; 
 Dynamic. 
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The accuracy, capability and limitation of accident models vary significantly, depending on 
their purpose and focus as reported by the (Rathnayaka et al., 2011) and also cited by the (Al-
shanini et al., 2014).  
The sequential models follow the chain of events, while the epidemiological models focus on 
the performance deviations and also on the environmental conditions. The systematic models 
and formal models are the modern accident analysis models. While, a new category is also 
introduced which is dynamic sequential models. These models apply the traditional sequence 
methods (e.g. FTA, ETA) to represent an accident scenario and is often combined with some 
other approaches to represent the non-linearity among the relation. The further detail about 
these models can be found in the (Al-shanini et al., 2014). 
 
 
Legend: FTA: Fault Tree Analysis, ETA: Event Tree Analysis, FMEA: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, CCA: Cause-Consequence 
Analysis, STAMP: Systems-Theoretic Accidental model and Processes, CREAM: Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method, FRAM: 
Functional Resonance Accident Model, DREAM: Driver Reliability and Error Model, WBA: Why-Because Model, SHIPP: System Hazard 
Identification Prevention and Prediction Methodology, DRA: Dynamic Risk Assessment. 
Figure 10. Accident model classification, adapted from (Al-shanini et al., 2014) 
 
There are number of other accident models that also consider the possible barriers which can 
contain/ prevent the evolution of an accident. One such model is represented as Accident 
Evolution and Barrier Function (AEB) model. However, these models cannot be used to 
quantify the analysis based on the eMARS reporting system because eMARS reporting 
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system seldom provide information about the barriers which were present to contain the 
accident evolution.  
In this scope of work, it has been decided to use the Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) to 
analyse the accidents as provided by the (Reason, 1990) and is also illustrated in the Figure 
11. There are following main reasons to choose the Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) for 
this analysis: 
 Swiss cheese model is quantifiable based on eMARS database; 
 Since scope of this work is to quantify the HOF, and Swiss cheese model can provide 
a logical link among human and organizational factors; 
 This model can also be used in prospective way to quantify the HOFs. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Swiss cheese model, adapted from (Reason, 1990) 
 
According to Swiss Cheese Model (SCM), an accident can occur when different safety layers 
align in a way so that hazard can find its way to an accident. The holes in these layers 
represent the flaws in the safety layers. The holes therefore enhance the probability of a 
hazard to find its way to the accident. The SCM can help to identify different layers that are 
used or that can be used to prevent/ mitigate an accident. Furthermore, it can also identify the 
possible factors that can influence the performance of the layers. Therefore, in order to 
improve the performance of safety layers it is required to improve the influencing factors 
corresponding to those specific layers. 
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4.3 Modified Swiss cheese model 
 
In order to study the accidents in chemical process plants, it has been decided to modify the 
SCM according to the requirements and to obtain a structure which can be quantifiable from 
the information present in the eMARS database. 
The (Reason et al., 2006) has reviewed the SCM and highlighted that although SCM has 
some limitations but it is so far the widely used accident model. Furthermore, (Reason et al., 
2006) also highlighted different forms of the SCM. The (ATSB, 2008) has adapted a form of 
SCM, which is highlighted in the Figure 12. In this model it is assumed that an organization 
achieve its production goals through a combination of various events and conditions. In most 
cases the production goals can be achieved. However, in some cases various events and 
conditions will combine to produce unnecessary events. Therefore, risk controls should be in 
place to ensure that system is safe or at least the consequences of an unnecessary action can 
be minimized. At the same time, other risk controls in the form of “prevention” can also be 
used to minimize the likelihood of deviation from normal operations. However, performance 
of the risk controls is always subject to a number of factors termed as “organizational factors” 
(ATSB, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 12. ATSB adaption of the Reason model, adapted from (ATSB, 2008) 
 
The safety indicators can be used for each of the involved elements to ensure the safety and 
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integrity of operations.  
In this scope of work, SCMs are adapted in their different forms according to the initiating 
cause to an accident and failure of subsequent prevention/ mitigation safety layers. All the 
layers are classified into two main states: 
 Operational;  
 Prevention/ mitigation. 
The state of a layer represents its activity/ role according to the design/ control philosophy of 
a plant. The errors in the operational layer correspond to those errors which happen during 
the normal operations. While, prevention/ mitigation errors are the errors which can happen 
when the system is already in an undesired situation. At this point in time, actions could be 
preventive or mitigative depending upon the allowable fluctuation of process parameters. 
However, definitions of preventive and mitigative terms are not fixed and subject to 
variations according to the design/ control philosophy of a specific plant. 
A form of the adapted SCM is illustrated in the Figure 13, in which layers are classified into 
two main states: “operational” and “prevention/ mitigation”. Two main elements are 
considered for each of the state: 
 Technical; 
 Human.  
These two elements represent the two main actors of a chemical process plant and failures/ 
errors are associated to each of the elements. The “technical” element is usually considered in 
the risk calculations by means of the failure rate of an equipment (i.e. λ) while “human” 
element is considered by means of a failure probability (i.e. HEP). Moreover, as highlighted 
by vast published literature that performance of both of these elements subject to change by 
specific PSFs as detailed in the section 3. In this analysis “organizational” PSF are considered 
for both of the elements. While, “stress/ fatigue” and “meteorological” PSF are considered 
for human and technical elements, respectively. The holes in any of the layers represent the 
flaws in that layer depend upon the performance/ quality of associated PSF. However, it is 
also considered that each layer has its own inherent flaws and holes represented by failure 
rate (i.e. λ) and probability of failure for technical and human elements, respectively. 
Therefore, more the weaknesses in a layer, the bigger will be the holes. Hence, more will be 
the chances that hazard will find its way to an accident. In this analysis, only those technical 
aspects (i.e. failure) are considered for which there is an effect of PSFs.  
The SCM illustrated in the Figure 13 corresponds to the model 1A, according to the Table 19. 
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In the model 1A, a failure of all the layers lead to an accident. In this work, nine different 
forms of the SCM have been developed as summarized in the Table 19. It can be observed 
from this table that initiating causes to an accident are divided into three main alternatives: 
 Technical & human; 
 Technical; 
 Human.  
 
 
Figure 13. Modified Swiss cheese model, adapted from Reason’s Swiss cheese model 
 
Therefore, it has been assumed that accidents can occur due to the coupling of “technical” 
and “human” failures or due to failure of one of the aspects in “technical” and “human” 
failures. 
It can also observed from the Table 19 that different prevention/ mitigation layers correspond 
to different forms of SCMs. In this work two main prevention/ mitigation layers are 
considered: 
 Automatic;  
 Manual. 
In the Table 19, three possible alternatives are considered according to the safety barriers in 
the prevention/ mitigation state: 
 Automatic & manual 
 Automatic / manual 
 Not observed 
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The “Automatic & manual” cases correspond to those instances when both barriers were 
present and failed. While, during “automatic/ manual” cases only one of the barriers (i.e. 
automatic or manual) was present and failed. However, in some instances no barriers were 
observed that represents by the “Not observed” status. 
The automatic safety layer corresponds mainly to the automatic safety function (e.g. PSVs, 
SIFs, BDVs and ESDs etc). The manual safety layer corresponds to the supervision activities 
mainly performed by a supervisor.   
 
Table 19: Forms of the SCM “Accidents models”, adapted from Swiss 
cheese model 
No. Model name Initiating cause Prevention / mitigation layer 
1 1A Technical & Human Automatic & manual 
2 1B Technical & Human Automatic/ manual 
3 1C Technical & Human Not observed 
4 3A Technical Automatic & manual 
5 3B Technical  Automatic/ manual 
6 3C Technical Not observed 
7 5A Human  Automatic & manual 
8 5B Human Automatic/ manual 
9 5C Human Not observed 
 
The Figure 14 depicts the 
scenario corresponds to 
model 1B in the Table 19. 
This model is same as 
model 1A or model 1C 
considering the initiating 
causes. While, this model 
only considers one of the 
safety barriers (i.e. either 
automatic or manual). Therefore, in the Figure 14 two possible accident paths can be 
observed in the “prevention/ mitigation” state. 
Figure 14. Swiss cheese model, model 1B 
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The Figure 15 represents 
those instances for which 
no safety layer (i.e. 
prevention/ mitigation) was 
observed during the 
accident as identified in the 
post-accident investigation 
and reported in the eMARS. 
This model corresponds to 
the model 1C in the Table 19. 
In the model 3S, only one of the initiating cause (i.e. technical) was present, but the safety 
barrier layer (i.e. 
prevention/ mitigation) 
follows the same order as 
observed in the model 1. 
The Figure 16 illustrates 
the model 3A 
corresponding to Table 19, 
in which both safety layers 
were present and failed 
consequently led to an 
accident. 
The Figure 17 corresponds 
to those instances when 
either one (i.e. automatic or 
manual) safety barrier was 
present and failed during 
the accident. It can be 
expected that accidents 
corresponding to model A 
should be fewer than the 
model B, since in model A double safety layers are present. The model in the Figure 17 
corresponds to model 3B in the Table 19.  
In the model 3C as represented by the Figure 18, failure in the “technical” element 
Figure 15. Swiss cheese model, model 1C 
Figure 16. Swiss cheese model, model 3A 
Figure 17. Swiss cheese model, model 3B 
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corresponds to initiating 
cause while there is no 
safety barriers present to 
prevent / mitigate an un-
desired situation. 
In the model 5s, only 
“human” initiating cause is 
present. The Figure 19 
corresponds to situations 
when there were both 
safety layers were present 
and failed.  
This situation corresponds 
to model 5A in the Table 
19. During the accident 
analysis all the accidents 
involving “human” 
initiating cause were 
studied in-detail.  
The Figure 20 shows the failure of either one of the safety barriers. It is interested to observe 
the performance of safety barriers (i.e automatic or 
manual) when already a 
“human” failure has 
happened. 
The last accident model is 
represented by the Figure 
21, in which “human” 
initiating cause was 
present and there was no 
subsequent safety layer 
which can prevent the further accident escalation. This model corresponds to model 5C in the 
Table 19. 
In this analysis, only the immediate causes to accidents are considered. Since, sometimes 
operator has to intervene following some minor abnormality in the process but abnormality is 
Figure 18. Swiss cheese model, model 3C 
Figure 19. Swiss cheese model, model 5A 
Figure 20. Swiss cheese model, model 5B 
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not severe enough so that it 
alone can cause an accident. 
If abnormal escalation 
occurs as a result of 
operator’s intervention 
leading to an accident, in 
this case the initiating cause 
of accident is “human”. 
Another important aspect is 
that; an operator can interact with the automated safety barriers in following two conditions: 
 Normal operating conditions; 
 Maintenance conditions (i.e. proof testing of SISs etc). 
Both of these operator’s interactions are considered in the operational state during the 
development of this work. 
Therefore, in this analysis an assumption has been made that an accident escalation follows 
one of the nine aforementioned generic models in the Table 19. However, there are certain 
instances when a classification is not possible. This is mainly when the accident escalation 
exhibits more complex situation or due to insufficient information in the eMARS reports.  
 
4.4 Newly developed taxonomies for human and organizational factors 
 
As described earlier, the causal factors to accidents have been identified based on the 
subjective judgment. However, in order to ensure the consistency throughout the analysis, 
taxonomies and corresponding checklists have been developed for the Human and 
organizational factors (HOF). The main rationale behind the selection of these taxonomies 
are: 
 Taxonomies should be quantifiable based on the information present in the eMARS 
accident reports; 
 Taxonomies should cover as much as possible all failure attributes as observed during 
the preliminary analysis of accidents. 
The human factor taxonomy is a behavioural/ action based taxonomy which is slightly 
modified compare to the PHEA taxonomy to cover different types of human/ operator actions. 
The detail about the PHEA method can be found in the section 3.2.2. The human factors 
Figure 21. Swiss cheese model, model 5C 
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taxonomy is reported in the Table 20. 
 
Table 20: Human and organizational factors taxonomies 
Human factor taxonomy 
Organizational factor 
taxonomy 
Monitoring equipment from field (M) Training (To) 
Monitoring/ operating equipment from 
control room (A)  
Design (Do) 
Communication (C) Procedures (Po) 
Manual tasks on-field (F)  Management (Mo) 
Reporting (R) Safety culture (So) 
 
The organizational factor taxonomy has been modified from the taxonomy proposed by 
(Øien, 2001) to include the main organizational influencing factors.   
 
4.4.1 Considered parameters 
 
In this analysis, some other parameters are also considered to provide a comparison from 
results and to draw some conclusions, if possible. These parameters are reported in the Table 
21. However, it is not possible to quantify all the parameters based on the available 
information in the eMARS reports.  
 
Table 21: parameters considered in the analysis 
Equipment involved Type of hazard Operator’s skill level Plant’s conditions 
Pipework 
Vessel 
In-line equipment 
Flammable 
Toxic 
Both 
Skilled  
Novice 
No info 
Normal operations  
Start up 
Shutdown 
Maintenance 
 
However, some further modifications have been made to certain parameters to consider all 
possible situations. The contractor’s actions are considered in “Novice” operator skill level. 
The justification behind this concept is that contractor are less familiar to operations than a 
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full-time working operator. Hence, situations involving contractors are more prone to the 
failures. The loading/ unloading and fluid addition operations are also considered as “normal 
operations” even though these operations are conducted in batches. 
The detail of the equipment is provided in the Table 22. Furthermore, involved equipment are 
divided into three main classes according to the main function of the equipment. DNV’s 
Phast Hazard analysis software divide the equipments into two main classes: Vessel and 
Pipeline). The (Bellamy et al., 1989) also divides the equipments into two main classes: 
Pipework and in-line equipment.  
In this scope of work, it has been decided to divide the equipments into three main classes 
according to their functionality as illustrated in the Table 22. The Table 22 reports the non-
exhaustive list of equipments to provide an idea about the types of equipments considered in 
each of the class. 
 
Table 22: Classes of equipments 
Pipework Vessels In-line equipment 
Pipeline (Fixed, flexible, buried) 
Welds 
Pipe joints 
Tees 
etc 
Storage tanks 
Reactors 
Absorbers / adsorbers 
Distillation column 
etc 
Pumps 
Compressors 
Valves 
Sight glasses 
Heat exchangers 
Boilers 
Sensors 
Flanges 
Seals 
etc 
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5 Results of accident analysis 
 
This section will illustrate the main results obtained from the accident analysis. The 1st 
section demonstrates the quantitative results of the analysis, while in the 2nd section the 
developed checklists will be presented.   
 
5.1 Quantitative results of the analysis 
 
As mentioned earlier the Table 18 provides the list of industry types present in the eMARS 
database at the time of present work. The eMARS contains about 775 accident reports from 
1988-2012 at the time of this work, of which about 438 accident reports were related to 
considered industry types. A list of considered industrial types can be seen in the Table 18. 
The Figure 22 shows the total number of accidents and accidents caused by the HOF from 
1988 to 2012. During the analysis about 197 accidents (i.e. 45 % of total accidents) were 
observed, when there was Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) was the or one of causes 
to the accident.  
 
 
Figure 22. Total accidents versus accidents caused by HOF (1988-2012) 
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However, those accidents for which investigation are still underway are not considered in this 
analysis. At the same time, only those accidents are considered for which there is credible 
information about the causal factors to the accidents. The recommendations following an 
accident are not considered during the quantification assessment part. During the 
quantification assessment part only the causal factors to the accidents are considered. This is 
to ensure that failure factors are estimated correctly. However, recommendations following 
an accidents are considered in this scope of work and included in other ways mainly future 
suggestions generated from this work.      
According to the Seveso Directive, all the Seveso establishments in the European Union (EU) 
Member States have to report their accidents to the European Commission based on the 
criteria set by the Seveso Directive (EC, 2012). This criteria can also be found in the 
Appendix III. In this scope of work accidents were reported to the European Commission 
according to reasons highlighted in the Table 23. As can be observed that the total number of 
accident reporting reason is higher than the total number of accidents studied in this work, 
this is due to the fact that for some accidents more than one reporting reason may present. 
 
Table 23: Reason for reporting accidents to the European Commission 
Reasons for reporting the accidents Number 
Substances involved: greater than 5% of quantity in column 3 of Annex I, of 
Directive (2012). 
80 
Injury to persons: ≥ 1 fatalities, ≥ 6 hospitalizing injuries etc. 73 
Immediate damage to the environment (according to Annex VI) of Directive 
(2012). 
17 
Damage to property: onsite >2 M €, Offsite > 0,5 M€ 35 
Cross-border damage: transboundary accidents 0 
Interesting for lesson learned 13 
Not mentioned 30 
 
The highest number of accidents were reported due to the “amount of release substances” 
followed by the “injury to persons”. At the same time about 13 accidents were reported when 
an accident does not meet the quantitative criteria to report the accident but it was considered 
to be worth reporting by the establishment (or by Member States) in order to share the lesson 
learned from the accident. In these 13 accidents about 40% of accidents were reported in the 
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2nd half (i.e. 2000-2012) of the analysed time period.  
In order to observe the trend of accidents on a time scale, the total time period has been 
divided into two halves as can be seen from Table 24. It can be observed that the total 
number of accidents decrease slightly in the second half but number of accidents caused by 
HOF haven’t decreased by the same ratio. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that 
with the time, process control and safety have been enhanced but at the same time this also 
adds more complexity into the system. Therefore, human interaction can become more 
complex and can add more failures into the system. 
Some other conclusions are also drawn from this analysis; since all the accidents have been 
studied according to the plant’s/ unit’s operational state when accident has occurred or when 
the main abnormality has been induced into the system. These aspects can be seen from 
Figure 24 in which all the accidents caused by HOF and the accidents occurred due to the 
involvement of contractor into the operations against plant’s different operational stages is 
illustrated. The main contribution from contractor can be seen during the maintenance 
operations, when almost 41% of accidents caused due to the involvement of contractor into 
the operations. This aspect can be observed in reality, since number of industries rely on 
contractors to carry out the maintenance operations.  
Another important point worth mentioning here is the %age of accidents occurred during the 
shut-down conditions. During plant’s shut-down conditions apart from the maintenance, 
waste disposal activities may also be carried out that could potentially lead to accidents. 
Another cause of failures during the shut-down conditions comes from the hazardous wastes, 
that still require the supervision. But due to the shut-down conditions this supervision can be 
overlooked hence leading to potential accident.  
 
Table 24: Comparison of total accidents and accidents caused by the HOF 
Time period Total accidents Accidents caused by HOF %age of accidents 
1988-2000 240 103 43 
2000-2012 198 94 47 
 
During this accident analysis, type of hazard (according to the characteristic of released 
material) is also observed. It can be seen from the Figure 23 that major accidents involving 
HOF occurred, when flammable material was present (≈51%). It can be said that toxic 
materials have an enhanced protection, therefore had led to fewer number of accidents 
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compare to flammable materials. However, in some of the cases it was difficult to classify the 
material into one of the considered types which is about 7% of the cases. The higher number 
of flammable hazard could also be possible due to vast usage of flammable materials (i.e. 
hydrocarbons) in chemical process plants.  
 
 
Figure 23. Accident involving different materials 
 
As described earlier that accidents have been studied according to their initiating causes and 
the safety barriers, which were observed to prevent or mitigate the initiating causes.  
 
 
Figure 24. Total accidents (HOF) and accidents involving contractor in 
plant’s different operational stages 
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The description of accident models can be found in section 4.3 (Table 19). 
The Figure 25 reports the number of accidents occurred in each of the accident models. In 
order to ease the understanding of accidents models, the following explanation has been 
provided. The prefix “1” corresponds to failure of both “technical” and “human” aspects 
during the initiating cause. The prefix “3” corresponds to failure of “technical” aspects while 
prefix “5” corresponds to failure of “human” aspects, as initiating causes. It can be observed 
that accident models with prefix “5” have the highest number of accidents since they 
correspond to “human” failures, which observed implicitly and explicitly during this analysis 
compare to the “technical” failures (i.e. prefix “3”) which only observed when affected by the 
human and organizational factors. Therefore, it can be said that models “3” can provide an 
insight into the value change of λ (i.e. failure rate) as affected by the organizational 
parameters (e.g. to operator and maintain equipments in operations). However, modification 
of failure rate according to the organizational attributes is not scope of this work, that 
required a detailed analysis focused on the failure of the technical equipments.  
However, for certain accidents it was difficult to classify them into one of the accident 
models or the accident evolution exhibits too complex situation to identify them into any of 
the adapted models. These accidents are considered in category “others”.  
 
 
Figure 25. Number of accidents occurred in each of the accident models 
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barriers (i.e. prevention/ mitigation safety layers). The models with suffix “A” shows that 
both “manual and automatic” safety barriers were present and failed hence led to an accident. 
The models with suffix “B” shows that only one of the safety barriers among “manual and 
automatic” was present and failed, while for the models with suffix “C” no safety barriers 
were observed. 
A fewer ratio has been observed for the models with suffix “A”, since both manual and 
automatic safety barrier were present for these models (e.g. 1A, 3A, 5A). However, these 
estimations based on assumption that accident reports (or post-accident investigation) 
includes all the information about the possible safety barriers during an accident.  
Furthermore, in order to see the effectiveness of the barriers (i.e. automatic or manual) 
against different initiating causes (e.g. technical or human failure) a comparison is shown in 
the Figure 26. The Figure 26 illustrates the %age of accidents against each of the accident 
models and against each of the initiating causes (i.e. technical & human, technical, human) 
correspond to 1,3 and 5, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 26. Ratio of accidents across accident models 
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role as safety barrier against the technical initiated failures is less effective compare to when 
applied to human initiated failures. Since, for human initiated failures (i.e. prefix 5) much 
higher ratio is observed when no safety barriers were available (i.e. 5C) compared to when a 
safety barrier is available (i.e.5B). 
However, it could also be possible that human initiating causes are mitigated by the technical 
safety barriers. However, most of the human failure (as initiating cause) occurred due to lack/ 
insufficient manual supervision of the operations.      
The Figure 27 illustrates the number of accidents and the main equipments involved in the 
accident. It can be seen from the Figure 27, that majority of accidents are caused due to 
vessel type equipment (i.e. 40%) followed by the pipework (i.e. 31%) and in-line equipment 
(i.e. 26%). The details about the equipment and their specification can be found in the Table 
22. However, in some cases (i.e. 3%) it was not possible to identify the main involved 
equipment due to insufficient information in eMARS database.  
 
 
Figure 27.  Number of accidents for different equipment types 
 
Furthermore, a comparison between initiating causes and the type of equipments has also 
been done. The details about the initiating causes can be found in the Table 19.  
The Figure 28 illustrates a comparison of the initiating causes to the accidents and the 
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cleaning / maintenance activities of toxic/ flammable storage tanks. Since these activities are 
usually carried out by the contractors and therefore in the absence of an effective safety 
management system or procedures, failure are more probable to occur. 
 
 
Figure 28.  Comparison of initiating causes and type of equipment 
 
Another possible explanation of these failures could be that these activities are usually 
overlooked during the initial risk assessment studies (i.e. HAZID/ HAZOP, QRA etc). 
Therefore, it is recommended to consider these maintenance activities during the preliminary 
risk assessment studies and therefore can be reflected during more detail risk assessment 
studies in later stages of a project.  
In contrary, the technical failures correspond mainly to the pipework compared to other 
equipment types. This could be due to the wide usage of paperwork in chemical process 
industry. 
In similar way, a comparison can also be made between the initiating causes to accidents and 
the substances released, as shown by the Figure 29. This phenomenon can be explained that 
in general toxic substances have better protection that the flammable substances assuming 
that both types of substances are equally used in chemical process plants.  
However, the fewer accidents during the “technical” failures cannot be compared as such 
with the other initiating causes. Since, in this scope of work the emphasis has been done on 
the human factors and human factors related failures than the technical failures. In order to 
draw more absolute conclusions in this regard require to determine the scope of accident 
0 20 40 60
Human
Technical
Technical+
Human
In-line equipment
Vessel
Pipework
77 
 
analysis, accordingly.   
 
 
Figure 29.  Comparison of initiating causes and type of substance 
 
5.2 Checklists for human and organizational factors 
 
The checklists have been developed for the human and organizational factor according to the 
attributes which were observed during the accident analysis. 
The checklists are a useful way to identify that known hazards and threats have been 
identified and assessed. The checklists are normally drawn from standards and operational 
experience and therefore focus on areas where the potential for mistake is high or where the 
problem has already occurred in the past (ISO 17776, 2000). Therefore, in this work it has 
been decided to develop the checklists to identify the potentially critical human and 
organizational attributes based on analysis of past accidents. 
In the MEDIA methodology, the Human Error Identification (HEI) checklists were originally 
adapted from the error classification developed by the (Embrey, 1992) and then later 
modified/ improved in the light of observed accidents. The human activity and errors against 
the selected human factors taxonomy class can be seen in the Table 25. This table has been 
developed as the result of the accident analysis and most of the reported aspects had led to the 
accident in the past with sufficient threshold that accidents were reported to the eMARS. In 
the Table 25 and in the 3rd column, underlined errors/ deviations are those errors that have led 
to accidents in the past. 
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The rationale to collect the specific activity and errors against each of the taxonomy are 
following: 
 It helps to remain consistence throughout the accident analysis, since aspects can be 
considered in same taxonomy class according to their description: 
 Aspects collected in the Table 25 can also assist an analyst to identify the potentially 
critical human interventions and associated errors, prospectively. 
During the proposed methodology, it is recommended to use the checklists in the Table 25 to 
identify the potentially critical human interventions. Since these aspects have already led to 
accidents therefore it is much likely that they can cause accidents again.  
Similarly, Table 26 reports the human interventions and associated errors/ deviations during 
the recovery actions, when there is already a failure or abnormal situation.  
There are number of instances, where it is difficult to classify the interventions among 
operational or recovery layers. For example, for supervision activities it is difficult to classify 
them clearly among the operational or recovery layer. In this scope of work, actions by a 
supervisor and relevant failures are considered in the recovery layer, while monitoring / 
supervision of process parameters are usually considered in the operational layer.  
The accident sequences have also helped to classify the actions among the operational or 
recovery layers. For example, when it is first technical or human failure then it has been 
considered in the operational layer but when there is already a failure and then the role of 
intervention is to mitigate the consequences then they are considered in the recovery layer.  
The Table 27 reports the organizational factor taxonomy and the relevant organizational 
attributes which were overlooked and hence led to the accidents or had a contribution to the 
human / technical failures, that ultimately led to an accident.  
During the organizational factor taxonomy, it has been assumed that an organization has to 
carry out certain actions in a plant’s life from design through operation to decommissioning. 
If an organization fails to carry out these tasks in-time, it may lead to technical or human 
failures and consequently cause an accident. In this scope of work, mainly design and 
operational stage of a plant have been considered while overlooked the decommissioning 
phase. Since, most of the accidents reported to eMARS were in the operational stage and 
have contribution from the design phase or actions were overlooked during the design phase 
of a project.  
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Table 25: MEDIA human action and error classification during operations 
Human factor 
Taxonomy classes 
Related activity types Relevant errors/ deviations 
10 100:Monitoring 
equipment from field 
10 110: Monitoring of vibrations (e.g. vibration from pump 
operations etc). 
10 120: Visual checks for leaks and gas release (e.g. flaring etc). 
 
10 130: Monitoring of automated safety functions (e.g. to ensure if 
not disarmed etc). 
 
10 140: Monitoring of alarms / indicators / equipments / PH displays 
(i.e. display monitoring / readings etc). 
 
10 150: Supervision for potentially wrong sequence of operations. 
 
10 160: Supervision of maintenance operations / hazardous / 
contractor’s operations (e.g. cleaning/ maintenance of units, welding 
operations etc). 
10 170: Supervision of potentially risky operations (e.g. loading / 
unloading operations, fluid transfer operations etc). 
10 180: Monitoring / visual inspection of valves positions, seals, 
flanges etc. 
10 111: Monitoring omitted 
10 112: Monitoring incomplete 
10 121: Monitoring omitted  
10 122: Monitoring incomplete 
10 131: Monitoring omitted  
10 132: Monitoring incomplete 
10 141: Monitoring omitted  
10 142: Monitoring incomplete / 
wrong 
10 151: Monitoring omitted  
10 152: Monitoring incomplete 
10 161: Monitoring omitted  
10 162: Monitoring incomplete 
10 171: Monitoring omitted  
10 172: Monitoring incomplete 
10 181: Wrong/ Incomplete 
monitoring  
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10 190: Visual monitoring for possible external corrosion (e.g. 
external corrosion of pipelines and storage tank basements etc).  
10 182: Monitoring omitted 
10 191: Action omitted 
10 192: Action incomplete / 
insufficient 
10 200: Monitoring/ 
operating equipments 
from control room 
10 210: Monitoring / actions related of remotely operated valves (e.g. 
ESD valves. flow control valves etc). 
 
 
10 220: Monitoring / actions related to process parameters (e.g. 
change in pressure, temperature and flow etc). 
10 230: Monitoring / actions related to switching of units (e.g. 
switching between multiple standby or parallel units etc). 
10 240: Monitoring / actions related to unit start-up and shut-down 
(e.g. especially in plant start-up and maintenance operations etc). 
 
 
10 250: Monitoring / actions related to process alarms in control 
room.  
 
 
 
10 211: Action omitted  
10 212: Action too little / too much 
10 213: Action in wrong direction 
10 221: Action omitted  
10 222: Actions too much/ too little 
10 231: Action in wrong direction 
 
10 241: Wrong action on right object 
10 242: Right action on wrong 
object 
 
10 251: No detection 
10 252: Undue silencing of alarms 
(i.e. violations) 
10 253: Action cannot diagnose 
correctly following an alarm 
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10 260: Supervision for potentially wrong sequence of operations 
(e.g. in case of multiple steps are performed to attain an objective). 
 
10 270: Supervision of maintenance operations / hazardous / 
contractor’s operations (e.g. cleaning/ maintenance of units, welding 
operations etc), where applicable from CR instead from field. 
10 280: Supervision of potentially risky operations, where applicable 
from CR. 
10 290: Monitoring of actions related to the isolation of pipelines and 
process units. 
10 261: Supervision omitted 
10 262: Supervision incomplete / 
insufficient 
10 271: Supervision omitted 
10 272: Supervision incomplete 
10 281: Supervision omitted 
10 282: Supervision incomplete 
10 291: Action omitted 
10 300: 
Communication 
10 310: Communication between shifts. 
 
 
 
 
 
10 320: Communication between process operators and supervisors. 
 
 
 
 
10 311: Information / 
communication not transmitted 
10 312: Wrong information / 
communication transmitted 
10 313: Information / 
communication transmission 
incomplete 
10 321: Information / 
communication not transmitted 
10 322: Wrong information / 
communication transmitted 
10 323: Information / 
communication transmission 
incomplete 
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10 330: Communication among process operators (e.g. control room 
and manual on-field operations, truck operators in case of fluid 
transfer operations) - in case when multiple parties are involved 
during an operation. 
 
 
 
10 340: Communication between different personnel (e.g. process 
plant personnel and maintenance personnel especially when carried 
out by an outside contractors etc). 
 
 
 
10 350: Communication among supervisors. 
 
10 331: Information / 
communication not transmitted 
10 332: Wrong information / 
communication transmitted 
10 333: Information / 
communication transmission 
incomplete 
10 341: Information / 
communication not transmitted 
10 342: Wrong information / 
communication transmitted 
10 343: Information / 
communication transmission 
incomplete 
10 351: Information / 
communication not transmitted 
10 352: Wrong information / 
communication transmitted 
10 353: Information  / 
communication transmission 
incomplete 
10 400: Manual tasks 
on-field 
10 410: Manual operation related to valves / pumps / sealing kits / 
flanges screws etc. 
 
10 411: Action omitted (e.g. left 
valve open /close, blind flange 
operations etc) 
10 412: Action in wrong direction 
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10 420: Manual operations related to on-field alarms (i.e. Switching 
off /silencing an alarm). 
 
 
 
10 430: Manual testing/ calibration of on-field operations. 
 
 
10 440: Manual maintenance operations (e.g. welding, opening / 
cleaning of unit, isolation operations (use of blanking plate or 
spectacle blind for unit isolation), pigging operations, change of 
filters, pressure test and operations related to SISs). 
(i.e. open / close a valve when 
required to do the opposite 
operation) 
10 413: Action too little / too much 
(e.g. for partially open / close valves 
etc) 
10 414: Right action on wrong 
object 
10 415: Un-necessary action (i.e. 
including violation, wilful 
disobedience etc). 
10 421: Switched off/ silencing an 
alarm (required for prevention/ 
mitigation safety operations) 
10 422: Violation in alarm 
operations. 
10 431: Action omitted 
10 432: Right action on wrong 
object 
10 433: Wrong action on right object 
10 441: Action mistimed/ not correct 
10 442: Violation in maintenance 
operations 
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10 450: Fluid addition/ transfer operations (e.g. loading / unloading 
operations, fluid addition and mixing operation). 
 
 
10 460: Manual operations related to pipe / flexible hose connections 
or relevant pipe work operations. 
10 443: Wrong action on right object 
10 444: Right action on wrong 
object 
10 451: Action omitted 
10 452: Action mistimed, not correct 
10 453: Right action on wrong 
object 
10 454: Procedures not followed (i.e. 
Violations) 
10 461: Right action on wrong unit 
10 500: Reporting 
10 510: Report about faulty operation.  
 
 
 
10 520: Report about equipment faulty state, discovered during the 
operations (e.g. alarms taken off, removal of certain instrumentation 
from process etc). 
 
 
10 511: Information not transmitted 
10 512: Wrong information 
transmitted 
10 513: Information transmission 
incomplete or in-sufficient. 
10 521: Information not transmitted 
10 522: Wrong information 
transmitted 
10 523: Information transmission 
incomplete 
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Table 26: MEDIA human action and error classification during recovery (i.e. prevention / mitigation) 
Human factor 
Taxonomy classes 
Related activity types Relevant errors/ deviations 
30 100: Monitoring 
30 110: Supervision of potentially risky operations (e.g. loading / 
unloading operations, fluid transfer operations, valve operations 
etc). 
30 120: Monitoring of PH or other process parameters for fluid 
mixing operations (where applicable). 
30 130: Monitoring of  the pipe connection operations. 
30 111: Not provided in-time monitoring / 
supervision 
 
30 121: Monitoring of PH or process 
parameter omitted / insufficient monitoring. 
30 131: Action incomplete/ not timed. 
30 200: Monitoring / 
operating equipments 
from control room 
30 210: Monitoring / actions related to process parameters (e.g. 
pressure, temperature, flow rate etc) followed by an accident. 
30 220: Monitoring / actions related to process alarms (i.e. 
followed by a severe abnormal situation compare to operational 
errors). 
30 230: Actions related to pipe works followed an accidents (e.g. 
loss of containment)  (i.e. isolations or pipe connection). 
30 211: Action too much/ too little 
 
30 221: Undue silencing of alarms  
 
 
30 231: Error of commission 
30 300: Communication Not observed  
30 400: Manual tasks 
on-field 
30 410: Operations followed an accident (i.e. spill / leak etc).  
30 420: Operations following an in-line unit failure (i.e. valve, disc 
etc). 
30 430: Actions related to pipework followed an accident (e.g. loss 
30 411: Error of commission 
30 421: Error of commission 
 
30 431: Violations (i.e. procedures not 
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of containment) (i.e. isolations or pipe connection). 
30 440: Operator actions related to automatic control systems (i.e. 
SISs) followed an abnormal situation. 
followed) 
30 441: Error of commission 
 
30 500: Reporting Not observed.  
 
Table 27: MEDIA organizational factor taxonomy and error classification 
Organization factor 
taxonomy class 
Related organizational actions (attributes) Relevant errors/ deviations 
20 100: Training 
20 110: Training about normal operations with a refresher. 
20 120: Enhanced training about most hazardous scenarios / 
actions as identified in a safety report (e.g. pressurized 
equipment). 
20 130: Training about response during an emergency situation 
(e.g. spill or leak). 
20 140: Training about the maintenance activities / operations. 
20 111: Training inadequate 
20 121: Training omitted 
20 122: Training inadequate 
20 131: Training omitted 
20 141: Training omitted 
20 200: Design 
20 210: Ensure equipment requirements and specifications (e.g. 
flanges, heat exchangers, vessel type) according to the potential 
risk.  
20 220: To provide necessary interlocks / automatic valves (with 
verification of shutting time provided by interlocks, verification of 
set pressure of rupture disks etc). 
20 230: Calculate risk for all the operations and incorporate during 
the design phase (e.g. loading/unloading operations, power failure 
20 211: Action omitted  
 
20 221: Action omitted 
 
20 231: Action omitted 
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scenario and dirt deposition scenario etc). 
20 240: Consider periodic maintenance of units and adjust 
accordingly in design phase of a plant (e.g. trap of units to collect 
the spillage, access to perform the maintenance operations etc). 
20 250: Consider potential human errors during operations and 
incorporate in design phase of the plant (e.g. including ergonomics 
etc). 
20 260: Consider vibrations of units and pipelines due to 
diversions (e.g. fatigue fracture due to vibrations can led to a leak 
in pipeline and fittings etc). 
20 270: Provide redundancy (i.e. double alarms and interlocks) for 
potentially high risk operations (e.g. loading and unloading 
operations etc). 
20 280: Consider proper type/class of an equipment/ material/ 
monitoring devices (e.g. pumps, heat exchangers, building 
material, scaling devices, filter upstream to safety valves 
especially after columns) depending upon the operations and 
involved substances.  
20 290: Consider to add double drainage valves (where 
appropriate) in case of valve opening due to solid plug of 
materials.  (to avoid the material release to atmosphere).  
20 2100: To provide the trap for units, where there is a possibility 
for leakage/ seepage (e.g. pump carrying hazardous material etc). 
20 2110: To provide the layers of protection (where it seems 
credible) (e.g. add the alarms, double alarms etc) before starting 
the automatic emergency sequences. 
 
20 241: Action omitted 
 
20 251: Action omitted 
 
 
20 261: Action omitted 
 
20 271: Action omitted 
 
 
20 281: Action omitted 
 
 
20 291: Action omitted 
 
20 2101: Action omitted 
 
20 2111: Action omitted 
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20 300: Procedures 
20 310: Provide procedures for the normal operations.  
20 320: Provide procedures for the abnormal / emergency 
operations (e.g. pipeline de-blocking Spill, leak etc). 
20 330:  Provide safe procedures / tools for the maintenance 
operations (maintenance of units, protective clothes in work, 
permits for hazardous work etc). 
20 340: Provide more strict procedures for hot work applications / 
hazardous scenarios (Hazardous fluid addition, cleaning of tanks).  
20 350: Provide procedures for the outsource contractor’s work 
(e.g. maintenance related activities, loading operations etc), also 
ensure the active supervision of all operations related to 
contractors. 
20 360: Assess the Implementation of procedures (i.e. with respect 
to difficulty / impracticality etc). 
20 370: To update the procedures following changes (add as an 
integral part of the “management of change” framework).  
20 380: Procedures for un-expected weather patterns leading to a 
hazardous situation (e.g. wind speed, direction etc), if required. 
20 390: Provide procedures for the inspection of critical 
components (e.g. critical flanges, critical storage tanks etc). 
20 3100: Provide non-routine job procedures (e.g. for temporary or 
infrequent operations). 
20 3110: Provide procedures for equipments use / maintained by 
20 311: Action omitted/ Insufficient 
20 321: Action omitted 
 
20 331: Action omitted 
 
20 341: Action omitted 
 
20 351: Action omitted 
 
20 361: Action omitted 
 
20 371: Action omitted 
20 381: Action omitted 
 
20 391: Action omitted 
20 3101: Action omitted 
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contractor at different facility (e.g. pressure test procedures for 
temporary storage tanks prior to their application) or at least 
should have detail knowledge about adapted procedures by the 
contractor. 
20 3111: action omitted 
 
20 400: Management 
20 410: Adequate manning level in accordance with the safety 
studies (to carry out the desired actions etc). 
20 420: Define roles / responsibilities for operators, accordingly. 
20 430: Eliminate/ minimize the communication problems among 
different involved parties (e.g. different departments or parties etc) 
20 440: To Follow latest / proper safety standards / rules / software 
and ensure to provide adequate process /risk analysis (e.g.  to 
provide product or off-spec storage in case of any natural hazard 
and calculations of anticipated corrosion rate should be based on 
international standards). 
20 450: Provide adequate knowledge about the properties of 
chemicals / fluids used in a plant, also to share layout of critical 
plant sections with all involved parties. 
20 460: Handling/ communication of management of change. 
20 470: To update the process/ control according to risk 
assessment/ safety studies. 
 
20 480: To carry out the risk assessment studies comprehensively/ 
before and following major modifications. 
20 490: To provide / ensure an effective maintenance/ inspection. 
20 411: Action omitted 
 
20 421: Action omitted 
20 431: Action omitted 
 
20 441: Action omitted 
 
 
20 451: Action omitted 
 
20 461: Action omitted 
20 471: Action omitted 
20 472: Action insufficient 
 
20 481: Action omitted 
20 491: Action omitted 
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plan. 
20 4100: To provide standard for temporary pieces (e.g. T-piece to 
be used during maintenance operations), standard / procedure to 
use an old pipelines (e.g. pressure test, check for leaks before to 
use for transportation of fluid). 
 
20 4101: Action omitted 
20 500: Safety culture 
20 510: Ensure the adequate safety leadership / culture. 
20 520: Ensure an efficient and effective safety communication 
(e.g. accident and lessons learned from accidents).  
20 530: Ensure to provide adequate response to complaints related 
to operations and existing safety stature.  
20 540: Ensure steps to avoid the blame culture inside the 
organization. 
20 511: Action omitted 
20 521: Action omitted 
20 531: Action omitted 
20 541: Action omitted 
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6 Quantification of human and organizational factors 
 
This section presents the procedures adapted to estimate the human error probability from the 
accident analysis, assumptions and limitations. Furthermore, weightage of organizational 
factors on human reliability as obtained from the analysis is also presented.  
 
6.1 Estimation of human error probabilities 
 
The estimation of HEPs is always subject to some assumptions, especially if it is based on the 
past experience. In order to define the HEP, it is not only necessary to know the number of 
errors that have occurred for each task and how often the task was performed but also the 
circumstances under which the task was performed (OECD, 1998). 
Furthermore, as stated by the (OECD, 1998) that the HRA methods can be classify according 
to the level of the data scale. For example, three main scales have been identified as: 
 Absolute scale 
 Relative scale 
 Ordinal scale 
The absolute scale can provide the HEP in the range from 0 to 1, where 0 means no error and 
1 means a sure failure. The relative scale can provide information about the two tasks in 
comparison, for example task 1 has twice as higher probability of failure as the task 2. While, 
the ordinal scale can provide information like task 1 is more likely than the task 2. The 
ordinal scale cannot identify the extent of the scale.   
Normally, HEP can be estimated by an equation of the form (i.e. n/N) where n is the observed 
frequency of failure of events and N is total observable events. However, if one decides to 
use the past experience (i.e. accident analysis) to quantify the HEP then aforementioned 
equation is not valid, since accidents are always reported by a certain threshold value. The 
reporting threshold values are determined by the management or authorities. In this scope of 
work, the reporting threshold is determined by the Annex VI of the “Seveso Directive”. This 
aspect is also highlighted by the (Sträter, 2000) who has further illustrated the problem of 
determining the probabilities from the operational experience because from operational 
experience one can only determine the limited frequencies having the following form shown 
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in the Eq. 9.       
 
Therefore, if one decides to calculate the HEP from operational experience then total number 
of events related to an action type are unknown and also the total failures are unknown since 
errors are only reported above a certain threshold.  
Furthermore, the comparison of HEP (i.e. from THERP) with the operational data as adapted 
in this work is only permissible if one can demonstrate that as argued in the CAHR method 
(Sträter, 2000): 
 The number of requirements in the collected events corresponds to those of HEP 
values; 
 The data from the Swain and Guttman (i.e. THERP) also have the same statistical 
information as of the obtained data from the operational experience.  
The rule based behaviour is associated to make the choices, sometimes these choices could 
lead to accidents. Since, the rule based behaviour is connected to the idea that how much an 
operator is familiar with the task. This can be assume to be attainable through the idea that 
how often an operator perform a certain action of type of i (i.e. frequency of use) (Sträter, 
2000). Therefore, it can be assumed that the HEP (i.e. from THEPR) can be compared with 
the operational experience 
(frequencies of failure).  
The  Figure 30 illustrates the 
different types of operator’s 
behaviour and their requirements. It 
can be observed that for the rule 
based behaviour, that is guided by 
rules/ procedures, recognition of 
the situation. Therefore, right 
procedures play a role in rule based 
behaviour. The skill based 
behaviour is based on the 
spontaneous response of the 
operator. This response can be driven by the learned skills. However, this response is rather 
 h(erroneous action of type i | event above a certain reporting threshold) Eq. 9 
 
Skill based 
behaviour 
Rule based 
behaviour 
Knowledge based 
behaviour 
A
utom
atic 
Conscious 
Figure 30. Different types of operator’s behavior and 
their requirements  
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Errors caused by 
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Total observable human errors 
automatic and less rely on the cognitive traits of the operator. On the other hand, the 
knowledge based behaviour is driven by the conscious of the operator (i.e. cognitive skills 
etc) and less automatic compare to the other response types. At the same time, it can also be 
assumed with certain confidence that same kind of operational experience has been utilized in 
the THERP database (i.e. used in this scope of work) without precise knowledge of the 
system. Therefore, based on these arguments it is justifiable to compare the observed 
frequencies (from the operational experience) with the THERP database. 
The Figure 31 illustrates the concept that has been used in the newly developed methodology 
(i.e. MEDIA). It has been assumed that humans have a tendency to make errors even in an 
ideal working condition, these types of errors are interpreted as the inherent errors or failures. 
Then there are errors that are caused by the affect of the PSFs that can be interpreted as the 
errors caused 
by the 
external 
PSFs.  
The rate of 
accidents (i.e. 
failures) 
caused by the 
external PSFs 
is determine 
by the 
situation of 
the PSFs. The better the situation of the PSFs, the lower is the error rate caused by the 
external PSFs. However, worst situation of the external PSFs can enhance the error rate 
caused by the external PSFs. 
It can also be argued that external PSFs might also have a +ve effect on the human error rate. 
But, currently the +ve effect of the PSFs is not considered in this scope of the work. 
The main uncertainties in this assessment are caused due to the following elements, some of 
these elements have been identified by the (Swain and Guttmann, 1983) : 
1. The stochastic variability within an individual and among the performance of 
different individuals; 
2. Identification of the all relevant PSFs, their interactions and effects on the 
Figure 31. Inherent human errors and errors causes by the PSFs 
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performance of an operator; 
3. Deficiencies/ limitations in the post-accident investigation / reporting to identify the 
causal factors that have led to the accidents; 
4. The insufficient number of events corresponding to an action class; 
5. Limitation due to the subjective nature of the assessment (e.g. the accident analysis 
performed by two different individuals might lead to different results to identify the 
causal factors to an accident). 
The first type of uncertainty can be handled by the assumption of selecting a range ratio (used 
in the lognormal distribution) that is based on some of studies in the field of the adult 
intelligence (e.g. Wechsler range ratio etc). While, the second type of uncertainty can be 
minimized by an improved reporting in the eMARS system. The 3rd type of uncertainty 
cannot be addressed in this scope of work, that is related to the post-accident investigation 
procedures. The 4th type of uncertainty can be considered in defining the Error Factor (EF) 
against a HEP value. The less the HEP corresponding to fewer observed events hence the 
more will be its corresponding uncertainty. This concept has been considered in defining the 
EF. The last type of uncertainty can be improved by extended the analysis to more than one 
individuals. However, given the subjective nature of whole risk assessment process, this type 
of uncertainty has been accepted at the moment.  
Furthermore, the considered taxonomy for human factors (from Table 20) has been recorded 
for number of instances observed during the accident analysis. The model for the inherent 
human errors and the total human errors can be observed in the Figure 31.  
The Table 28 reports the observed instances against the considered human factor taxonomy in 
both inherent and total human errors cases. It can be observed from the Table 28 that major 
accidents occurred when operators are performing manual tasks on-field operations. Since, 
high numbers of daily operations are carried out by the operators as manual task on-filed in 
the chemical process plant.  
Surprisingly, a high number has also been obtained in case of “diagnostic” monitoring task. 
These cases correspond to those situations when operator/ supervisor were responsible to 
carry out the supervision activities and failed to manage it, hence led to the accidents. 
Meanwhile, monitoring task in the “Operational” layer also corresponds to number of 
accidents. These are operator’s monitoring activities that an operator should have carry out 
but failure in carrying out led to accidents. At the same time, a lower number has been 
observed corresponding to the control room actions compare to other actions types. 
Therefore, it can be said that in general control room actions might not be as critical as other 
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action types.  
Table 28: Number of instances observed for different action types 
Human factor taxonomy 
Instances – 
Inherent human 
errors 
Instances – 
Total human 
errors 
Monitoring equipment from field (M) 5 14 
Monitoring/ operating equipment 
from control room (A) 1 5 
Communication (C) 3 9 
Manual tasks on-field (F) 40 107 
Reporting (R) 1 3 
Diagnostic: Monitoring 8 16 
Diagnostic: Control room action 4 10 
Diagnostic: Manual tasks on-field 3 8 
 
6.1.1 Lognormal distribution  
 
The lognormal distribution is used quite frequently in reliability and safety studies, primarily 
due to its characteristic of skewness at one end of the distribution (Red Book, 1997). The 
lognormal distribution has also been adapted in the THERP database (Swain and Guttmann, 
1983). The use of log normal distribution for the Human Error Probability (HEP) has been 
justified based on the following main aspects: 
 Since the performance of the skilled persons tend to bunch up towards the lower end 
of the distribution, that can be justifiable by using a non-symmetric distribution (i.e. 
log normal distribution); 
 The log normal distribution can readily be adapted to the human reliability studies, 
since its parameters can be using its two percentiles in contrary to other non-
symmetrical distributions.  
Therefore, a log normal distribution has been used in this work providing the absence of 
strong data to contradict its use and due to its use in the existing human reliability studies 
(e.g. THERP etc).  
The relationship to a normal distribution is as follows: If a stochastic variable ln (X) has a 
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normal distribution, then X has a lognormal distribution. The Probability Density Function 
(PDF) of a lognormal distribution is provided by the Eq. 10, as reported in the (Red Book, 
1997): 
 
 
Whereas: 
 𝜎 is the standard deviation. 
 μ is the Mean, location parameters of the distribution.  
 
The Error Factor (EF) for lognormal distribution is defined as follows: 
 
EF =  √
X0.95
X0.05
 =  
X0.95
Xmedian
 =  
Xmedian
X0.05
  
 
Whereas: 
  X0.95 is the 95
th percentile,  
  X0.05 is the 5
th percentile 
 
These percentiles are also called the upper and lower Uncertainty Bounds (UCBs). The upper 
UCBs (i.e. 95th) means that the HEP would be higher than this value no more than 5% of the 
cases, while the lower UCBs (i.e. 5th) means that HEP would be lower than this value no 
more than 5% of the cases. Therefore, it can be said that the HEP would lie in the region 
defined by the UCBs around 90% of the cases.   
 
The sigma (𝜎) “standard deviation” can be calculated as follows: 
 
σ =  
ln (EF)
Z0.95
 =   
ln (EF)
1.645
 
 
Therefore, following form of the log normal distribution (i.e. PDF) can be obtained by using 
the values of sigma (𝜎), as represented in the Eq.11. 
 f(X) =  
1
xσ√2п
 .  exp 
[−  
{ln(X) ­μ}2
2σ2
]
 Eq. 10 
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The median of the log normal distribution is given by (Red Book, 1997): 
 
 Xmedian =  exp
μ 
 
The mean of the log normal distribution is given by: 
 
Xmean =   exp
(μ+0.5σ2) 
 
The variance of the log normal distribution is given by: 
 
Var (X) =  exp(2μ+σ
2)  {expσ
2
 − 1} 
 
However, in order to use the log normal distribution for the HEPs, it is required to apply the 
hypothesized distribution as shown in the Figure 5 and has been proposed by the THERP 
database.  
The hypothesized distribution has been obtained by assuming a standard deviation of 0.42 
that can be obtained by assuming a 4:1 range ratio between the percentiles. The range ratio of 
4:1 assume that abilities of the best person are 4 times higher than the abilities of the worst 
person in a random group. The selected range ratio also accounts for the uncertainty coming 
from the variation among people’s abilities to a great extent. Providing the lack of 
information to provide more sophisticated approach, it has been decided to use the 
information providing in the THERP database. 
For the tasks performed under stress, the entire distribution tends to move towards right and 
can be skewed on the left rather than on the right. Therefore, task performed under stress tend 
to have a higher probability of failure than the tasks performed under normal conditions.   
However, the EF across the median HEPs in the THERP database are asymmetric in-contrary 
to the hypothesized distribution shown in the Figure 5. This was an unnecessary refinement 
as also argued by the (Swain and Guttmann, 1983). Furthermore, a generic table has been 
 f(X) =  
1
x.
ln (EF)
1.645 . √2п
 .  exp 
[– 
1
2 
(ln(X) ­μ
ln (EF)
1.645
⁄ )
2
]
 Eq.11 
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proposed in the THERP database in order to assign the EF against the HEPs. The main 
assumption of this proposed table is that, the lower HEPs values corresponds to the higher EF 
values due to the infrequent nature of the actions as can be observed from the Table 14.    
Therefore, in this scope of work the HEPs are provided according to the log normal 
distribution and  UCBs are based on the EF illustrated in the Table 14. However, future work 
can be extended to provide further guidelines on the selection of the EF either based on a 
distribution (i.e. symmetric EFs) or based on more insight to defines the error factors (i.e. 
asymmetric EFs). The asymmetric EFs can be defined based on either the values of the HEPs 
itself or different actions types assuming the different levels of uncertainty or the stress 
levels.   
As mentioned earlier that in this work, HEPs have been obtained from the past accidents 
analysis. In order to obtain the HEPs from the past accidents, the obtained failure frequencies 
(or modified frequencies) are compared with the corresponding THERP HEPs by using a 
probabilistic model. The section 6.1 has already provided the justifications for the 
comparison of THERP HEPs to the failure frequencies obtained from the accident analysis. 
 
6.1.2 The probabilistic Rasch model – Application of CAHR 
 
The Rasch model has been developed by the George Rasch that can help to analyse the data 
as a trade off between the difficulty and ability parameters (Rasch, 1960). The (Choppin, 
1983) has described the Rasch model as a model that can link the probability of outcome of a 
single person for an item according to the characteristics of the person and the item. 
Therefore, the Rasch model is termed as the model for the latent-trait measurements. 
During the CAHR development, number of approaches had been applied for the calibration 
of the observed frequencies (i.e. failure) and had found that the probabilistic Rasch model 
provides the maximum agreement to the THERP HEP values. Since, more events were 
collected during the CAHR development compared to the existing study, so it has been 
decided to use the probabilistic Rasch model to calibrate the observed frequencies according 
to the approach used in the CAHR model. 
According to the Rasch model  the response of individuals to the items of an intelligence test 
can be derived as shown in the Eq.12 and is adapted from (Rasch, 1960), p. 168. It has been 
assumed in this model, that response of different persons to the same item as well as the 
responses of each person to all items are stochastically independent. This assumption is also 
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valid in case of human operations in chemical process industry in which the human 
operations are independent to a greater extent until there are operations in a series.    
The probability of correct response (i.e. θνi) of a person (ν) to an item (i) is expressed as: 
 
 
Whereas: 
 ξν is a parameter related to a person (i.e. ability). 
 δi is the parameter related to the item (i.e. difficulty). 
 
During some further transformation and simplification, new parameters had been defined for 
the person’s ability and item’s difficulty. For example, ξν = W and δi = W, against a constant 
“W” as also mentioned by the (Choppin, 1983). Furthermore, these parameters can also be 
defined by ξν =  W
ξν  and δi = W
δi, whereas W is again a constant. 
However, in some further simplifications introduced by the Rasch and also used in the 
literature is to fix the constant “W” to the natural logarithmic base (e), as mentioned in the 
(Choppin, 1983). 
After simplifying the  Eq.12 by introducing the logarithmic base (e) as a constant, the 
following form is obtained: 
 
θνi =  
eξν
eξν +  eδi
 
 
Dividing both numerator and denominator by eδi: 
 
θνi =  
et
1 +  et
 
 
Whereas: 
 et = (ξν - δi) 
 
In order to simplify the used terminology in these equations, the following further 
 θνi =  
ξν
ξν +  δi
 Eq.12 
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simplification has been carried out: 
ξν = X (i.e. ability parameter) 
δi = D (i.e. difficulty parameter) 
Therefore, above equation can be re-written as: 
 
θνi =  
e(X − D)
1 +  e(X − D) 
 
 
The aforementioned equation can be modify in order to obtain the probability of failure as 
shown by the Eq.13. The Eq.13 had been already been used in the CAHR method and is 
therefore adapted from the (Sträter, 2000): 
 
 
One of the assumptions of the Rasch model is that the latent value and true value of a 
property are interconnected by an Item Characteristic Curve (ICC). The ICC provides the 
output value of a property from 0 to 1, therefore it can provide the results in a range that can 
be used as a probability estimates. As argued by the (Sträter, 2000), that due to this reason the 
probabilistic Rasch model is suitable for comparing the operational experience with the 
THERP HEP values.  
The parameters of the ICC have been estimated by the (Sträter, 2000) and are as follows: 
 
ChancesFailure of task of type i  =  Di − X 
 
In the aforementioned relation, X  = 0 , Since the ability parameter can only be estimated by 
observing the successful events. However, in this work estimation to the ability cannot be 
provided as failures have been observed. Also, the ability parameters can be considered as a 
constant due to the provided education / training compare to the technical system.  
The difficulty parameter can further estimate by the following relation: 
 
Di =  
n`i −  μ
Sn 
 
 
 PFailure =  
e(D − X)
1 +  e(D − X) 
 Eq.13 
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Whereas: 
 Di is estimation of difficulty of task i 
 n`i is the anticipated frequency of error of type i 
 μ is the mean value 
 Sn is the anticipated deviation  
 
Therefore, based on the newly defined parameters, the following equation can be obtained:  
 
 
The Eq.14 can provides the probability of failure of type i event, that are observed ni times. 
While, the parameter “Sn” was estimated by iterations using least square method and to find 
the condition that can provide the maximum agreement with the THERP HEP values.  
The anticipated frequencies can be calculated from the observed frequency by the Eq.15 as 
mentioned in the (Sträter, 2000): 
 
 
Whereas: 
 n`i is the anticipated frequency for task i 
  m is the number of all events (i.e. 172) 
 mi is the number of events for task i (i.e. total human errors). 
 ni is the number of events with inherent failure characteristics for task i (i.e. inherent 
 human errors). 
 
The advantage of using the anticipated frequencies rather than the absolute frequencies is that 
the different action types can be compared on the same scale. Because, some action types 
might occur more or less frequent than other action types (consequently more or less failure 
frequencies). This aspect can be taken into account by modifying the absolute frequencies 
into the anticipated frequencies. Furthermore, (Sträter, 2000) has argued that by using the 
anticipated frequencies instead of absolute frequencies more correlation can be found 
 PFailure of type i =  
eDi
1 + eDi  
=  
e
(
n`i− μ
Sn
)
1 +  e
(
n`i− μ
Sn
)
 
 Eq.14 
 n`i = [
m
mi
] × ni Eq.15 
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between frequencies and the THERP HEP. Another advantage of using the concept of 
anticipated frequencies is that, the frequency count become irrespective of the numbers of 
action types considered during the analysis. For example, one can argue that if consider a 
taxonomy consist of more than five action types, then the overall frequency count might 
decrease due to the random distribution of the failures among the action types. Consequently, 
the overall analysis will depend a lot on the action types considered in a taxonomy. The 
aforementioned arguments can be explained in this work for two possible conditions: 
 If failure frequencies have been observed for an actions type: in this case, the 
anticipated frequency relation will determine the frequency value based on the model 
adapted in this work (i.e. Figure 31). 
 If no failure frequencies have been observed for an action types: in this case, the used 
checklists will ensure that the particular activity should be or shouldn’t be considered 
against an action type. Then developed checklists will help to remain consistence 
during the development phase and the possible prospective application phase.  
The further assumptions of the Rasch model and its use to compare the frequencies to the 
THERP HEP can be found in the (Sträter, 2000). 
In order to calibrate the anticipated frequencies to the HEP from the THERP, the least square 
method has been used.  
 
6.1.3 Fitting the model 
 
The first step to fit the probabilistic model was to collect the corresponding THERP HEPs. It 
has been tried to collect as much as possible the closet THEPR HEPs against the main types 
of activities considered in each of the action types. However, due to the nature of the accident 
analysis and the format of THERP database. It is not possible to find the exact 
correspondence between the considered action types and the THERP HEPs. The Table 29 
illustrates the MEDIA action types and the selected THERP HEPs, corresponding EF and the 
THERP tables. The rationale behind the selection of a specific table and items can be seen in 
the Appendix V.   
The upper and lower uncertainty bounds of the THERP HEPs values have been calculated by 
considering the log normal distribution and by using the concepts mentioned in the section 
6.1.1. Since, the HEP values in the THERP represent the median values of the lognormal 
distribution.  
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Therefore, the THERP median values should be converted into mean value for the 
comparison with the frequencies that have been observed during the accident analysis. The 
mean values of HEP have been selected because it can also take into account the skewness at 
each end of the distribution by considering the standard deviation. The procedure to get the 
mean values can be seen in the section 6.1.1. 
 
Table 29: MEDIA taxonomy and the corresponding THERP HEP values 
Action type 
THERP values 
(Median) 
Error 
Factor 
Corresponding THERP 
tables 
Monitoring equipment from field (M) 3,00×10-3 10 Table 20-27, item (4) 
Monitoring/ operating equipment 
from control room (A)  1,00×10
-3 3 
Table 20-11, item (1) & 
item (2) 
Communication (C) 3,00×10-3 3 
Table 20-7, item (2) & 
item (3) 
Manual tasks on-field (F)  8,00×10-3 3 Table 20-13, item (4) 
Reporting (R) 1,00×10-3 5 Table 20-22, item (9) 
Diagnostic: Monitoring (M) 1,00×10-3 5 Table 20-22, item (4) 
Diagnostic: Control room action (A) 2,50×10-2 10 Table 20-2, item (2) 
Diagnostic: Manual tasks on-field (F) 8,00×10-2 5 Table 20-16 (item 6) 
 
The next step after the conversion of the median values into the mean values is the 
comparison with the anticipated frequencies from the accident analysis. The least square 
method has been adapted in this study in order to compare the data and to fit the model. The 
object of the least square method is to minimize the distances as can be seen in the following 
equation Eq.16. 
 
 
Whereas: 
 𝑦𝑖 is the observed values (i.e. THERP) 
  𝑦𝑖
^
 is the predicted values (i.e. from Rasch model) 
      ∑(yi 
n
i=1
−   yi
^
)2 Eq.16 
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Another aspect that has been considered during the calculations is the uncertainty bounds of 
the THERP values. According to the THERP database, HEP can subject to variations 
according to their uncertainty bounds. As the curve obtained from the Rasch model is a S-
shaped curve therefore optimal fitting condition has been obtained by satisfying following 
two main conditions: 
 Minimizing the least square distances; 
 Maximizing the %age agreement of the predicted values with the THERP uncertainty 
bounds; 
The Table 30 illustrates the THERP mean values, corresponding Uncertainty Bounds 
(UCBs), anticipated frequencies (i.e. estimated from the absolute frequencies according to the 
Eq.15) and the estimated values predicted by the Rasch model. 
It can be observed from the Table 30 that for the “Monitoring/ operating equipment from 
control room (A)” has a very low HEP value compare to other action types. This can be 
explained by the fewer number of inherent human errors corresponding to this action type.  
At present condition (i.e. Sn = 5,41), the 75% of the predicted values are within the THERP 
uncertainty bounds. The two action types that have values outside the THERP uncertainty 
bounds are: 
 Monitoring/ operating equipment from control room (A); 
 Diagnostic: Monitoring. 
These two values outside the uncertainty bounds can be explained by a difference in the 
industry types. Since THERP has been developed in the nuclear industry while this accident 
analysis has been performed in the chemical process industry. The first action type can be 
explained in following terms: as most of the failure in chemical process industry occur in 
manual tasks on-field and lesser are associated with the control room actions as compared to 
the nuclear industry. In the nuclear industry the generic actions/ interventions are control 
room centric hence more associated failures can be observed from the control room based 
actions.  
While, the second action types that is associated with the monitoring failures during the 
diagnostic tasks has obtained a higher value than the THERP estimates. It could be possible 
that, giving the less criticality of the chemical process industry, human actions can be 
considered during the diagnostic tasks but due to lack of proper training and tools led to 
errors.  
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Table 30: THERP mean values, relative frequencies and estimated HEP values 
Action type 
THERP 
values 
(Mean) 
UCBs 
n`i 
Predicted 
values 
(Rasch 
model) 
Upper Lower 
Monitoring 
equipment from 
field (M) 
7,99×10-3 3,00×10-2 3,00×10-4 61,4 1,05×10-2 
Monitoring/ 
operating equipment 
from control room 
(A) 
1,25×10-3 3,00×10-3 3,33×10-4 34,4 7,21×10-5 
Communication (C) 3,75×10-3 9,00×10-3 1,00×10-3 57,3 4,97×10-3 
Manual tasks on-
field (F) 1,00×10
-2 2,40×10-2 2,67×10-3 64,3 1,78×10-2 
Reporting (R) 1,61×10-3 5,00×10-3 2,00×10-4 57,3 4,97×10-3 
Diagnostic: 
Monitoring (M) 1,61×10
-2 5,00×10-2 2,00×10-3 86,0 5,00×10-1 
Diagnostic: Control 
room action (A) 6,66×10
-2 2,50×10-1 2,50×10-3 68,8 4,00×10-2 
Diagnostic: Manual 
tasks on-field (F) 1,29×10
-1 4,00×10-1 1,60×10-2 64,5 1,84×10-2 
 
The Figure 32 illustrates the comparison of the THERP HEP values and HEP estimates 
obtained from the Rasch model against the anticipated frequency scale. It can be observed 
from the chart in the Figure 32, that as the anticipated frequency increases, the corresponding 
HEP estimates also tend to increase. The maximum value of the anticipated frequency could 
become equal to the total number of events observed (i.e. 172). This condition corresponds to 
a hypothetical condition when all the all the failures become equal to the inherent human 
failure for an action type. In this case the obtained HEP will become equal to one.  
However, If the anticipated frequency of an action type is closer to the median value (i.e. 86) 
then the predicted estimate of the corresponding HEP is closer to 0,5.  
It can be seen from the Figure 32 that the Rasch curve follows the THERP HEP values and 
can predict the values of HEP based on the anticipated frequencies. But, there is always an 
uncertainty to predict the values outside the model range. 
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In order to make 
more explicit 
conclusions, there is 
a need to gather data 
against more action 
classes. Hence, 
required to develop a 
taxonomy that 
constitutes much 
more action types 
than five. But, this 
type of taxonomy 
can pose a challenge 
during the assessment step and also during the prospective analysis. During the assessment 
step, the challenge is mainly due to the required detailed information to classify and 
differentiate among different actions. The more are the actions types, the more information it 
is required to classify among them. Moreover, the same information acquisition challenge can 
add more uncertainty 
into the analysis during 
the prospective 
analysis.  
 In order to observed 
more precise movement 
of THERP values along 
the Rasch curve, the 
Figure 33 can provide 
the comparison on the 
logarithmic scale.  The 
THERP values can be 
seen along the Rasch 
curve, however in few 
cases some deviation has been confirmed, as has already been identified. In order to examine 
Figure 33: Comparison of THERP values and the estimated values 
from Rasch (logarithmic scale) 
Figure 32: Comparison of THERP values and the estimated values 
from Rasch (Normal scale) 
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this deviation, the further analysis into the residuals has been carried out.  
In order to carry out the residuals analysis, a “residual versus fitted plot” can provide some 
indication about the outliers and also about any existing trend. The residuals of ith value can 
be calculated as highlighted in the Eq.17. 
 
 
Whereas: 
 𝑦𝑖 is the observed values (i.e. THERP) 
 𝑦𝑖
^
 is the predicted values (i.e. from Rasch model) 
 
It can be seen from the Figure 34 that due to high fitted value of “Diagnostic: Monitoring” 
the corresponding residual is also higher. A possible explanation of high fitted value has 
already been provided. 
 
 
Figure 34. Residuals vs fitted plot 
 
The rest of the plot exhibits a normal behaviour. However, due to lack of data points it is 
difficult to draw sweeping conclusions from these plots. Based on this analysis, it can be 
proposed to perform an advanced or at-least more in-details analysis about the diagnostic 
tasks or the operator’s behaviour during the diagnostic tasks. 
In order to employ the uncertainty bounds of the obtained HEPs, the guidelines provided by 
THERP have been adapted as shown in the Table 14. These guidelines have been used in the 
absence of any concrete evidence in order to provide more reliable bounds. Therefore, the 
final obtained HEP with their EFs are presented in the Table 31. The EF presented in the 
 Residual =  ( 𝑦𝑖 −  𝑦𝑖
^
 ) Eq.17 
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Table 31 are corresponding to the THERP type A “step-by-step and under routine 
circumstances and under optimal stress level” for the MEDIA action types in the operational 
layer. However, for the action types in the diagnostic tasks, THERP type E “task under high 
stress, e.g. large LOCA; conditions in which the status of the PSFs is not perfectly clear; 
conditions in which the initial operator responses have proved to be in inadequate and sever 
time pressure is felt” has been used. The only exception has been made for the “Diagnostic: 
Monitoring” tasks for which very high HEP has been obtained and therefore a different rule 
has been used in this case to keep the upper uncertainty bounds below 1 (i.e. the maximum 
value for a probability). However, for certain other situations, for example tasks under high 
stress level and for tasks require more dynamic interplay between operator and system 
different error factors should be used as suggested by the THERP. 
 
Table 31: MEDIA HEP and relevant EF 
Action type 
MEDIA values 
(Median) 
EF 
Bounds 
Upper Lower 
Monitoring equipment from 
field (M) 1,05×10
-2 5 5,25×10-2 2,10×10-3 
Monitoring/ operating 
equipment from control room 
(A) 
7,21×10-5 10 7,21×10-4 7,21×10-6 
Communication (C) 4,97×10-3 3 1,49×10-2 1,66×10-3 
Manual tasks on-field (F) 1,78×10-2 5 8,90×10-2 3,56×10-3 
Reporting (R) 4,97×10-3 3 1,49×10-2 1,66×10-3 
Diagnostic: Monitoring 5,00×10-1 1,5 7,50×10-1 3,33×10-1 
Diagnostic: Control room 
action 4,00×10
-2 5 2,00×10-1 8,00×10-3 
Diagnostic: Manual tasks on-
field 1,84×10
-2 5 9,20×10-2 3,68×10-3 
 
During a risk assessment study, an analyst can select the values between the upper and lower 
uncertainty bounds with most probable estimates closer to the median values. However, these 
values can subject to modification under specific conditions, required for an assessment. The 
HEP in Table 31 are assumed to be distributed according to hypothetical log normal 
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distribution as also assumed in the THERP database and the median values are illustrated in 
the Table 31.  
 
6.2 Verification of obtained HEPs 
 
This section provides the information about the verifications of the obtained HEP from the 
MEDIA assessment. However, a validation of the obtained HEP from the end-users relevant 
to the chemical process industry has not been carried out at the moment. In order to verify the 
obtained HEPs, three most widely used quantitative human reliability methods have been 
chosen along with the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) values recommended by the 
International Standard. These are as follows: 
 THERP; 
 SPAR-H; 
 TESEO; 
 PFD, adapted from (IEC 61511, 2003). 
The Figure 35 illustrates the comparison of the MEDIA and the THERP HEPs. It can be 
observed that data points are almost randomly distributed on both sides of the correspondence 
line. However, due to lack of data points an overall conclusion is difficult to make about the 
main characteristic of the MEDIA compared to the THERP. In any case, it can be seen that in 
certain cases, the MEDIA is more pessimistic than the THERP but in fewer cases the MEDIA 
is more optimistic than the THERP. The pessimistic nature of the MEDIA can be explained 
by the less criticality of failures in the chemical process industry compared to the nuclear 
industry. 
In the SPAR-H method 
(Gertman et al., 2005), 
it has been 
recommended to use the 
base nominal human 
error probability equal 
to 0,001 and 0,01 for 
action and diagnostic 
tasks, respectively. 
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Figure 35: Comparison of MEDIA and THERP HEP 
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These base HEP subject to modification according to PSFs. The Table 32 illustrates a 
comparison of MEDIA HEP and HEP recommended by the SPAR-H method. The HEP 
corresponding to “action” are of same order of magnitude but the “diagnostic” HEP obtained 
from MEDIA is higher than the HEP recommended by the SPAR-H. Since MEDIA has 
estimated the HEP by balancing the human inherent HEP and the HEP caused by the PSFs. 
So, it can be said that in the diagnostic layer more of the HEP are originated by the inherent 
characteristics than the characteristic influencing by the PSFs especially organizational PSFs.   
 
Table 32: Comparison of MEDIA and SPAR-H HEP 
Action type MEDIA SPAR-H 
Action (i.e. operational layer in MEDIA) 7,66×10-3 1,00×10-3 
Diagnostic 1,86×10-1 1,00×10-2 
 
The TESEO method provides the information about the probability of failure of the control 
room operator based on the five aspects as discusses in the section 3.2.1. The human failure 
probability has been calculated from the five mentioned factors in the TESEO calculations 
and compared with “control room actions” from MEDIA for both “operational” and 
“diagnostic” layers.  
 
Table 33: Comparison of MEDIA and TESEO HEP 
Layer type TESEO factors MEDIA TESEO 
Operational 
Simple, routine 
Time available: 20 s 
Average Knowledge, training 
Normal situation 
Good microclimate, good interface with plant 
 
7,21×10-5 5,0×10-4 
Diagnostic 
Not routine 
Time available: 45 s 
Average Knowledge, training 
Situation of potential emergency 
Good microclimate, good interface with plant 
4,00×10-2 6,00×10-2 
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The probability against “diagnostic” layer from TESEO has been estimated based on more 
severe conditions than the “operational” layer. (e.g. not routine and situation of potential 
emergency). 
The Table 33 illustrates a comparison of MEDIA and the TESEO. It can be seen that the 
values in the “Diagnostic” layer corresponds to each other while a difference exist in the 
operational layer. Since, TESEO was originally developed for the chemical process industry 
so it can be argued that TESEO can provide more reliable grounds for comparison compare 
to other methods. But all the action types from MEDIA cannot be compared with TESEO as 
TESEO provides failure probability just for control room operator. 
The International Standard (IEC 61511, 2003), recommended to use the Probability of Failure 
on Demand (PFD) values corresponding to human actions mainly during a LOPA 
assessment. The Table 34, illustrates a comparison of the PFDavg recommended by the 
International Standard and the most corresponding HEPs obtained from the MEDIA 
assessment.  
  
Table 34: Comparison of PFDavg and MEDIA HEP 
International Standard, adapted from (IEC 
61511, 2003), p. 49 
MEDIA 
Protection layer PFDavg MEDIA, action type HEP 
Human performance 
(trained, no stress) 
1,00×10-2 to 
1,00×10-4 
Manual tasks on-
field (F) 1,78×10
-2 
Human performance 
(under stress) 
5,00×10-1 to 
1,00×100 
Diagnostic: 
Monitoring 5,00×10
-1 
Operator response to 
alarms 
1,00×10-1 
Diagnostic: Control 
room action 4,00×10
-2 
 
A correspondence can be seen for actions in the first two classes but a higher value has been 
observed in case of “operator response to alarms”. In case of “operator response to alarms” 
some assumptions have been made in order to compare the values from the International 
Standard with the MEDIA HEP. It has been assumed that alarms will be in the control room 
and it must be alarmed after an abnormal situation, requiring an action from the operator.  
In all of the aforementioned comparisons, an absolute comparison cannot be made. This is 
mainly due to the differences in the assessment procedures and also the differences in 
considering the PSFs. However, the aforementioned methods can be used to provide the HEP 
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estimates, to be used in other risk assessment studies. Therefore, this verification step has 
been carried out since one of the purposes of the MEDIA is to provide the HEP estimates. 
 
6.3 Weightage of organizational factors 
 
The organizational factors that are considered in this scope of work have already been 
detailed in the Table 20. These organizational factors have been studied for their influencing 
effect on different action types according to the considered taxonomy. The Table 35 
illustrates the obtained weightage of different organizational factors on different human 
actions. As the human factor taxonomy is an action based taxonomy so in this scope of work 
it has been assumed that organizational influence can vary among different actions types.  
 
Table 35: Influencing effect of organizational factors on different actions types 
 
Type of 
layer 
PSFs 
 
 
Failures* 
Organizational factors** 
Training Design Procedures Management 
Safety 
culture 
M
ai
n
 c
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
n
g
 f
ac
to
rs
 
Operational 
layer 
Technical 0,11 0,25 0,24 0,38 - 
M 0,25 0,42 0,25 0,08 - 
A 0,14 0,29 0,29 0,29 - 
C 0,44 0,11 0,44 - - 
F 0,21 0,20 0,37 0,18 - 
R - - - 1 - 
Diagnostic 
or 
preventive 
layer 
Technical 0,13 0,50 0,13 0,25 - 
M 0,30 0,10 0,30 0,10 0,20 
A 0,30 0,10 0,50 0,10 - 
F 0,29 - 0,57 0,14 - 
* Taxonomy from Table III. ** Only those values are reported with influencing affect ≥ 10%.    
The numbers that are reported in the Table 35 are normalized against each action type and 
only those values are reported that have a considerable influencing affect (i.e. ≥ 10%). It can 
be seen from the table that “procedures” and “management” exhibit high influencing effect 
on human reliability compare to other organizational factors. Therefore, it can be said that in 
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order to improve the overall human reliability, “procedures” and “management” attributes 
should be improved with a priority. The corresponding specific actions/ attributes of the 
organizational factors can be seen in the Table 27. 
If it is assumed that, situation during an accident is comparable to situation during normal 
operations with respect to organizational influence on human/ operator actions. Then, 
estimates from the Table 35 can be used to provide a comparative influence of organizational 
factors on human actions in the form of weights. The main purpose of estimating the weights 
of organizational factors is to consider that some of the factors have more influencing affect 
then the other factors. 
In number of existing studies, the weights of influencing factors are calculated by considering 
the expert’s opinion or by conducting a survey. Some of these methods and corresponding 
references can be seen in the section 3.3.  
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7 New methodology: MEDIA 
 
The Figure 36 illustrates the newly developed “Method for Error Deduction and Incident 
Analysis (MEDIA)” methodology, that has been proposed in this work. 
. 
 
Figure 36. Method for Error Deduction and Incident Analysis (MEDIA) methodology 
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accident analysis, evaluation of HEPs, effect of organizational PSFs and a new methodology 
“MEDIA”. However, the Figure 36 illustrates the MEDIA methodology that can be used 
alongside the risk assessment studies that usually are carried out as a project review or during 
the design phase of a project.  
The main advantage of this methodology is that it is coherent to the data collection or the 
HEPs evaluation step. The newly developed taxonomies and the checklists ensure the 
consistency among the data collection and prospective analysis steps.  
A HOF assessment based on this methodology begins with the rating of the considered PSF.  
The PSF can be rated on a Likert scale by an analyst using the checklists from the Table 27. 
After assessing the current situation of the existing organizational factors. The rating of the 
organizational factors can be performed. The worst situation can take a value close to the 
maximum value (i.e. 10). Hence, maximizing the multiplicative effect on the human 
reliability. While, a better organizational factors can take a value close to the minimum value 
and hence minimizing the effect on the human reliability. This step of rating has not been 
benchmarked against an existing situation. Therefore, this step can only provide a 
comparative analysis rather than an absolute result that can be used across multiple plants. 
The same concept of rating has been proposed in many of the existing relevant approaches.  
The weight of each of the factors has been estimated during the accident analysis taking into 
account their comparative importance as also shown in the Table 35. The combined effect of 
the PSFs for an action type can be estimated by using the Eq.18. 
 
 
Whereas: 
 ωnWeight of n
th PSF, from (Table 35) 
 rnRating of n
th PSF, from analyst 
 
The weights of the PSF are constant, hence the only variable in this equation is the rating of 
the PSF. The Eq.18 should be used separately for each of the action types since weight of 
PSFs on the actions types varies among different human actions types. 
The next step in this methodology is the identification of the critical human actions as can be 
seen from the Figure 36. In this work, emphasis is made to identify the critical human actions 
 PSFCombined  = ∑(ωn . rn )
5
n =1
 Eq.18 
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based on the Piping and Instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs). Apart from P&IDs, output from 
the HAZOP can also be used in order to consider potentially critical human interventions, 
that have been identified during the HAZOP study. In order to ease the identification process, 
the checklists have been developed during the accident analysis. The checklists to identify the 
critical human actions are presented in the Table 25. 
The Nominal HEP (NHEP) for each of the action types in the MEDIA taxonomy has been 
estimated during the accident analysis.   
After estimating the PSFCombined, the identification of critical human interventions and the 
relevant NHEP, it is required to calculate the HEP from the NEHP.  
There could be number of ways to calculate the HEP, but in this work the method used in the 
SPAR-H has been considered. The SPAR-H method to calculate the HEP from the NHEP is 
shown in the  Eq. 5. Since it has been assumed that the human interventions lie in one of the 
five action types identified in the human factors taxonomy. Therefore, if further 
modifications are not required then the HEP estimation corresponding to certain actions in a 
single action class remain the same. However, further refinement can be made depending on 
the numbers of PSFs that can influence the human reliability in a specific assessment.   
The riskindex corresponding to a section of the plant (e.g. HAZOP nodes, QRA isolatable 
sections etc) can be derived based on the Eq.19 for n actions in an action type. The Eq.19 is 
for an action type, since the HEP varies among different action types.   
 
 
Whereas: 
 HEPi is the human error probability of i
th action  
fi is the frequency of intervention during a specific time period of i
th action (e.g. 1 
year) 
 si is the corresponding safety layer of i
th action (i.e. 1-4) 
 
Therefore, the riskindex for a certain section of the plant is based on the numbers of critical 
interventions, their corresponding frequency and the safety layer.  
The concept of safety layer has been adopted in this work to consider the criticality of an 
action failure. It has been observed that during the accident analysis that whenever failure of 
 Riskindex =  ∑(HEPi · fi · si)
n
i = 1
 Eq.19 
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an action corresponds to a higher safety layer, the consequence of failure is also severe. This 
is mainly due to the possible absence of the subsequent safety layers in order to prevent/ 
mitigate the failure. For example, if monitoring of an alarm to a random column fails for an 
event and event has been analysed to be credible during the risk assessment studies. Then, 
there should be subsequent safety layers (e.g. double alarms, SIFs etc) to prevent any possible 
consequences from the failure in the 1st safety layer. Assuming that the subsequent safety 
layers will work (when required), these layers have the potential to bring back the system 
under safe conditions. On the other hand, if a human failure occurs in a higher safety layers 
(e.g. maintenance of PSVs or proof testing of SISs) and not detected in-time. In this case, due 
to a possible absence of the subsequent layers, human failure can lead to much severe 
consequences. The safety layers are shown in the Figure 2, in which the concept is shown as 
a risk reduction method in the process industries.  
However, in order to consider the action frequency into the Riskindex calculations, certain 
assumptions need to be taken. For example, constant monitoring is difficult to be consider in 
the overall calculations in terms of their frequencies. But, frequency interventions for certain 
actions (e.g. maintenance of PSVs, proof testing of SISs etc) is relatively easy to be 
incorporated into the Riskindex calculations. Because, these interventions should be considered 
during the SIL allocation/ verification studies for the automated safety functions. Therefore, a 
correspondence can be ensured among the SIL and MEDIA studies.   
The Riskindex can provides an estimation of critical human interventions in a plant or in a 
section of the plant. Therefore, it can provide possible grounds for a follow up action 
followed the Riskindex estimation. It can also be said that MEDIA methodology can help to 
screen and to prioritize human interventions or plant sections that need further attention with 
respect to human and organizational factors. In order to reduce the overall risk level, the 
following main actions can be taken for a specific interventions as has been shown in the 
Figure 36: 
 To reduce the associated safety layer corresponding to a human intervention; 
 To reduce the frequency of human intervention; 
 To improve the organizational factors and their impact on the human intervention.   
However, decreasing a corresponding safety layer might not be appropriate or practical 
during most of the cases. But, possible decrease in the safety layers can be considered by 
adding an extra supervision in the form of the operator/ supervisor. But, there is a need to 
explore this aspect from practical point of view. 
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Based on the Riskindex calculations, an indication can be provided about the critical human 
interventions or the sections of a plant. For these interventions or the sections, advanced HOF 
methods can also be used to ensure the safety of these operations as highlighted in the Figure 
36. This is an optimizations step, since due to the economic and practical reasons it is close to 
impossible to carry out the HOF assessment for the whole plant. Therefore, MEDIA can help 
to identify the critical interventions or the sections, that can be improved by using more 
advances relevant tools or methods.  
Therefore, the MEDIA can provide an indication for possible critical human interventions 
that should be handled with care. However, it is not an advanced human factors assessment 
method. So, based on this primary screening step, advanced human or cognitive tools can be 
used as mentioned earlier.  
Furthermore, it has been observed that to fetch the reliable information also require enormous 
resources that can be limited with the help of MEDIA. At the same time, the identified 
critical human interventions related to the SIFs can also be consider or least review in the SIL 
allocation / verification studies. This is only possible, if SIL allocation/ verification studies 
are to be carried out later than the MEDIA assessment.  
It is recommended to carry out the MEDIA study during the project’s initial stages preferably 
after the HAZOP study, as it has been developed keeping in mind the amount of information 
that can be obtained during project’s design phase. At the same time, MEDIA can assist 
during some other risk assessment studies (e.g. SIL allocation / verification, QRA etc). 
Another advantage of the MEDIA study is that it can identify those organizational areas that 
have an influence on the human’s reliability and also on the equipment’s reliability. 
Therefore, project’s management can take steps to ensure the appropriate level of the 
organizational influencing factors. A number of organizational factors find a correspondence 
to the Process Safety Management (PSM) studies. Therefore, during plant’s operational 
stages a possible PSM study sever an advanced tool to quantify the organizational factors 
possibly based on the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). For example, possible KPIs can be 
developed for the “training” and “procedures” organizational factors.  
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8 A case study: MEDIA 
 
In this chapter an insight will be provided into the case study that has been carried out based 
on the newly developed methodology “MEDIA”. The case study has been performed for a 
gas treatment plant. The objective of this treatment plant is to recover the gas reserves, 
separation and treatment of the fluids extracted from the production facility.  
In the following section, some details about the plant will be provided along with the 
information/ steps required to perform the MEDIA assessment. 
In order to ensure the project’s/ facility’s confidentiality, the sensitive information will be 
kept anonymous. However, where necessary and appropriate imaginary names/tags might be 
used.   
 
8.1 Gas treatment plant 
 
The main units of this gas treatment facility are as follows: 
 Pig receiver; 
 Slug catcher; 
 Compressor; 
 Dehydration unit; 
 Fractionating unit; 
 Storage unit. 
The purpose of the pig receiver is to remove the pig that is loading into a pipeline earlier to 
clean the pipelines. The purpose of slug catcher is to collect liquids that have settled in flow 
lines and may cause a damage to downstream units. The compressor works to compensate for 
the pressure drop in the flow lines and can provide the necessary head to the gas flow. The 
dehydration unit is used mainly to prevent any hydrates formation in order to transport the 
gas for long distances. The fractionating units are used to separate the raw gas into its 
constituents according to the difference in their volatilities. Following the treatment of the gas 
it is required to store the gas for a certain time before its transfer out of the facility. This 
objective is obtained in a storage unit. 
In order to perform the MEDIA assessment on the gas treatment plant and especially on the 
aforementioned units. It is required to gather the necessary information to carry out this 
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assessment. During this case study, the following main documents have been considered in 
order to collate the necessary information: 
 Piping & Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs); 
 Cause & Effect (C&E) metrics; 
  HAZOP report; 
 Philosophy of HSE management; 
 Emergency and process shutdown philosophy;  
 Random documents outlining the maintenance strategy and the intervention frequency 
related to the Pressure Safety Valves (PSVs), Safety Instrumented Systems (SISs) and 
the automatic flow control valves.  
The P&IDs can help to identify some of the required human interventions (e.g. related to 
automatic valves, indicators, alarms, PSVs etc). The C&E matrix can help to identify the 
effect of failure of some of the human interventions (e.g. related to the double alarms, SISs 
etc). The HAZOP report can identify some of the critical human interventions that had 
already been identified during the HAZOP session. The HAZOP report is regarded as a 
valuable information, since the HAZOP is usually performed in a team consist of respective 
field experts and their expertise are reflected in a typical HAZOP report.  
The HSE management philosophy can help to identify the scope of various HSE studies and 
to understand the relevant documents. While, the emergency and process shut down 
philosophy provides the information about the design and functionality of process alarms and 
shutdowns sequences.  
However, documents may vary from one project to the project, therefore it is recommended 
to consider any other relevant documents that can assist to refine the output from this study. 
For example, maintenance interventions for some of the units might not be available at earlier 
stages of a project. However, based on the expert’s judgment it can be considered with a 
possibility of modification at later stages of a project.   
The P&IDs related to the considered units are shown in the Appendix VI. In this case study, 
five nodes have been considered corresponding to the HAZOP studies. Since, HAZOP has 
already been performed for this project therefore HAZOP report has been used as input 
during this case study. The five nodes are as follows: 
1. Pig Receiver and Slug Catcher; 
2. Booster Compressor, (i.e. Booster Compressor Suction Scrubber, Booster 
Compressor, Booster Compressor after Cooler); 
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3. Depropanizer (i.e. Depropanizer tower, Depropanizer Rebolier, Depropanizer 
Condenser, Depropanizer Reflux drum and Pump); 
4. Debutanizer (i.e. Debutanizer tower, Debutanizer Rebolier, Debutanizer Condenser, 
Debutanizer Reflux drum and Pump); 
5. Propane Storage (i.e. Propane Storage Bullet, Propane Transfer Pump). 
These nodes can be found in the Appendix VI with the highlighted instrumentation that 
required any kind of human intervention.  
 
8.2 Assessment procedure 
 
In this case study, five HAZOP nodes have been studied but in this document only one node 
(i.e. Node 2) will be described in-detail. Since the assessment procedures are similar for all 
the nodes. While, the results from all five nodes will be presented. 
The main instrumentation components that may require any kind of human intervention (i.e. 
normal or maintenance) are indicators, alarms and the safety functions (i.e. SIS, PSVs etc). It 
is required to identify all (critical) instrumentation in order to identify the relevant human 
interventions. Therefore, in order to make this identification process easy. The following 
sheet in the Figure 37 can highlight what kind of instrumentation should be consider. The 
input from the following main documents have been considered in order to gather the 
required information: 
 P&IDs; 
 HAZOP report; 
 C&E matrix; 
As mentioned earlier that the imaginary tag numbers have been used where seems 
appropriate in order to maintain the project’s confidentiality. The following main steps have 
been carried out in the assessment procedures: 
1. To identify the critical parameters (e.g. pressure, temperature, flow etc) for a 
particular node. For this purpose, information from the HAZOP can be considered 
along with generic process analysis; 
2. To list the main indicators and the safety functions corresponding to the critical 
parameters for all main units in that node. (shown in the Figure 37); 
3. To study the human factors checklists for any potentially critical human intervention. 
(shown in the Figure 38); 
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4. To calculate the risk index for that node. (shown in the Figure 38). 
The step 2 &3 can also provide the input to identify the human related common cause failures  
 
Figure 37.Identification of critical process controls  
 
Unit / HAZOP- Node No. / IS (QRA)
Unit ID
NGO-V-231-1100 A
NGO-CA-231-2100 A 
NGO-AC-231-2200 A 
Safety functions
BDVs
Automatic controlled valves
Level control valve
Anti-surge control valve
Unit: NGO-V-231-1100A
On-field indicators On-field alarms CR indicators CR alarms
No / Low Flow
High Flow
PDIT-1103A 
upstream of unit
PDIAH-1103A 
upstream of unit 
(auxiliary CR)
1
231-PG-1103A on 
the pipeline going to 
HP flare
1
231-PIT-1102A 
(differential pressure 
across demister)
231-DPIAH-1102A 
(High differential 
pressure across 
demister)
1
Temperature
High 
Temperature
231-TIT-1101A on 
the unit
231-TIAH-1101A 
and 231-TIAL-
1101A on unit
1
High Level
231-LG-1102A on 
unit
231-LIAH-1103A 
and 231-LIAL-
1103A on unit
1
Low Level
231-LIT-1101A on 
the unit
1
NGO-CA-231-2100 A 
On-field indicators On-field alarms CR indicators CR alarms
231-PDI-2103A 
upstream of unit
1
231-PIT-2104A 
upstream of unit
1
231-PIT-2105A 
upstream of unit
1
231-PIT-2108A 
upstream of unit
1
231-PIT-2106A 
downstream of unit
1
231-TIT-2101A 
upstream of unit
1
231-TIT-2102A 
downstream of unit
1
231-TIT-2104A 
downstream of unit
1
Flow High Flow
231-FIT-2101A 
upstream of unit
1
Level
Parameters Deviation
On -field Control Room 
Associated safety layer
High 
Temperature
Temperature
Pressure High Pressure
N/A
High PressurePressure
Flow
On -field
Parameters Deviation
Control Room 
Associated safety layer
Booster Compressor System / Node 2 
Booster Compressor Suction Scrubber
Booster Compressor Package
Booster Compressor After Cooler
Unit Name
Location
Upstream of NGO-V-231-1100A
Downstream of NGO-V-231-1100A
321-FCV-2201A
HAZOP (critical parameters or issues)
No/Low Flow, High Flow
High Pressure
High Temperature
High Level
Maintenance of anti-surge valves
Downstream of NGO-AC-231-2200A
N /A
231-BDV-2101A 
Tag No.
231-LCV-1103A
BDV is on Compressor outlet
Location
Downstream of NGO-V-231-1100A
PSVs
231-PSV-2101A
231-PSV-1101A
Downstream of NGO-EM-231-2210A
PSV on NGO-CA-231-2100A
PSV on NGO-V-231-1100A
Tag No.
ESDVs / ESDs
231-SDV-1101 A
231-SDV-1102 A
231-SDV-1103 A
231-SDV-2201A
231-SDV-2202A
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for the safety function as recommended by the (IEC 61511, 2003) and detailed in the section 
3.1.4 of this document. 
The use of the checklists can ensure that any of the critical human actions are not overlooked 
during the assessment. Therefore, this assessment can also provide a base point for the 
sequential safety studies during later stages of a project that may consider human factors 
issues in any capacity. 
However, in order to estimate the Riskindex for a node, it is required to make some 
simplifications. These simplifications are necessary to consider the frequency of actions and 
the corresponding safety layers as mentioned earlier. The simplifications to consider the 
frequency of actions are listed in the Table 36. While, the simplifications to consider the 
corresponding safety layer are listed in the Table 37. The frequency of actions is considered 
for a time period of one year (i.e. 8760 hrs). For certain actions this data is available, while 
for some other it is required to use the justifiable assumptions.  
 
Table 36. Simplification to identify the frequency of operations 
Assumed frequency/ 
year 
Action 
1 
Instrumentation require constant monitoring (e.g. pressure 
indicators, alarm etc). 
2 
Maintenance interventions (e.g. SISs, pigging operation, 
conditions in plant’s start-up/ shut-down state etc.), where data is 
not-available. 
 
The instrumentation that require constant monitoring assumed to have a frequency of one. 
While, some other interventions mostly the maintenance activities are considered according 
Unit: NGO-AC-231-2210A
On-field indicators On-field alarms CR indicators CR alarms
Pressure High Pressure
231-PG-5001A 
upstream of Cooler
231-PDIAH-2203A 
downstream of unit
1
Temperature
High 
Temperature
231-TIT-2201A 
downstream of unit
231-TIAH-2201A 
and 231-TIAL-
2201A downstream 
of unit
1
Critical Human factors issues - Identified 
during HAZOP
Human interventions
Other
On -field Control Room 
Associated safety layerParameters Deviation
Inadvertent closure of manual block valves downstream of 231-ESD-1101 A/B.
Inadvertent closure of manual valves in seal gas line.
Inadvertent closure of manual block valves downstream of 231-ESD-2201 A/B.
Provide operator procedures and training for stand by compressors and switch over the compressors.
Need to depressurized entire compressor circuit for maintenance of antisurge valve (Review the possibility of isolation valves upstream and downstream of antisurge valves for 
maintenance purposes without need to de-inventory compressor section).
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to their anticipated frequencies. But, if the frequency values are not possible to obtain, then 
the values from the Table 36 can be used. The affect on the final output will vary according 
to a linear relation. So, higher the values the more affect it will have. The higher frequency 
value (i.e. 2) has been considered due to high number of failure for maintenance activities 
compare to the normal operations, as observed during the accident analysis. 
In this scope of work, certain assumptions have been taken about the frequencies but it is 
recommended to use the information as accurate as possible. At the same time, it is also 
suggested for the future to define the procedures in order to include the “constant 
monitorings” into the assessment. 
The simplifications that have been considered in order to include the associated safety layers 
are listed in the Table 37. While, the concept of the safety layers has been illustrated in the 
Figure 2.  
The first four safety layers are considered in this scope of work. The first two safety layers 
are usually correspond to the normal process controls while the subsequent two safety layers 
correspond to the abnormal process control. The definitions of “prevention” and “mitigation” 
safety layers subject to change and could be interchangeable according to a specific project. 
The following main aspects need to be highlighted here: 
 Automatic valves are considered in the 2nd safety layer, since it is desirable to keep 
track of their position all the time especially when they are at a critical location or 
controlling to a critical parameter; 
 Normal maintenance is also considered in the 2nd safety layers, as it has been 
observed during the accident analysis that considerable number of accidents occur 
during the maintenance operations;  
 Reporting about the faulty state of a safety function especially when they are critical 
are considered in the 4th safety layer. It could be possible that operator or maintenance 
personnel fail to report a faulty element in a critical safety function. Therefore, due to 
high consequences of this action failure, the corresponding actions are considered in 
the highest safety layer (i.e.4); 
 Mechanical Pressure Safety Valves (PSVs) and the pneumatic Blow Down Valves 
(BDVs) are considered in the 4th safety layer. Since, these instruments are the last line 
of defence in case of any pontifical abnormal situation.  
 
 
125 
 
Table 37. Simplification to identify the corresponding safety layers 
Safety 
layer 
Action type 
(IEC 61511) 
Actions 
1 Process 
Normal process control 
 Monitoring of indicators and alarms corresponding to 
parameters ( e.g. temperature, pressure and flow etc). 
2 
Control and 
Monitoring 
Normal process control 
 Monitoring of indicators and alarms for parameters (e.g. 
temperature, pressure and flow etc), a step prior to the tripping 
emergency automatic functions (e.g. SIFs). 
 Monitoring of critical process deviation alarms (i.e. high/ low 
deviation alarms associated with the SIFs). 
 Monitoring of position of critical automatic controlled values 
(e.g. automatic pressure and flow control valves etc). 
 Other critical operations (e.g. switching between critical parallel 
components etc). 
Maintenance operations 
 Critical maintenance interventions (e.g. pigging, cleaning of 
vessels etc). 
3 Prevention 
Abnormal process control 
 Actions associated with the automatic protective systems (e.g. 
SISs etc). 
Maintenance operations 
 Maintenance operations associated with the automatic 
protective devices (e.g. proof testing of SISs etc). 
4 Mitigation 
Abnormal process control 
 Actions associated with the mechanical or pneumatic mitigation 
devices (e.g. PSVs, BDVs etc). 
Maintenance operations 
 Maintenance operations associated with the mechanical or 
pneumatic mitigation devices (e.g. maintenance of PSVs and 
BDVs etc).  
Reporting 
 Reporting of faulty state of critical safety functions (e.g. PSVs, 
SISs, BDVs, F&G system etc). 
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Figure 38.Identification and quantification of critical human action 
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8.3 Results of the case study 
 
This section illustrates the result of all five nodes that have been obtained as a result of the 
case study. The Table 38 illustrates the considered nodes and the obtained Riskindex from the 
MEDIA case study.  
 
Table 38. Nodes and Riskindex 
Node Node description Riskindex 
1 Pig receiver and slug catcher 1,63E+00 
2 Booster compressor 2,24E+00 
3 Depropanizer 2,26E+00 
4 Debutanizer 2,26E+00 
5 Propane storage 2,72E+00 
 
It can be seen from the Table 38, that the Riskindex is same for Depropanizer and Debutanizer 
sections of the plant. Since, both of these sections have almost the same units (e.g. distillation 
tower etc), instrumentation and hence corresponding human interventions.  
The Riskindex for the node corresponding to “Propane storage” is higher among all the five 
nodes. This is due to the fact that most number of human interventions correspond to this 
node and also most of them are crucial as identified during the past accident analysis. The 
critical human interventions that are not present in other nodes are related to the cleaning of 
the storage tanks. These interventions are usually overlooked during the preliminary risk 
assessment studies (e.g. HAZOP) and can lead to a possible undesired situation during the 
operational stages. 
Therefore, based on the MEDIA assessment described in the Figure 36. It can be said that the 
node 5 (i.e. Propane storage section) is the most critical section. Therefore, further resources 
should be spent to improve the HOF issues in this node. At the same time, this assessment is 
also an indication about the HOF issues that should be considered by the management during 
a project. It is important to highlight that the Riskindex number is not an absolute number, 
however it can be seen in a comparison.  
The obtained results from MEDIA case study are compared with the risk calculations that are 
usually performed during the QRA studies. For this comparison, Location Specific Individual 
Risk (LSIR) has been selected. The LSIR at a specific location indicates a fatal injury to an 
135 
 
individual, hypothetically considering that a worker is permanently positioned at that 
location. The LSIR at any given location can be calculated by the Eq. 20.     
 
 
Whereas: 
 λS is release frequency (summation S over release events). 
PT is probability of the scenario, given the release (summation over T outcome 
scenarios). 
Pwind is wind direction probability (summation over U wind directions). 
V(T) is vulnerability at location T. 
 
In order to perform the MEDIA comparison with the LSIR, it is required to find a 
correspondence between the HAZOP nodes and QRA isolatable sections. The LSIR is 
usually calculated for the main risk areas identified on the plant layout. It has been observed 
that a correspondence can be consider but this correspondence is not a precise 
correspondence. Since, some random changes among HAZOP nodes and QRA isolatable are 
possible. But, despite that it can provide reasonable grounds for the comparison.   
Both LSIR and MEDIA-Riskindex are on separate scales so cannot be compared as such but 
can be compared among different nodes. The LSIR is calculated mainly from the technical 
failure (i.e. loss of containment events). The LSIR at a specific location (i.e. risk area) inside 
an isolatable section can have some contribution from the nearby sections according to the 
release scenarios. The main information providing by the LSIR is about the source terms 
rather than a specific location at a given location. As for two multiple locations, the same 
location parameter (i.e. permanent individual presence) is assumed hence can be considered 
as a constant.  
It can be seen from the Figure 39 that at one location the LSIR can be lower but MEDIA-
Riskindex can be higher compare to other nodes. Therefore, it can be said that integrity of a 
node or isolatable section can be impaired by the human interventions to a considerable 
extent. As major contribution of loss of containment events scenarios comes from the failure 
rate of a unit (i.e. 𝜆) overlooking the human /operator aspects during the operations.  
Therefore, MEDIA methodology can help to identify the critical sections (i.e. nodes/ 
 LSIRT =  ∑ λS
S
 . ∑ PT
T
 . ∑(PwindV(T))S,T,U
U
 Eq. 20 
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isolatable sections) in a plant that require further attention to ensure the safety of operations. 
Although, in this study the output from the QRA report has been considered for the 
comparison purposes. But, it is recommended to use the MEDIA methodology prior to the 
QRA study. In this case, the MEDIA can identify the potentially critical human interventions 
and sections of a plant. The critical human interventions can be considered as the possible 
process deviation events during a QRA study. The obtained critical sections of the plant can 
be looked into more detail during a QRA study.  
 
 
Figure 39. Comparison of LSIR and MEDIA-Riskindex against risk areas and 
considered nodes 
 
  
1,00E+00
1,20E+00
1,40E+00
1,60E+00
1,80E+00
2,00E+00
2,20E+00
2,40E+00
2,60E+00
2,80E+00
3,00E+00
1,00E-05
6,00E-05
1,10E-04
1,60E-04
2,10E-04
2,60E-04
3,10E-04
3,60E-04
1 2 3 4 5
LSIR
RiskIndex
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9 Conclusions 
 
The Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) cannot be overlooked during the risk 
assessment studies due to their critical contribution. It has been observed that these factors 
had led to a considerable percentage of accidents especially in the chemical process industry, 
that is the main focus in this study.  
The integration of HOF around the technical aspects has been studied in this work, to ensure 
the optimal use of the available resources.  
A number of critical aspects have been observed and highlighted in the section 3.2 related to 
the existing and the mostly widely used HOF methods. Furthermore, a review has been done 
related to the new and developing concepts and the methods that can enhance the 
effectiveness of HOF assessment, as can be seen in the section 3.3.  
A new action based taxonomy has been developed for the HOF that can account for all major 
actions in the chemical process plants.  
The past accident analysis has been performed in order to learn lessons and to provide a 
quantification of the HOF. In this work, a total of 438 accidents of 25 years (1988-2012) have 
been studied related to the Seveso establishments in the EU, of which 197 accidents (i.e. 
about 45 % of total accidents) were caused due to the HOF.  
The Swiss cheese model has been modified in order to structure and to synchronize the 
accident analysis. A total of nine forms of the Swiss cheese model have been developed that 
can account for the main accident evolution paths.  
The probabilistic Rasch model has been adapted in this work in order to obtain the Human 
Error Probabilities (HEPs) from results of the accident analysis, according to the CAHR 
application. Furthermore, the weightage of the organizational Performance Shaping Factors 
(PSF) has also been obtained from the accident analysis. The further details about the 
quantification of the HOF can be found in the section 6. 
Consequently, a new methodology “Method for Error Deduction and Incident Analysis 
(MEDIA)” has been developed in this work based on the accident analysis. The MEDIA can 
help to identify the critical sections or the interventions in a plant with respect to human 
actions and the technical failures. The MEDIA provides an integrated and optimized solution 
with respect to the HOF and the technical failure. This methodology can be used integrated 
with the HAZOP, QRA and the SIL studies. The further details about the MEDIA can be 
found in the section 7.   
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A number of recommendations are also proposed in this work based on lessons learned from 
the accident analysis. The following main recommendations are as follows: 
1. It is recommended to use the developed checklists related to the organizational factors 
during the HAZID studies. The HAZID study is usually performed with the checklists 
proposed in the International Standard (ISO 17776, 2000); 
2. It is recommended to report the accidents/ near misses to the European Commission 
by the EU Member States, when the HOF have a contribution to the accidents. The 
aforementioned statement should be fulfil even if the existing reporting criteria 
identified in the Seveso directive (EC, 2012) does not meet. The existing criteria to 
report accidents to the Commission can be seen in the Appendix III. In the section II 
of this existing reporting criteria it is stated that “accidents or near-misses which 
Member States regard as being of particular technical interest for preventing major 
accidents and limiting their consequences and which do not meet the quantitative 
criteria above should be notified to the Commission”.  
Therefore, giving the existing lack of information and ambiguity about the HOF and 
their role especially during the abnormal situations. It is recommended to learn more 
about the HOF and their role during the abnormal situations. A possible way to learn 
more about these factors is to learn through the past accidents. This learning can help 
to mitigate some of the uncertainty about the HOF. Therefore, in this work it is high 
recommended to have a legal obligation for the EU Member States to report their 
industrial accidents to the European Commission when among others caused by the 
HOF as identified during the post-accident investigation. This potential modification 
to the existing reporting criteria can help to learn lessons from the HOF issues to a 
greater extent. 
3. It is also recommended to modify the eMARS’ existing report structure. The existing 
eMARS structure can be seen in the Appendix IV. It has been observed that there are 
certain ambiguous areas in the “Cause of the accident” section especially related to 
the “Organizational” and “Human” elements. Therefore, it is required to modify the 
existing “Organizational” and “Human” elements and their details. It is proposed to 
consider taxonomy for both “Organizational” and “Human” elements that can cover 
all possible failure attributes. For example, MEDIA organizational and human factor 
taxonomy is an action based five factors taxonomy. However, in case of eMARS 
report structure it might require more than five factors that can cover all possible 
failure attributes. 
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4. It is highly recommended to consider the maintenance activities during the 
preliminary risk assessment studies (e.g. HAZOP). It has been observed during the 
accident analysis that a considerable number of failures were occurred during the 
maintenance activities or relevant tasks. One possible explanation of these failures is 
that these activities are usually overlooked during the preliminary risk assessment 
studies (e.g. HAZOP), hence reflect in the same way during the subsequent risk 
assessment studies. In this regard, the main human failures were observed during the 
vessel cleaning activities.    
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Appendix I: SIS safety life cycle overview, adapted from (IEC 61511, 2003) p.36 
Safety life-
cycle activity 
Objectives 
Require-
ments 
clause or 
subclaus
e (IEC 
61511-1) 
Inputs Outputs 
Hazard and 
risk 
assessment 
To determine the hazards 
and hazardous events of the 
process and associated 
equipments, the requirement 
for risk reduction and the 
safety functions required to 
achieve the necessary risk 
reduction. 
8 
Process 
design, 
layouts, 
manning 
arrangements, 
safety targets 
A description 
of the hazards, 
of the required 
safety function 
(s) and of the 
associated risk 
reduction. 
Allocation of 
safety 
functions to 
protection 
layers 
Allocation of the safety 
functions to protection 
layers and for each SIF, the 
associated safety integrity 
level 
9 
A description 
of the required 
safety 
instrumented 
function(s) 
and associated 
safety 
integrity levels 
Description of 
allocation of 
safety 
requirements. 
SIS safety 
requirement 
specification 
To specify the requirements 
of each SIS, in terms of 
required safety instrumented 
functions, and their safety 
integrity 
10 
Description of 
allocation of 
safety 
requirements 
SIS safety 
requirements, 
software safety 
requirements 
SIS design 
and 
engineering 
To design the SIS to meet 
the requirements for safety 
instrumented functions and 
safety integrity 
11 and 
12.4 
SIS safety 
requirements 
software 
safety 
requirements 
Design of the 
SIS in 
conformance 
with the SIS 
safety 
requirements, 
planning for 
the SIS 
integration test 
SIS 
installation, 
commissioni
ng and 
validation 
To integrate and test the SIS 
To validate that the SIS 
meets all aspects the 
requirements for safety in 
terms of the required safety 
instrumented functions and 
the required safety integrity 
12.3, 14, 
15 
SIS design, 
SIS 
integration 
test, SIS safety 
requirements, 
plan for the 
safety 
validation of 
Fully 
functioning SIS 
in conformance 
with the SIS 
design results 
of SIS 
integration test, 
Results of the 
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Safety life-
cycle activity 
Objectives 
Require-
ments 
clause or 
subclaus
e (IEC 
61511-1) 
Inputs Outputs 
the SIS installation, 
commissioning 
and validation 
activities 
SIS 
operations 
and 
maintenance 
To ensure that the functional 
safety of the SIS is 
maintained during 
operations and maintenance 
16 
SIS 
requirements, 
SIS design, 
plan for SIS 
operations and 
maintenance 
Results of the 
operations and 
maintenance 
activities 
SIS 
modifications 
To make corrections, 
enhancements or adaption 
of the SIS, ensuring that the 
required safety integrity 
level is achieved and 
maintained 
17 
Revised SIS 
safety 
requirements 
Results of SIS 
modifications 
Decommissio
ning 
To ensure proper review, 
sector organization, and 
ensure SIF remain 
appropriate 
18 
As built safety 
requirements 
and process 
information 
SIF places out 
of service 
SIS 
verification 
To test and evaluate the 
outputs of a given phase to 
ensure correctness and 
consistency with respect to 
the products and standards 
provided as input to that 
phase 
7, 12.7 
Plan for the 
verification of 
SIS for each 
phase 
Results of the 
verification of 
the SIS for 
each phase 
SIS 
functional 
safety 
assessment 
To investigate and arrive at 
a judgment on the functional 
safety achieved by the SIS 
5 
Planning for 
SIS functional 
safety 
assessment, 
SIS safety 
requirement 
Results of SIS 
functional 
safety 
assessment 
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Appendix II: Collection of PSFs levels, adapted from (Gertman et al., 2005) 
SPAR-H  
PSFs 
SPAR-H PSF levels 
SPAR-H 
Multipliers 
HEART 
Multipliers 
CREAM 
Multipliers 
ASEP Multipliers 
THERP 
Multipliers 
Available time 
Inadequate time P (failure) = 1 11- EPC 2 - 
P(failure) = 1,0 – table 
7.2 
P (failure) =1,0 – 
Table 20.1 
Time available = time 
required 
10 1 5- CPC20 10 – Table 7.2 10 – Table 20.1 
Nominal time 1 - 1- CPC 19 1 – Table 7.2 1- Table 20.1 
Time available ≥ 5X 
time required 
0,1 - - - - 
Time available ≥ 50X 
time required 
0,01 - 0,5 – CPC18 0,01 – Table 7.2 0,01 – Table 20.1 
Stress/ 
stressors 
Extreme 5 - - 5- Table 7.3 5,25 – Table 20.16 
High 2 
1,3 – EPC 29 
1,15- EPC33 
1,2 – CPC 22 - 2,5 – Table 20.16 
Nominal 1 - 1-CPC 21 - - 
Complexity 
Highly complex 5 5,5- EPC 10 2 – CPC 17 
2,5 or 5 (depending on 
stress) 
- 
Moderately complex 2 - 1 – CPC 16 - - 
Nominal 1 - 1 – CPC 15 - - 
Experience Low 3 17 – EPC1 2-CPC 25 10 – Table 8.3 2 – Table 20.16 
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SPAR-H  
PSFs 
SPAR-H PSF levels 
SPAR-H 
Multipliers 
HEART 
Multipliers 
CREAM 
Multipliers 
ASEP Multipliers 
THERP 
Multipliers 
/training 3 – EPC 15 
8- EPC 6 
6-EPC 9 
4- EPC 12 
2,5 – EPC 18 
2 –EPC 20 
1,6 EPC 24 
Nominal 1 1 1- CPC 24 1 1 
High 0,5 - 0,8 – CPC 23 0,1 – Table 8.3 - 
Procedures 
Not available 50 - - 
P(failure) = 1,0 – Table 
7.1, Table 8.1 
50 – Table 20.7 
Incomplete 20 
5 – EPC 11 
3 – EPC 16,17 
1,4 – EPC 28 
1,2 – EPC 32 
2 – CPC 14 - 10 – Table 20.7 
Available, but poor 5 
5 –EPC 11 
3 – EPC 16,17 
2 – EPC 14 - 10 – Table 20.7 
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SPAR-H  
PSFs 
SPAR-H PSF levels 
SPAR-H 
Multipliers 
HEART 
Multipliers 
CREAM 
Multipliers 
ASEP Multipliers 
THERP 
Multipliers 
1,4 – EPC 28 
1,2 – EPC 32 
Nominal 1  1 – CPC 13 - - 
Ergonomics / 
HMI 
Missing/ Misleading 50 - - 
P (failure) = 1,0 – 
Table 7.1, 8.1 
100 or 1000 -  
Table 20.12 
Poor 10 
10 – EPC 3 
9 – EPC 4 
8 – EPC 5,7 
4 – EPC 13, 14 
2,5 – EPC19 
1,6 – EPC 23 
1,4 – EPC 26 
1,2 – EPC 32 
5 – CPC 11 
2 – CPC7 
- 
6 – Tables 
20.9,11,12 
10 – Tables 
20.10,13,14 
Nominal 1 - 1 – CPC 9, 10,6 - - 
Good 0,5 - 
0,8 – CPC5 
0,5 - CPC8 
- - 
Fitness for duty Unfit P(failure) = 1.0 - - - - 
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SPAR-H  
PSFs 
SPAR-H PSF levels 
SPAR-H 
Multipliers 
HEART 
Multipliers 
CREAM 
Multipliers 
ASEP Multipliers 
THERP 
Multipliers 
Degraded fitness 5 
1,8 – EPC 22 
1,2 – EPC 30 
1,1 – EPC 35 
- - - 
Nominal 1 - - - - 
Work 
processes 
Poor 2 
2 - EPC 21 
1,6 – EPC 25 
1,4 – EPC 27 
1,2 – EPC 31 
1,06 – EPC 36 
5 – CPC 29 
2 – CPC4 
1,2 – CPC 3 
1 – CPC 28 
- - 
Nominal 1 - 1 – CPC 2.27 - - 
Good 0,8 - 
0,8 – CPC 1 
0,5 – CPC 26 
- - 
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Appendix III: Criteria for the notification of an accident to the European Commission, 
adapted from “Seveso Directive” (EC, 2012) 
 
I. Any accident covered by paragraph 1 or having at least one of the consequences described 
in paragraphs 2,3,4 and 5 must be notified to the Commission. 
1. Substances involved 
Any fire or explosion or accident discharge of a dangerous substance involving, a 
quantity of at least 5% of the qualifying quantity laid den in column 3 of Annex I of the 
Seveso Directive (2012/18/EU). 
2. Injury to persons and damage to real estate 
An accident directly involving a dangerous substances and giving rise to one of the 
following events: 
 a death, 
 Six persons injured within the establishment and hospitalized for at least 24 hours, 
 One person outside the establishment hospitalized for at least 24 hours,  
 Dwelling(s) outside the establishment damaged and unusable as a result of the 
accidents, 
 The evacuation or confinement of persons for more than 2 hours (persons × hours): 
the value is at least 500, 
 The interruption of drinking water, electricity, gas or telephone services for more 
than 2 hours (persons × hours): the value is at least 1000. 
3. Immediate damage to the environment 
 Permanent or long-term damage to terrestrial habitats: 
- 0.5 hectares (ha) or more of a habitat of environmental or conservation 
importance protected by legislation, 
- 10 or more hectares of more widespread habitat, including agricultural land,  
 Significant or long-term damage to freshwater and marine habitats 
- 10 Km or more of river or canal, 
- 1 ha or more of a lake or pond, 
- 2 ha or more of a delta, 
- 2 ha or more of a coastline or open sea, 
 Significant damage to an aquifer or underground water 
- 1 ha or more.  
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4. Damage to property 
 Damage to property in the establishment: at least ECU 2 million, 
 Damage to property outside the establishment at least ECU 0.5 million. 
5. Cross-border damage 
 Any accident directly involving a dangerous substance giving rise to effects outside 
the territory of the Member State concerned.  
II. Accidents or “near misses” which Member States regard as being of particular technical 
interest for preventing major accidents and limiting their consequences and which do not 
meet the quantitative criteria above should be notified to the Commission.  
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Appendix IV: EMARS accident reporting structure: available to extract the data from 
accident report, adapted from (Emars, n.d.). 
 
Accident profile 
Date/Time of major occurrence 
Accident tile 
 
Accident type   Reporting under    Seveso II status 
Major accident  EU Seveso I Directive 
Near miss   EU Seveso II Directive 
Near miss   EU Seveso II Directive + OECD 
Other event   EU Seveso II Directive + UN/ECE 
    OECD 
    UN/ECE 
Industrial type 
 
Reason for reporting 
 
 Substances involved: greater than 5% of quantity in Column 3 of Annex I (Seveso 
Directive) 
 Injury to persons: ≥ 1 fatalities,  ≥ 6 hospitalizing injuries etc 
 Immediate damage to environment (according to Annex VI) 
 Damage to property: on-site > 2M €, off-site > 0.5M €  
 Cross-border damage: transboundary accidents  
 Interesting for lessons learned 
 
Accident report 
Accident description: 
 
 
 
Accident involved: 
Domino effects 
Natech events 
Transboundary effects 
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Contractors 
 
Release 
Major occurrences 
  
 Fluid release to ground 
 Fluid release to water 
 Gas/vapour/ mist / etc release to 
air 
 Not known / not applicable  
 Solid release to air  
 Solid release to ground 
 Solid release to water 
 
Fire 
Major occurrences 
  
 Conflagration (a general 
engulfment fire)  
 Fireball (burning mass rising in 
air, often after BLEVE) 
 Flash fire (burning vapour 
cloud, subsonic flame front) 
 Jet flame (burning jet of fluid 
from orifice) 
 Not known / not applicable 
 Pool fire (burning pool of 
liquid, contained or 
uncontained) 
 
Explosion 
Major occurrences 
  
 
Initiating events 
 
 Fluid release to ground 
 Fluid release to water 
 Gas/vapour/ mist / etc release to 
air 
 Not known / not applicable  
 Solid release to air  
 Solid release to ground 
 Solid release to water 
 
 
Initiating events 
 
 Conflagration (a general 
engulfment fire)  
 Fireball (burning mass rising in 
air, often after BLEVE) 
 Flash fire (burning vapour 
cloud, subsonic flame front) 
 Jet flame (burning jet of fluid 
from orifice) 
 Not known / not applicable 
 Pool fire (burning pool of 
liquid, contained or 
uncontained) 
 
 
Initiating events  
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 BLEVE (boiling liquid 
expanding vapour explosion) 
 Dust explosion 
 Explosive decomposition (of 
unstable material) 
 Not known / not applicable 
 Pressure burst (rupture of 
pressure system) 
 Rapid phase-transition 
explosion (rapid change of 
state)  
 Runaway reaction explosion 
(usually exothermic) 
 VCE (Vapour Cloud Explosion; 
supersonic wave front) 
 
Transport 
Major occurrences 
  
 Air 
 Rail 
 Road 
 Water (sea. river, etc) 
 
 BLEVE (boiling liquid 
expanding vapour explosion) 
 Dust explosion 
 Explosive decomposition (of 
unstable material) 
 Not known / not applicable 
 Pressure burst (rupture of 
pressure system) 
 Rapid phase-transition 
explosion (rapid change of 
state)  
 Runaway reaction explosion 
(usually exothermic) 
 VCE (Vapour Cloud Explosion; 
supersonic wave front) 
 
 
Initiating events  
 
 Air 
 Rail 
 Road 
 Water (sea. river, etc) 
 
 
Others 
 
 
  
Site description 
 
 
Installation / unit description 
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Storage 
 
Major occurrences Equipment type 
 Distribution-associated (not on-
site of manufacture) 
 
 Not known / not applicable  
 Other  
 Process-associated 
(stockholding, etc. on-site of 
manufacture) 
 
 
Initiating Events Equipment type 
 Distribution-associated (not on-
site of manufacture) 
 
 Not known / not applicable  
 Other  
 Process-associated 
(stockholding, etc. on-site of 
manufacture) 
 
 
Process 
 
Major occurrences Equipment type 
 Chemical  batch reaction  
 Chemical continuous reaction  
 Disposal activities 
(incinerating, buying, etc) 
 
 Electrochemical operations  
 Heat exchanger (boiler, 
refrigerator, heating coils, etc) 
 
 Not known / not applicable  
 Others  
 Physical operations (mixing,  
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melting, crystallizing, etc) 
 Power generation (burning fuel 
etc.) 
 
 Treating /use for treatment  
(stanching, preserving etc.) 
 
 
Initiating events Equipment type 
 Loading /unloading activities 
(transfer interfaces) 
 
 Mechanical transfer (conveyors 
etc) 
 
 Not known / not applicable  
 Others  
 Pipeline / pipework treatment  
 Vehicular transport  
 
Transfer 
 
Major occurrences Equipment type 
 Loading /unloading activities 
(transfer interfaces) 
 
 Mechanical transfer (conveyors 
etc) 
 
 Not known / not applicable  
 Others  
 Pipeline / pipework treatment  
 Vehicular transport  
 
 
 
 
Initiating events Equipment type 
 Chemical  batch reaction  
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 Chemical continuous reaction  
 Disposal activities 
(incinerating, buying, etc) 
 
 Electrochemical operations  
 Heat exchanger (boiler, 
refrigerator, heating coils, etc) 
 
 Not known / not applicable  
 Others  
 Physical operations (mixing, 
melting, crystallizing, etc) 
 
 Power generation (burning fuel 
etc.) 
 
 Treating /use for treatment  
(stanching, preserving etc.) 
 
 
Transport 
 
Major occurrences Equipment type 
 Not known / not applicable  
 Others  
 Packing  (bagging, cylinder 
filling, drum filling etc) 
 
 
Initiating events Equipment type 
 Not known / not applicable  
 Others  
 Packing  (bagging, cylinder 
filling, drum filling etc) 
 
 
Others 
 
 
 
160 
 
Substances involved 
 
 
 
Substances Classification 
 Named substance 
 Very toxic 
 Toxic 
 Oxidizing 
 Explosive 
 Flammable 
 Highly Flammable  
 Extremely Flammable 
 Dangerous for the environment 
 Any classification 
 
 
Substance Involved 
 
Substances CAS 
Number 
Directly Involved 
(tonnes) 
Potential Quantity (tons) 
    
 
 
Causes of the accidents 
 
The reason for the accident (potentially un-wanted event) 
 
 
Organizational 
 
Causative Factor Type 
 Blockage  
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 Component / machinery failure / malfunction  
 Corrosion / fatigue  
 Electrostatic accumulation  
 Instrument / control / monitoring-device 
failure 
 
 Loss of process control  
 Not identified  
 Not known / not applicable  
 Others  
 Runaway reaction  
 Unexpected reaction / phase-transaction  
 Vessel / container / containment-equipment 
failure 
 
 
Plant / Equipment 
 
Causative Factor Type 
 Malicious intervention  
 Not identified  
 Not known / not applicable  
 Operator error  
 Operator health (includes ailments, 
intoxication, death, etc) 
 
 Others  
 Wilful disobedience / failure to carry out 
duties 
 
 
Human 
 
Causative Factor Type 
 Design of plant / equipment/ system  
 Installation  
 Isolation of equipment / system  
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 Maintenance / repair  
 Management attitude problem  
 Management organization inadequate   
 Manufacture / construction  
 Not identified  
 Not known / not applicable  
 Organized procedures  
 Others  
 Process analysis  
 Staffing  
 Supervision  
 Testing/ inspection/ recording  
 User-unfriendly (apparatus, system etc)  
 
External 
 
Causative Factor Type 
 Domino-effect from other accident  
 Establishment safeguards / security deficiency  
 Natural events (weather, temperature, 
earthquake, etc)  
 
 Not identified  
 Not known / not applicable  
 Others  
 Struck by object  
 Transport accident  
 Utilities failure (electricity, gas, water, steam 
air, etc) 
 
 
Others 
 
 
Consequences 
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Human 
 
On site Quantity Quantity / Effect 
 At risk   
 Fatalities   
 Injuries   
 Others   
 
Off site Quantity Quantity / Effect 
 At risk   
 Fatalities   
 Injuries   
 Others   
 
Environment 
 
On site Quantity Quantity / Effect 
 Freshwater: freshwater 
reservoir 
  
 Freshwater: pond/lake   
 Freshwater: river   
 Freshwater: stream/tributary   
 Inland: arable land/ crops/ 
vineyards/ orchards 
  
 Inland: grassland/ pasture/ 
meadow 
  
 Inland: marsh/ reedbeds   
 Inland: metropolitan 
development 
  
 Inland: moor/ heathland/ upland 
vegetation 
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 Inland: Parkland/ common land   
 Inland: Rural development   
 Inland: Urban development   
 Inland: Woodland; 
predominantly or totally natural 
  
 Inland: Woodland; 
predominantly or totally 
plantation 
  
 Offshore: Estuary   
 Offshore: Saline lagoon   
 Offshore: Sea/ seabed   
 Others   
 Shore: Rocky shore   
 Shore: Salt-marsh / mud-flats   
 Shore: Sand / dunes/  dune 
slacks 
  
 Shore: Shingle beach   
 
Off site Quantity Quantity / Effect 
 Freshwater: freshwater 
reservoir 
  
 Freshwater: pond/lake   
 Freshwater: river   
 Freshwater: stream/tributary   
 Inland: arable land/ crops/ 
vineyards/ orchards 
  
 Inland: grassland/ pasture/ 
meadow 
  
 Inland: marsh/ reedbeds   
 Inland: metropolitan 
development 
  
 Inland: moor/ heathland/ upland 
vegetation 
  
165 
 
 Inland: Parkland/ common land   
 Inland: Rural development   
 Inland: Urban development   
 Inland: Woodland; 
predominantly or totally natural 
  
 Inland: Woodland; 
predominantly or totally 
plantation 
  
 Offshore: Estuary   
 Offshore: Saline lagoon   
 Offshore: Sea/ seabed   
 Others   
 Shore: Rocky shore   
 Shore: Salt-marsh / mud-flats   
 Shore: Sand / dunes/  dune 
slacks 
  
 Shore: Shingle beach   
 
Cost 
 
On site Cost in Euro Quantity / Effects 
 Material losses   
 Others   
 Response, cleanup, restoration 
costs 
  
 
Off site Cost in Euro Quantity / Effects 
 Material losses   
 Others   
 Response, cleanup, restoration 
costs 
  
 
Disruption 
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On site Quantity Quantity / Effects 
 Infrastructure 
(telecommunication, roads, 
railways, waterways, air 
transport etc) 
  
 Nearby factories, offices, small 
shops 
  
 Nearby residence, hotels   
 Others   
 Other places of public assembly   
 School, hospitals, instaurations   
 Utilities (gas, water, electricity 
etc) 
  
 
Off site Quantity Quantity / Effects 
 Infrastructure 
(telecommunication, roads, 
railways, waterways, air 
transport etc) 
  
 Nearby factories, offices, small 
shops 
  
 Nearby residence, hotels   
 Others   
 Other places of public assembly   
 School, hospitals, instaurations   
 Utilities (gas, water, electricity 
etc) 
  
 
Emergency response 
 
 
 
Emergency response Quantity Quantity / Effects 
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 Evacuation   
 Off-site external services   
 On-site external services   
 Others   
 Sheltering   
 
Remedial measure Quantity Quantity / Effects 
 Decontamination   
 Other   
 Restoration   
 
 
 
Theme of lessons learned 
 Causes – External 
 Causes - Human  
 Causes – Organizational 
 Causes – Plant/ equipment 
 Emergency response 
 Others 
Lessons Learned 
 
 
Attachment Section 
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Appendix V: Selection criteria for THERP tables 
 
Action type 
Corresponding 
THERP tables 
THERP description Rationale for selection 
Monitoring 
equipment from 
field (M) 
Table 20-27, 
item (4) 
Table to estimate the probabilities that the basic 
walk-around inspection (after 4 days) will fail to 
detect a particular deviant indication of equipment 
outside the control room within 30 days, given 
one inspection per shift for three shifts per day. 
Assumed that no written procedures are used. 
Basic walk around table has been selected since 
monitoring in chemical process industry is usually 
performed by a walk-around carried out by an 
operator. Item (4) has been selected based on expert 
judgment. 
Monitoring/ 
operating equipment 
from control room 
(A) 
Table 20-11, item 
(1) & item (2) 
Table to estimate the probabilities for errors of 
commission in check-reading displays. Item (1) is 
related to digital indicators and item (2) is for 
analog meters with easily seen limit marks. 
The specific table has been selected because 
operations are related to control room and 
corresponding table can provide the closest estimate 
to the actions considered in this action type. 
Communication (C) 
Table 20-7, item 
(2) & item (3) 
Table to estimate the probability of errors of 
omission per item of instruction when use of 
written procedures is specified. Item (2) 
corresponds to when procedures with checkoff 
provision are correctly used for long list > 10 
items. Item (3) when procedures without checkoff 
provisions are used for short list < 10 items. 
Procedures without check off provisions for short 
list < 10 items has been selected to represent the 
communication errors in chemical process industry. 
Manual tasks on-
field (F) 
Table 20-13, item 
(4) 
Table to estimate the failure probability for 
selection errors of locally operated valves. Item 
(4) represents the unclearly, ambiguously 
labelled, part of group of a group of two or more 
that are similar in one of the following: size and 
shape, state or presence of tags. 
The selection errors table has been selected to 
represent the manual tasks on-field tasks since 
number of times selection errors have been observed 
during this action class. Furthermore, valves are 
usually grouped together in process industry for 
certain operations. Hence, corresponding table and 
item can provide the required correspondence. 
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Reporting (R) 
Table 20-22, item 
(9) 
Table to estimate the probability that a checker 
will fail to detect errors made by others. Item (9) 
represent the checking status of equipment if that 
status affects one’s safety when performing the 
tasks. 
This table has been selected to represent the 
reporting based on the assumption that whenever 
checker/ operator detects the problem, he will 
certainly report the problem. 
 
Diagnostic: 
Monitoring (M) 
Table 20-22, item 
(4) 
Table to estimate that a checker will fail to detect 
errors made by others. Item (4) representing those 
checking operations that involve active 
participation, such as special measurements. This 
table applies to cases during the normal 
operations. 
This table has been selected to represent the 
supervisor’s failure probability in the process 
industry. Due to possible complexity of supervisor’s 
tasks item (4) has been selected. 
Diagnostic: Control 
room action (A) 
Table 20-2, item 
(2) 
Table to estimate the failure probabilities for rule-
based actions by control room personnel after 
diagnosis of an abnormal events. This is for the 
CR crew rather than one individual. 
The corresponding action class is representing the 
failure during CR actions following an abnormal 
situation therefore the considered THERP table and 
the item can provide a high relevance. 
Diagnostic: Manual 
tasks on-field (F) 
Table 20-16 item 
(6) 
Table to modify the error probabilities for the 
effects of stress and experience levels. Item (6) 
corresponds to the step-by-step tasks for a novice 
operator. 
In order to select this table, it has been assumed that 
following an abnormal situation, stress level is also 
increase. Therefore, corresponding table multiplier 
(i.e. ×10) has been used for maximum affect to 
modify probability of normal manual tasks on- field. 
The conservative multiplier has been used which is 
for a novice operator. 
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Appendix VI: Piping and instrumentation diagrams, used in case study 
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